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Abstract 
Public Private Partnerships (PPP) have come to be preferred by governments for 
infrastructure development over traditional procurement. PPP is seen as the answer to 
many shortcomings of traditional procurement. Despite the complex nature of a PPP 
procurement process, governments around the world are emphasising and promoting 
competition within the procurement process. Competition is recognised as a significant 
element in the abundance of academic literature. Competition in the procurement process 
leads to desirable results for the procuring authority, by achieving value for money, 
encouraging innovation and promoting efficiency. Nevertheless, there is evidence that 
competition is still lacking within the PPP procurement process, so the idea of obtaining 
efficiency from the private sector may not be fully realised.  
This thesis first examines the procurement process from the global practice, and the 
integration of competition within the complexity of PPP. It then focuses on analysing the 
less known Malaysian PPP procurement process and the competition organised within its 
procurement process. A case study was conducted on the Malaysian Public Private 
Partnership Unit, Unit Kerjasama Awam Swasta (UKAS), to investigate the manner of 
competition incorporated within PPP in Malaysia. UKAS is the central agency responsible 
for facilitating and coordinating PPP implementation in Malaysia. The case study was 
generated from a combination of thirteen semi-structured interviews and multiple 
document reviews to address the research objectives. Content analysis was adopted to 
examine the interview transcripts and documents. Nvivo was later used to manage the 
coding process. 
Based on the empirical findings, in its effort to make the country’s PPP programme a 
success, UKAS has been flexible in its implementation, with less emphasis on 
incorporating competition within the procurement process. UKAS, however, still manages 
to procure infrastructure using PPP for the reasons for adopting PPP. This result in 
inconsistencies in UKAS governance on procurement process. Where the findings 
illustrate that value for money can be achieved by other means, the researcher concludes 
that competition involves more than achieving value for money; it can also be used as a 
procedural barrier, hence achieving good governance.  
xiii 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
There have been rapid increases over recent years in the use of Public Private Partnerships 
(PPP) in place of traditional procurement. PPP can be identified as a procurement which 
involves cooperation between the public and private sectors to achieve a common goal 
(Koppenjan, 2005; Hodge & Greve, 2009; Kwak et al., 2009; Petersen, 2011a). PPP has 
been used by governments around the world as an alternative approach to the traditional 
procurement methods (Ball et al., 2000; Eaton & Akbiyikli, 2005; Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; 
Parker, 2009; Burger & Hawkesworth, 2011), due to the benefits gained from private sector 
participation: alternative financing (Ball et al., 2000; Yescombe, 2007; Dewulf et al., 2012; 
The World Bank, 2014); positive impact on quality and efficiency (Clive, 2003; Murphy, 
2008; Son, 2012; World Bank Institute, 2012); and providing value for money (Yescombe, 
2007; HM Treasury, 2008a; World Bank Institute, 2012). Despite its advantages, PPP has 
been the subject of numerous studies discussing whether it really is of benefit to the 
taxpayer and other stakeholders. Holistically, PPP has been discussed and investigated 
from all angles in many fields such as political science (Hayllar & Wettenhall, 2010; 
Gawel, 2011; Siddiquee, 2011); the law (Kalbe, 2005; Tvarnø, 2006; Burnett, 2009; 
Andersen et al., 2010); public administration (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011; Chen et 
al., 2013); and accounting (Heald, 2003; Asenova & Beck, 2010). 
Nevertheless, where most studies’ objectives were to understand the nature of PPP and its 
positive outcomes (Eaton & Akbiyikli, 2005; Hardcastle et al., 2005; Koppenjan, 2005; 
Clifton & Duffield, 2006; Smyth & Edkins, 2007), there are also opinions on the 
drawbacks of PPP and its disadvantages. For example, the total cost of development can be 
higher since the cost of capital borrowings by the private sector is much higher than that by 
the public sector (Ball et al., 2000; Spackman, 2002; Parker & Hartley, 2003). Doubts have 
been expressed by supporters of public ownership on the role of changing values between 
public authority and the private sector, given the nature of the private sector as a business 
entity which operates mainly for profit (Regan, et al., 2011). PPP also permits private 
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companies to increase their authority in the government’s decision-making process and 
policy development (Whitfield, 2001). 
1.2  Background of the Research 
There is no shortage of definitions of PPP in the literature. It has been identified as a tool 
and strategy for governments around the world to procure infrastructure and services 
(Public Accounts Committee, 2006; Kwak et al., 2009). Generally, what differentiates PPP 
from other traditional forms of procurement is the single contract used for the whole 
development, compared to different contract arrangements for works, maintenance and 
operations. The bundling of works in a PPP contract explains the very long-term contract 
period, normally up 20 to 30 years or more (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; Gillard, 2008; Parker, 
2009; Reeves, 2013). Under PPP arrangements, governments are no longer seen as 
providing infrastructure to the public, but as buying services from the private sector (Eaton 
& Akbiyikli, 2005).  
PPP encourages the involvement of the private sector in providing infrastructure to varying 
and increasing degrees: funding; planning; designing; and operating and maintaining the 
infrastructure. This is especially so in the case of private funding (Hodge, 2004), an 
innovation which has achieved enhanced value for money for the tax payer. Input from the 
private sector partner from the early stages of the project through the whole life cycle of an 
infrastructure development is essential to guarantee value for money. PPP and sub-
procurement methods such as Private Finance Initiatives (PFI), Build Transfer Operate 
(BTO), Design Build Operate Maintain (DBOM) and Design Build Finance Operate 
(DBFO) have been successfully used by developed countries such as the UK, Australia and 
the US in procuring services and infrastructure (Kumaraswamy & Zhang, 2001; Siddiquee, 
2011; Zhang & Chen, 2013).  
Within the context of Malaysia, the attraction of features such as optimising government 
debt and/or expenditure, risk sharing and gaining value for money has led to PPP being 
endorsed by the government as one of the best means of procurement for infrastructure 
projects (Bernama, 2010). The demand for infrastructure delivery is vast in Malaysia, due 
to the rapidly expanding economy and the Asian urbanisation boom (Man, 2013; Llanto et 
al., 2015). To facilitate the country’s growth, since 1956 Malaysia has phased its economic 
development in five-year cyclical plans. The Tenth Malaysia Plan was announced in June 
2010. Following the outline in this Plan, the government introduced the Economic 
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Transformation Programme (ETP), a determined, detailed programme to improve and 
reform the country’s economy and ensure the transformation of Malaysia into a developed 
nation through certain identified sectors. Under this programme, the role of the private 
sector is crucial in terms of the required contributions, as well as participation in 
implementation of the ETP, particularly in delivering services and infrastructure to the 
people. An estimated 92% of the funding for the key areas identified in the ETP will be 
supported by the private sector with the government assisting in facilitating the delivery of 
public services through its regulatory actions (Prime Minister’s Department, 2011).  
Malaysian experience of working with the private sector in infrastructure development 
began with the incorporated programme and privatisation in the 1980’s. Benefitting from 
the results of the successful privatisation programme in providing infrastructure, the 
government introduced the PFI as an enhancement to its privatisation programme. Later, it 
introduced PPP to continue the special relationship with the private sector experienced 
through privatisation and PFI. In spite of a long history of evolution of PPP in Malaysia, 
the current mode of PPP and its practice of competition is less understood. Existing 
literature on PPP activities in Malaysia focuses on the value for money of PPP (Khan et al., 
2010; Ismail et al., 2011, 2012; Ismail, 2013a), risk management in PPP (Takim et al., 
2009), Critical Success Factor (CSF), challenges in implementing PPP, drivers of PPP 
implementation (Ismail, 2013b, 2014; Ismail & Haris, 2014b) rather than the procurement 
process of PPP and implementation of competition mechanism in depth. Rahman et al. 
(2014) and Zainon et al. (2012) discussed the procurement process of Malaysian PPP, 
although their research was based on a review of the UK procurement process. Another 
recent article by Rashid et al. (2016) dedicates a sub-section to the Malaysian PPP 
procurement process, with the suggestion of referring to the guidelines published by the 
Malaysian PPP unit.  
Despite the vision and targets of the Malaysian government for good governance of the 
procurement regime, there are still weaknesses that have a negative impact on the 
campaign and efforts by the government. Nambiar (2009) suggested that Malaysian 
privatisation lacks good governance, including competition. Nevertheless, currently 
Malaysia acknowledges the importance of greater competition to entice private investors, 
thus striving to improve current policies by removing barriers to competition and creating a 
more liberalised market (PEMANDU, 2010).   
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1.3  Rationale of Research 
According to Burger and Hawkesworth (2011), there are many factors contributing to the 
success of PPP, one of which is competition amongst private parties. Competition is also 
deemed as the most important determinant to achieve value for money, apart from risk 
allocation (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). They insisted that competition in PPP will lead to 
better value for money. Competition encourages the competing parties to be more 
innovative by efficiently using available resources and improving the quality of offers with 
the incentive of winning the concessions. In addition, competition safeguards the interest of 
the taxpayers (HM Treasury, 2008a). An effective competition policy in PPP also increases 
the propensity of attracting the private sector to invest in PPP programmes. As PPP is by its 
nature a long-term contract amounting to a huge amount of money, PPP is a magnet for 
potential misconduct of the procurement process to satisfy political or business interests. 
According to Amaral et al. (2009), most governments insist on competition being upheld in 
PPP. Without competition and transparency, PPP may be used as a mechanism to legalise 
the awarding of contracts or projects to a favoured company or party. Therefore the role of 
government is vital in ensuring and stimulating competition in the PPP procurement 
process (Office of Fair Trading, 2004).  
Unfortunately, despite awareness of the importance of competition in PPP, Zou et al., 
(2008) and Kwak et al., (2009) stated that current causes of PPP failure are contributed to 
by the lack of competition in the procurement process. Given PPP’s huge and complex 
characteristics, there is evidence that competition is ignored during bidding exercises, with 
the result that obtaining efficiency from the private sector may not be fully realised (Pollitt 
et al., 2002; Bloomfield, 2003). A lack of competition within the procurement process has 
led to: minimal innovation (National Audit Office & Infrastructure UK, 2010); unethical 
decision making (Hassim, 2012); corruption (Estache & Iimi, 2008; Anderson et al., 2011); 
abuse of diplomatic and political power (Søreide, 2006); and failure to achieve value for 
money (Dudkin & Välilä, 2005; The World Bank, 2014). Based on Ireland’s experience 
using PPP, Reeves (2013a) listed competition as the one element that needs to be improved 
in order to achieve economic efficiency and the social welfare offered by PPP.  
Although the procurement process of selecting a private partner is vital in order to achieve 
value for money, there is a gap in organising the competitive environment for awarding 
PPP contracts (United Nations, 2008). There are different views about the method by 
which a private partner should be chosen, especially concerning whether PPP concession 
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should be awarded in the same manner as other public procurement. Pouncey and Brown 
(2014) suggested that the open tender best suits a simple non-complex contract. A complex 
contract arrangement such as PPP might not be suitable in achieving the best competitive 
environment in an open tender procedure, since PPP usually involves a large-scale project 
(European Commission, 2003); high administration costs (Trybus, 2006); a minimum 
numbers of bidders to ensure that competition is intense (Shaoul et al., 2008); and the need 
for negotiation between parties (SIGMA, 2011).  
Another ardently debated anti-competitive practice in PPP globally is the unsolicited 
proposal (Hodges & Dellacha, 2007; Andersen et al., 2010; Verma, 2010). In PPP, an 
unsolicited proposal is an attempt by a private company to submit a new idea or initiative 
in return for the exclusive award behind closed doors from the contracting authority. The 
practice of unsolicited proposals is acceptable in certain countries where it can be a source 
of innovation, especially where public needs go unnoticed by the government (Meyer, 
2012). On the other hand, some countries have barred the practice for its anti-competitive 
conduct and lack of transparency (UNESCAP, 2010). There are also legal concerns about 
the proposal’s intellectual property rights (Søreide, 2006). 
With the introduction of PPP, Malaysia is creating a private-sector led economy. The 
challenge faced by the government is making PPP an attractive investment opportunity in 
the eyes of potential investors (Economic Planning Unit, 2010). Malaysia has 
acknowledged the importance of greater competition to entice private investors, striving to 
improve current policies by removing barriers to greater competition and creating a more 
liberalised market (PEMANDU, 2010). Due to the Malaysian ethnicity-based affirmative-
action policy which gives preferential treatment to the Bumiputera (the majority Malay 
ethnic group), the government has a huge task in attracting private investors to participate 
in PPP. The Bumiputera policy was originally developed to achieve national unity by 
narrowing the economic imbalance between different ethnic groups in Malaysia. This 
policy may be seen as a restriction on the competition exercise among existing players and 
potential entrants to Malaysian PPP. 
In response to the importance of competition in the PPP procurement process and the effort 
of the Malaysian government to sustain improvement, the need arises for this research, for 
several reasons. First, the Malaysian context offers a unique perspective of a mid-ranking 
emerging economy and developing country that has an ethnicity-based affirmative-action 
policy but at the same time desires to achieve greater economic growth through investment 
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and co-operation with the private sector by promoting PPP. Second, as little is known 
about the competition practice within the Malaysian PPP procurement process, the research 
intends to analyse global and Malaysian PPP practice and the competition incorporated 
within the PPP procurement process. 
1.4  Aim and Objectives of the Study 
The research aim is to enhance the procurement process for infrastructure delivery in 
Malaysian PPP by incorporating competition. Five objectives are developed to fulfil the 
research aim:  
i. to understand and analyse the PPP procurement process with particular
reference to competition;
ii. to evaluate the challenges to incorporating competition within PPP
procurement process globally;
iii. to appraise and synthesise the PPP procurement process with particular
reference to competition adopted by the Malaysian Government for
infrastructure delivery;
iv. to investigate the relevance of competition within the PPP procurement
process in Malaysia;
v. to develop and validate a competition-based PPP framework which targets
improvement for Malaysian PPP.
1.5  Scope of the Research 
PPP is a multidisciplinary subject, used by public authorities around the world in various 
sectors. It has been adopted in the health sector, education, defence, housing, 
transportation, telecommunication, tourism and supply of energy (Asian Development 
Bank, 2012). In these sectors, PPP is used to procure services and/or infrastructure. It is 
important to highlight that the current research focuses on the adoption of PPP by the 
public authority to procure infrastructure in Malaysia. Infrastructure can be categorised as 
economic or social. The former includes sectors such as transport, utilities, communication, 
and renewable energy. The provision of a social infrastructure is one of the government’s 
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responsibilities in serving community interests, such as educational, healthcare, social and 
welfare facilities (Inderst, 2010). 
Various sub-procurement of PPP have been adopted around the world (see section 2.3). 
This study does not intend to cover each of these sub-procurements. Nevertheless, since the 
development of PPP is linked to privatisation and PFI, these elements are emphasised. 
Given the claim of lack of competition within the procurement process, this research seeks 
to study the competition element within the PPP procurement process, both globally and in 
the context of Malaysia’s infrastructure delivery. 
1.6  Research Process 
To achieve the aims and objectives of this research is challenging. To satisfy the objectives, 
a qualitative paradigm is adopted to focus on understanding the practice globally and to 
discover the Malaysian practice by drawing on the experience of involved individuals. The 
research is divided into several stages: the literature review, case study and framework 
development. These stages are illustrated in Figure 1.1. The literature review 
comprehensively examines the concept of PPP and leads to identification of the research 
problem. In particular, it appraises the concept of competition and its relevance within PPP, 
to address research objectives 1 and 2 outlined in section 1.4. 
Research objectives 3 and 4 are addressed by a case study, designed to study the UKAS 
procurement process and the competition element incorporated within it. UKAS is the PPP 
unit set up by the Malaysian government. The case study combines interviews and a 
document review as the sources of evidence. Primary data was gathered from a total of 
thirteen semi-structured interviews with participants chosen for their engagement and 
involvement with the UKAS procurement process. The aim of these interviews was to 
scrutinise the experience and knowledge of individuals who have first-hand experience of 
Malaysian PPP. The transcripts of the interviews were organised and analysed 
methodically. The final stage is the development and validation of the frameworks, from a 
synthesis of the results of the literature review and the case study. A detailed discussion of 
the research methodology and methods is presented in Chapter 4.  
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Figure 1.1 – Research Process 
1.7 Significance of the Research 
Since the use of PPP in the early days (from privatisation to PFI), Malaysia has benefited 
economically and socially. The government declared the privatisation programme a 
success, having implemented 698 PPP projects from initiation until December 2014. Since 
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procurement process with particular 
reference to competition 
RO 3 –to appraise and synthesise the 
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Malaysian Government for infrastructure 
delivery 
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competition within the PPP procurement 
process in Malaysia 
RO 5 – develop and validate a 
competition based PPP framework 
which targets improvement for 
Malaysian PPP. 
Identification of research problem 
RO 1 – analyse PPP procurement 
process globally and ith particular
reference to co petition
Literature Review
RO 2 – evaluate the challenges to
advocate competition within PPP
procurement processes globally
RO 2 – evaluate the challenges to 
incorporating competition within PPP 
procurement process globally 
Literature R
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privatisation, the government managed to save £37.81 billion of capital expenditure and 
£1.8 billion of government operating expenditure (Hamsa, 2015).  
Nevertheless, the good reputation of PPP programmes has been smeared by critiques and 
allegations. Post-privatisation saw allegations that the concessionaire companies were 
making supra-profits from the government over a prolonged period, due to the lopsided 
nature of the agreement. There have also been allegations of abuse of power by the ruling 
government with a lack of competitive bidding in awarding contracts (Jomo and Syn, 2003; 
Tan, 2008; Wang et al., 2012). These allegations might deter private investors from 
participating in PPP programmes.  
PPP must be seen as an attractive investment opportunity rather than merely a project to the 
private sector. Outcomes of the research may be used to indicate continuous effort by the 
government for good governance of public procurement and to suggest improvements to 
the current system if necessary. Further contributions of the research are presented in 
section 7.3. 
1.8  Structure of the Thesis 
This research is structured in seven chapters. 
Chapter 1 introduces the research. The nature of the research is explained through an 
overview of the background, the research problem, and the aim and objectives. The content 
of this chapter guides the reader in understanding the progress of the research. 
Chapter 2 presents the findings of the literature review on PPP, including the practice of 
PPP and the diversity offered by the procurement globally. The chapter also looks at the 
evolution of PPP in the UK, which has been identified as the most advance practitioner. 
The background and evolution of PPP in Malaysia is then examined, proving to be similar 
to that in the UK. 
Chapter 3 is a literature review of the main subject of this study, concentrating on the best 
practice of competition within the PPP procurement process. The success of the European 
Union (EU) in organising competition within the procurement process among the many 
member states is highly regarded and is studied further in this chapter. The challenges 
faced by PPP practitioners in advocating competition within the PPP procurement process 
1 Conversion is based on July 2016 where 1 Malaysian Ringgit is equal to 0.19 British Pound. 
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are also investigated. The chapter ends with an overview of the Malaysian practice, as 
recorded in the literature. 
Chapter 4 explains the research methodology. It discusses the selection of the philosophy, 
research strategy, data collection methods, data analysis and relevant instruments that 
facilitate meeting the aim and objectives of the research. The chapter also discusses the 
case study design and procedures. 
Chapter 5 presents the outcome of the case study, comprising the findings from the 
document review and extracts from the interviews. The text from the interviews was 
analysed using content analysis, with the focus on discovering and understanding the 
Malaysian PPP practice, in particular the procurement process and competition. 
Chapter 6 discusses the case study. It provides in-depth discussion of the data analysed 
which gives valuable meaning to the findings. Within the Malaysia context, competition 
within the procurement process is demonstrated as vital in achieving benefits in addition to 
economic ones. The chapter presents the proposed frameworks which address the aim and 
objectives of the research, and ends by describing the validation of the frameworks.  
Chapter 7 is the final chapter of this thesis. The research objectives are revisited, with a 
summary of how the study was conducted and what it has achieved. The chapter also 
describes the value of this research to the literature and to industry. Limitations and 
recommendations for future research are suggested. 
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Chapter Two - Literature Review: Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
2.1 Introduction 
PPP has become a trend worldwide for governments to procure services and infrastructure, 
and there is no sign that the trend is going to stop soon. This is reflected by the continuing 
use of PPP today. This chapter reviews the essential literature that forms the foundation of 
this research. The research context and focus are provided for clarity. Referring to both 
scholarly articles and government publication as main sources, the literature review is 
divided into two main themes: PPP (Chapter 2) and competition (Chapter 3).  
This chapter commences with an overview of the concept and practice of PPP globally. It 
includes discussion of PPP’s characteristics, reasons to employ PPP and the benchmarking 
of PPP practice. It focuses on the history and progress of PPP in the UK, identified as the 
pioneer of PPP in the modern world and currently a leader in its practice, and then 
evaluates the initiation and progress of PPP in Malaysia. Although PPP implementation in 
Malaysia is still in its infancy, the country has a long history of working with the private 
sector to develop the nation. The chapter ends with a summary of findings. 
2.2 Understanding PPP 
Thirty years ago, there was great excitement over a new procurement. Although three 
decades may seem like a long time, the pioneer PPP ventures are now on the verge of 
contractual expiry, as most PPP agreements were designed to be long term,  from 25 to 30 
years (Tvarnø, 2006; KPMG International, 2007; Hall, 2008; HM Treasury, 2008a; United 
Nations, 2008; Chinyio et al., 2009; Chong & Callender, 2009; Takim et al., 2009; Cheung 
et al., 2012).  
Despite the widely publicised use of the term in recent years to epitomise the relationship 
between the public and private sectors, some scholars have argued that this relationship can 
be traced back to the 18th century (Kumaraswamy & Zhang, 2001; Vining et al., 2004; 
Hodge & Greve, 2007; Engel et al., 2010). However, PPP has only been used extensively 
for infrastructure projects since the 1990s (UNCTAD, 2013). 
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Despite the fact that it has been around in its present form for 30 years, there is still no 
single agreed legal definition of PPP (European Commission, 2003; 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2005; Public Accounts Committee, 2006; Chinyio et al., 2009; 
Andersen et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2012; World Bank Institute, 2012; UNCTAD, 2013). 
With different types of PPP arrangements, a possible explanation for this diversity is that 
every nation has tailored the concept of PPP to suit its own needs and complexities. 
Therefore, as suggested by Perry (1998), this research examined common global elements 
of PPP approaches in developed and developing countries by contracting authorities. Perry 
(1998) also warned that definitions by other researchers might be influenced by trivial 
personal beliefs. Table 2.1 illustrates salient common characteristics of PPP. Although 
there is no unified definition of PPP, Table 2.1 highlights common elements that are 
exploited by government organisations and agencies in approaching PPP. Under the rubric 
of PPP, the majority of organisations emphasise the synergy of bundling elements of PPP 
which include the maintenance and operation of infrastructure, long-term contracts and risk 
allocation. The key distinct features of PPP, as opposed to conventional procurement, are 
the distribution of significant risks and responsibilities of parties, ownership and the 
conceptualisation of the built asset and the source of project finance/funding (Burger & 
Hawkesworth, 2011). In PPP, the private sector partner’s role is enhanced and is more 
actively involved in all the stages from planning and development up to maintenance of the 
completed facility. In addition, due to the bundling of contractual arrangements for the 
services in all of these stages, PPP is more complex than conventional procurement. 
For the purpose of this study, PPP is defined as a partnership arrangement between the 
public and private sectors to provide infrastructure, where the private sector designs, 
develops, finances, maintains, and operates the infrastructure over a prolonged period, with 
payment by the public sector or end user for the services provided. To ensure clear 
definitions of each party’s rights and obligations, the parties involved need to enter into a 
legal contract with the aim of procuring infrastructure by maximising expertise and 
innovation through partnership. This contractual arrangement should not to be confused 
with more conventional affiliations between the public and private sectors to provide 
infrastructure.
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Table 2.1 –Global Common Elements of PPP 
Source Major PPP Elements Notes 
Contractual 
relationship 
Long  
term 
Funding 
by private 
sector 
Allocation 
of risk 
Innovation Asset 
ownership 
by public 
sector 
Involve 
maintenance 
and 
operation 
Public 
sector to 
achieve 
efficiency 
Rewards/incentives 
to private sector 
partner 
To reduce public 
sector's 
debt/surplus/deficit 
 
United Nations 
Conference on 
Trades And 
Development 
(UNCTAD) (2013) 
๏ ๏  ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ 
a. Public financial 
institution plays 
an important 
role on funding. 
Commission of 
the European 
Communities 
(2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏  ๏    
a. Relationship 
can be 
unilateral not 
contractual 
b. Funding may 
come from 
other sources 
including public 
fund 
 
United Kingdom, 
HM Treasury 
(2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏  ๏ ๏ ๏   ๏ 
a. Payments for 
incentives or 
reward may be 
charged direct 
to end user; for  
example, tolls 
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Source Major PPP Elements Notes 
Contractual 
relationship 
Long 
term 
Funding 
by private 
sector 
Allocation 
of risk 
Innovation Asset 
ownership 
by public 
sector 
Involve 
maintenance 
and 
operation 
Public 
sector to 
achieve 
efficiency 
Rewards/incentives 
to private sector 
partner 
To reduce public 
sector's 
debt/surplus/deficit 
Meyer (2012) – 
The National 
Council of Public-
Private 
Partnerships 
๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ 
a. Faster project
delivery
Hawkesworth & 
Marcel, (2011) - 
Organisation for 
Economic Co-
operation and 
Development 
(OECD) 
๏   ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ 
a. Rewards in the
form of profit
b. Ownership
depends on
model
Fiscal Affairs 
Department 
International 
Monetary Fund 
(IMF) (2004) 
๏ ๏   ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ 
a. Acknowledges
different types
of PPP
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Source Major PPP Elements Notes 
Contractual 
relationship 
Long 
term 
Funding 
by private 
sector 
Allocation 
of risk 
Innovation Asset 
ownership 
by public 
sector 
 
Involve 
maintenance 
and 
operation 
Public 
sector to 
achieve 
efficiency 
Rewards/incentives 
to private sector 
partner 
To reduce public 
sector's 
debt/surplus/deficit 
 
 
Public-Private 
Partnership Unit 
(UKAS) Malaysia 
(2009) 
๏ ๏ ๏ ๏  ๏ ๏  ๏ ๏ 
a. Payments for 
incentives or 
reward may be 
a charge direct 
to end user  
 
 
 
Felsinger & 
Miranda, (2008) – 
Asian 
Development 
Bank (ADB) 
 
๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏  ๏ ๏ ๏  
a. Acknowledges 
relationship but 
does not 
mention 
contractual 
b. Acknowledges 
private funding 
as private 
investment 
c. Rewards in the 
form of profit 
 
European 
Commission (EC) 
(2003) ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏ 
 
Ministry of 
Finance 
Singapore, (2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 ๏ ๏ ๏ ๏  ๏ ๏   
a. Acknowledges 
relationship but 
does not 
mention 
contractual 
 
 
 
16 
 
Source Major PPP Elements Notes 
Contractual 
relationship 
Long 
term 
Funding 
by private 
sector 
Allocation 
of risk 
Innovation Asset 
ownership 
by public 
sector 
Involve 
maintenance 
and 
operation 
 
Public 
sector to 
achieve 
efficiency 
Rewards/incentives 
to private sector 
partner 
To reduce public 
sector's 
debt/surplus/deficit 
 
 
European PPP 
Expertise Centre 
(EPEC), (2011) 
๏ ๏ ๏ ๏     ๏  
a. Payments for 
incentives or 
reward may be 
charged direct 
to end user  
 
 
Infrastructure 
Australia, (2008) 
 
๏ ๏  ๏   ๏ ๏ ๏  
a. Receive 
payments once 
commenced 
17 
 
2.3 Partnership Arrangement in PPP 
Contrary to the traditional role of the government in providing infrastructure for the people, 
the role has in some ways been shifted to the private sector in the form of PPP. In PPP, the 
public sector or the government is purely the purchaser of a service provided by the private 
sector. This change of role was initially driven by governments trying to reduce their fiscal 
debt level and spending, thus leading them to utilise private sector funding in the form of 
capital investment (Adair et al., 2011). Furthermore, the private sector is seen as being able to 
deliver things efficiently in order to achieve returns as a business (Alexandersson & Hultén, 
2006; Boles et al., 2013). In return, the private sector receives return from leasing payments of 
the built infrastructure or direct payment from the user; for example, toll charges. 
 
Another reasons why there is no common universal definition of PPP is that PPP is a very 
broad generic term, embracing a wide range of partnership arrangements. These partnership 
arrangements are categorised according to the agreement on risk allocation, the extent of the 
parties’ participation, the responsibilities and ownership of the infrastructure (HM Treasury, 
2012). No single preferred partnership arrangement is applied to every project or development 
(European Commission, 2003). The application of partnership arrangements depends on the 
particular needs, requirements and suitability of specific infrastructure developments, as each 
model has its own strong and weak points. Another source of confusion is the different labels 
employed by different countries for similar contractual arrangements (Wang et al., 2012). 
This research identifies and synthesises those PPP partnership arrangements commonly used 
by multiple organisations for infrastructure delivery, as shown in Table 2.2. Although a 
variety of terms is used by multiple organisations, there are common characteristics that 
distinguish PPP from traditional procurement. Based on the different partnership agreements 
listed in Table 2.2, it can be observed that the differences between PPP and traditional 
procurement lies in funding sources, responsibilities and ownership of the completed 
infrastructure. The different partnership arrangements of PPP have been developed with 
different objectives in mind, so governments are not short of choices when opting for PPP. 
With an appropriate partnership arrangement, PPP can bring the maximum benefit to the 
development and the stakeholders.  
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Table 2.2 – Types of Partnership Agreement 
Source Partnership Arrangement Delivery Method 
Eggers & Dovey 
(2007) for 
Deloitte 
Build Transfer (BT):  Also known as Design and Build (DB);
 Based on the public sector's statement of need, the
private partner will design and build the facility;
 The completed facility will be operated and maintained by
the public sector.
Build Lease Transfer 
(BLT): 
 Based on the public sector's statement of need, the
private partner will design and build the facility;
 Upon completion, the facility will be leased to the public
sector until the lease is fully paid;
 Public sector will operate the facility during the lease
period;
 No additional cost for facility ownership transfer.
Build Transfer Operate 
(BTO): 
 Also known as Design Build Operate (DBO);
 Based on the public sector's statement of need, the
private partner will design and build the facility;
 Ownership by the public sector;
 Private partner will operate the facility.
Build Operate Transfer 
(BOT): 
 Also known as Design Build Operate Maintain (DBOM);
 Private partner is responsible for designing, constructing,
operating and maintaining the facility;
 Asset will transfer ownership once contract period is
complete.
Build Own Operate 
Transfer (BOOT): 
 Private partner will be awarded grant for financing,
designing, building and operating the facility;
 Asset will transfer ownership once contract period is
complete.
Build Own Operate (BOO):  A private entity will be awarded authorisation for
financing, designing, building, operating and maintaining
the facility;
 Ownership will remain with the private entity.
Design Build Finance 
Operate/Maintain (DBFO): 
 Private partner is responsible for financing, designing,
constructing, operating and maintaining the facility.
 Long-term agreement;
 Asset will transfer ownership once contract period is
complete.
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Table 2.2 (continued) - Types of Partnership Agreement 
Source Partnership Arrangement Delivery Method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United Nations 
(2008) 
Build Own Operate (BOO):  The private partner is responsible for financing, building 
and operating a facility; 
 Private sector owns the facility. There is no transfer of 
ownership of facility. 
 
Build Own Operate 
Transfer (BOOT): 
 A private entity will be awarded a franchise for financing, 
designing, building, operating the facility; 
 May charge end user for use of facility; 
 Asset will transfer ownership once contract period is 
complete. 
 
Build Operate Transfer 
(BOT): 
 Private partner is responsible for financing, designing, 
constructing and operating the facility; 
 Long-term concession; 
 Asset will transfer ownership once concession period is 
complete; 
 Similar to BOOT and BLOT except the ownership of asset. 
 
Build Lease Operate 
Transfer (BLOT): 
 A private entity will be awarded franchise for financing, 
designing, building, operating leased facility; 
 Charge end user for use of facility against payment of a 
rent 
 
Design Build Finance 
Operate (DBFO): 
 Private partner is responsible for financing, designing, 
constructing, operating and maintaining the facility; 
 Long-term agreement; 
 Asset will transfer ownership once contract period is 
complete. 
 
Finance only: 
 
 A private entity funds project, directly or using other 
financing mechanism; 
 Normally a financial institution; 
 Long-term lease or bond issue. 
 
Design Build (DB):  Private partner to design and build facility based on 
specific performance requirement by the public sector. 
 Turnkey basis with a fixed price 
 Argued as being a typical public works contract rather 
than one of PPP. 
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Table 2.2 (continued) - Types of Partnership Agreement 
Source Partnership Arrangement Delivery Method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal Affairs 
Department 
International 
Monetary Fund 
(IMF) (2004) 
Build Own Operate 
(BOO): 
 
 Private partner to design, build, own, develop, operate and 
manage facility based on specific performance 
requirement by the public sector; 
 No obligation to transfer ownership to public sector; 
 Variant of Design Build Finance Operate (DBFO) 
Build Develop Operate 
(BDO): 
 
Design Construct 
Manage Finance (DCMF): 
 
Buy Build Operate (BBO): 
 
 Private sector to buy/lease an existing facility from public 
sector; 
 Facility will be upgraded; 
 Private sector will operate; 
 No obligation to transfer ownership to public sector. 
 
Lease Develop Operate 
(LDO): 
 
Wrap Around Addition 
(WAA): 
 
Build Operate Transfer 
(BOT): 
 
 Private partner to design, build and operate facility;  
 Transfers ownership of facility once contract period over; 
 Private partner may rent or lease the facility from the 
public sector. Build Own Operate 
Transfer (BOOT): 
 
Build Rent Operate 
Transfer (BROT): 
Build Lease Operate 
Transfer (BLOT): 
 
Build Transfer Operate 
(BTO): 
 
The partnering arrangements listed in Table 2.2 was designed and subsequently evolved to 
reflect the context of a country/contracting organisation and the specific technical 
requirements of the project. In the UK, one of the earliest partnership arrangements was PFI 
(Demirag et al., 2011). According to Eaton and Akbiyikli (2005), PFI is a subset of PPP 
which is a generic term used for all partnerships which involve construction. Although using a 
different label, the elements of PFI match those of the PPP elements as described in Table 2.1. 
Nevertheless, given the different labels and definitions, Ismail (2009) concluded that PFI and 
PPP are different. However, she failed to understand that even though the labels are different, 
the contexts of both procurements are similar. This is supported by the explanation of HM 
Treasury (2008) which claims PPP as an improved version of PFI to meet new demands. Like 
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PPP, PFI involves the public sector as a service purchaser from the private sector for a 
specified time, usually long term with pre-set payment mechanisms (Eaton & Akbiyikli, 
2005). PFI is also seen as a financial scheme where private investment replaces traditional 
funding of traditional construction procurements by the public sector (HM Treasury, 2003). 
Others may debate whether PPP and PFI are two different items; however, in this research, 
PFI’s role as an important foundation for the creation of PPP is acknowledged. However, the 
research will focus on PPP and will not be used interchangeably with PFI, since according to 
Eaton and Akbiyikli (2005) PFI is a sub-set of PPP. In line with the definition embraced by 
this research in an earlier chapter, this research agrees that Design Build Finance Operate 
(DBFO) largely mirrors PPP as the arrangements require the private sector to design, develop, 
finance, maintain and operate the infrastructure over a prolonged period, in consideration of 
payment by the public sector or end user for the service provided. Figure 2.2 shows selected 
partnership arrangements with the level of private sector involvement to illustrate the changes 
in the public sector role under PPP. 
Low  Private Sector Involvement           High 
Figure 2.2 – Level of Private Sector Involvement 
Source: Kwak, Chih, & Ibbs, (2009) 
Referring to Figure 2.2, PPP has indeed changed the public procurement paradigm, 
encouraging the involvement of the private sector in providing infrastructure to varying 
degrees. Within PPP, the involvement of the private sector in funding, planning, designing, 
operating and maintaining an infrastructure has increased.  
2.4 Distinctive Diversity of PPP 
So why did governments shift to PPP? Many publications have discussed governments’ 
motivations, whether right or wrong, for adopting PPP (McQuaid & Scherrer, 2010). The 
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diverse features of PPP compared with traditional procurement have been recognised through 
theoretical research and actual case studies. Nonetheless, PPP has been designed to 
accommodate and allocate the needs of the public sector and the rewards for the private sector 
partner (European Commission, 2004; Chinyio et al., 2009; Ministry of Finance Singapore, 
2012). The motivation for PPP is therefore driven by the diversity offered by this type of 
procurement.  
2.4.1 Optimal Sharing of Responsibilities, Resources & Risk (3R) 
An essential objective of public procurement is to achieve efficiency (Akbiyikli et al., 2012). 
Enhanced efficiency could lead to further remuneration and profitable returns. In a 
competitive and profit-oriented environment, unlike the public sector the private sector works 
to obtain profit. Private sector entities are more creative and innovative in their approach to a 
task with less wastage of resources (Bovis, 2013). Hence, forming partnerships with the 
private sector increases efficiency by means of distributing responsibilities and risks to the 
most capable party.  
An infrastructure project or development involves activities which comprise responsibilities 
and risks for the parties. Their allocation means assigning them to the partner who is best able 
to manage them. One of the main conventional responsibilities of the public sector in public 
procurement is to provide funds for infrastructure development (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2005a). Under PPP, the selection of private financing and funding was always 
considered as a favourable option. The private partner is expected to explore untapped sources 
of funding and resources from financial institutions, which the public sector is unable to 
achieve. Utilising private capital allows cash-strapped countries to spread the cost of 
providing the infrastructure. This will benefit the public sector in terms of reducing public 
spending in direct recourse to public money since PPP projects are generally on a large scale 
and in need of large upfront funding. However, such private funding may increase the overall 
cost of development compared to exclusively public funding (Chinyio et al., 2009; Engel et 
al., 2010; Wang et al. 2012). Driven by profit or incentives from the investment, the private 
partner will work creatively around available resources to ensure cost effectiveness of the 
development to achieve revenue and hence profit. With a long-term contract in hand, the 
private partner is happy to receive a steady cash flow over time. Public funding or private 
capital investment will have implications for the development. It is best for the parties to 
decide the most appropriate selection by considering the project goal. 
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Demirag et al. (2011) identify four categories of risk that have to be dealt with in a PPP 
project: design and development; finance; operation; and ownership. The magnitude of the 
risks varies during different stages of PPP development. These risks should be allocated 
between the partners. Although there are no standard rules for distributing the risks, empirical 
approaches to risk allocation have been developed by various researchers to identify which 
party is best able to manage them (Bing et al., 2005; Wibowo & Alfen, 2013). The 
identification and allocation of potential risks is fundamental to realising the value for money 
achieved from PPP (Bing et al., 2005). Well equipped with advanced technology, 
management skills and construction ability, the private sector is seen as more capable in 
managing most of the risk and uncertainties. However, the public sector should be aware that 
shifting risk substantially to the private sector is not cheap (Dewatripont & Legros, 2005).  
2.4.2 Maximising Value for Public Stakeholders 
In an era where cash is king and time is gold, the public currently demands better value for 
money from public procurement. PPP offers the public sector an opportunity to deliver value 
for money better than by conventional procurement for its stakeholders (Chinyio et al., 2009). 
Value for the public stakeholders can be in different capacities. Nonetheless, PPP has 
constantly been associated with value for money.  
There are many definitions of value for money. Jomo et al. (2016) emphasise that value for 
money in the PPP context should refer to the cost and quality of the service obtained. As the 
cost of PPP is higher than for traditional procurement, the quality received should be at par. 
Heald (2003) proposed that value for money is built around efficiency and effectiveness. HM 
Treasury (2003) goes further, describing value for money as the optimum combination of 
whole-life cost and quality (or fitness for purpose) to meet the user requirement. This view is 
similar to that of Burger and Hawkesworth (2011) who characterise value for money as an 
optimal combination of quantity, quality, features and price expected over the whole of the 
project’s lifetime. In other words, value for money can be seen as the expectation of a buyer 
or stakeholders of the quality of the purchased product at the best price. Although 
expectations may differ based on the partnership agreements and consideration of many other 
factors, according to Infrastructure Australia (2008) PPP offers value for money through: 
a) Optimal risk transfer; 
b) Management synergies; 
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c) Encouraging innovation; 
d) Efficient asset utilisation; 
e) Integrated life cycle asset management. 
Most countries use value for money to justify PPP adoption with the concept of acquiring a 
better quality product with an economical design and cost-effective operation and 
maintenance, compared to the traditional procurement. PPP promotes early involvement of 
the private sector in the procurement process as a strategy to allow the private sector partner 
to utilise its proficiency in designing the whole life cycle of the infrastructure into a potential 
cost-saving development. This move also helps to minimise design risk and uncertainties 
(Felsinger & Miranda, 2008). This will lead to the creation of incentives for the private sector.  
Different approaches to ensure value for money have been adopted by countries. Grimsey and 
Lewis (2005) identified that these approaches nevertheless share similarities when comparing 
two procurements measured by the lowest cost offered. A common tool used globally is the 
Public Sector Comparator (PSC), where a comparison of cost is made between a traditional 
public financed procurement and a privately financed PPP (Ismail et al., 2012; Wang et al., 
2012). 
2.5 PPP Structure 
A typical PPP structure is considered as a more complex system than traditional procurement 
(UNESCAP, 2010; Wang et al., 2012). It was established for full integration with a single 
point of responsibility to accommodate the creation for exclusivity of the financing 
arrangement and the bundling of contract strategies. A transformation of traditional 
procurement to PPP saw the formation of Special Purpose Vehicles. A Special Purpose 
Vehicle is a legal entity established by a single company or consortium of companies with the 
responsibility of delivering the infrastructure development to a specified standard. There are 
also circumstances in which the Special Purpose Vehicle is established by the public sector 
(government-owned companies) (Jayaseelan & Tan, 2006; Wang et al., 2012) or a joint 
collaboration of public and private sectors (Alfen et al., 2009). The Special Purpose Vehicle 
holds the single point of responsibility and will be accountable entirely for the design, 
building, operating and maintaining of the completed infrastructure (European Commission, 
2003). Nevertheless, Special Purpose Vehicles generally sub-contract the construction, 
operating and maintaining works. A construction contract will be formed to deliver the 
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infrastructure development, and after completion an operation and maintenance contract will 
be formed to carry out the operation and maintenance work for a specified time. A typical 
PPP structure is illustrated as Figure 2.3.  
                       
Figure 2.3 –Typical PPP Structure 
Source: World Bank Institute (2012) 
As shown in Figure 2.3, the role of the Special Purpose Vehicles does not end there, but will 
normally, under the PPP agreement, be required to secure finance for the development and 
enter an agreement with the financial institution (Grimsey & Lewis, 2007; Yescombe, 2007). 
The financing of the project may be from mixed sources, single sourced from loans, in the 
form of investment from a private equity firm, or be a combination of different private equity 
firms that also be shareholders. Although receiving a much criticism in some countries, there 
are also facilitation funds or viability funds made available by the governments to attract the 
private investor’s participation in PPP and to kick-start the project (Aziz & Khaderi, 2010; 
Department of Economic Affairs, 2010; Wang et al., 2012; Yee, 2013).  
Although most of the significant responsibilities and risks are transferred to the Special 
Purpose Vehicle, the public sector as a purchaser still plays a critical role in providing and 
specifying clear requirements and output specifications for the infrastructure. However, the 
Special Purpose Vehicle should be given freedom in the delivery method to allow innovation 
and cost minimisation to happen. The public sector as the purchaser should also sustain a 
payment regime to the Special Purpose Vehicle as specified in the PPP agreement. Although 
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PPP relies heavily on the efficiency of the private sector, it is fundamental for the PPP to be 
well structured with clear obligations and rights of parties to create a mutually beneficial 
environment for all parties involved. 
2.6 PPP Globally 
The estimated cost needed for infrastructure development globally is massive. An 
approximate amount estimated by EY (2015) to meet the infrastructure demand until 2030 can 
reach up to £38.6 trillion2. An estimated amount of £500 billion is needed by the UK until the 
year 2020 for infrastructure development (Helm et al., 2009), while the Asian Development 
Bank (2012) forecast that investment of £6.3 trillion is needed in the Asian region between 
2010 to 2020 for infrastructure development. The amounts forecast for providing 
infrastructure are daunting for governments to provide.  
With the shortfall in government reserves worldwide, PPP has been identified as the future 
direction to address the burgeoning infrastructure demand. PPP procurement is well 
established in most developed countries and has been widely used to procure infrastructure. 
Encouraged by these fruitful results of PPP, the enthusiasm of developing countries in 
procuring infrastructure services through PPP has grown (Cheung et al., 2012; Ng et al., 2012; 
Hwang et al., 2013; Reeves, 2013a)  
Eggers and Dovey (2007) introduced the PPP market maturity curve, which is a model used to 
identify a nation’s PPP growth, based on nine criteria: 
i. Awareness of risk transfer principles;
ii. Public sector PPP experience;
iii. Private sector PPP experience;
iv. Community and stakeholder support;
v. Market size;
vi. Stable and supportive public sector environment;
vii. Available funding;
viii. Recognising and achieving outcomes and innovation;
ix. Legal framework and commercial structures.
2 Conversion is based on July 2016 where 1 US Dollar is equal to 0.77 British Pound. 
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In detail, a country’s growth will be evaluated against the benchmarks, complexity and 
accomplishments achieved using PPP. Although each country has its own template for 
developing the PPP market, with this model it can be evaluated based on the same 
parameters for private investors and as an indicator for other stakeholders.   
Figure 2.4 - Benchmark for PPP Market Maturity Curve 
Source: Eggers & Dovey (2007) for Deloitte 
According to the standards set in the PPP market maturity curve (Figure 2.4), the growth of 
the PPP market in the UK has achieved the highest level of maturity with PPP practice 
widespread in every available industry, and steady availability of finance for PPP projects. 
The UK is a step ahead in procuring infrastructure through PPP. It has developed a strong 
institutional framework, a robust project pipeline and is supported by market confidence (EY, 
2015) 
Stage One
• Establish policy & legislative
framework;
• Initiate central PPP policy unit
to guide implementation;
• Develop deal structures;
• Get transactions right &
develop public sector
comparator model;
• Begin to build marketplace;
• Apply early lessons from
transport to other sectors.
Stage Two
• Establish dedicated PPP units
in agencies;
• Begin developing new hybrid
delivery models;
• Expand and help shape PPP
marketplace;
• Leverage new sources of funds
from capital markets;
• Use PPPs to drive service
innovation;
• PPP market gains depth—use
is expanded to multiple
projects & sectors.
Stage Three
• Refine new innovative models;
• More creative, flexible
approaches applied to roles of
public & private sector;
• Use of more sophisticated risk
models;
• Greater focus on total lifecycle
of project;
• Sophisticated infrastructure
market with pension funds &
private equity funds;
• Public sector learns from
private partner methods as
competition changes the way
government operations
function;
• Underutilized assets leveraged
into financial asset;
• Organizational & skill set
changes in government
implemented to support greater
role of PPPs.
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Figure 2.5 - PPP Market Maturity Curve 
Source: Modified from Deloitte in Controller and Auditor General (2011) 
Based on Figure 2.5, very few countries are identified as having reached stage three of 
potential PPP market maturity. Top of the list is the UK. Following the UK is Canada, which 
made substantial progress from 2006 to 2011, with Australia and Ireland trailing. According 
to the EY (ibid) report, the Canadian government provides a funding programme and financial 
mechanism to assist the viability of large infrastructure development. Through its PPP 
programme, Canada is anticipated to save a significant amount of money (Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation, 2014). The government of Australia’s strong dedication made its PPP 
programme consistently joint world leader with the UK. An earlier OECD (2007) report even 
listed Australia as the most advanced PPP practitioner, ahead of the UK and Canada. The 
countries listed at stage three have leveraged significant numbers of infrastructure through 
PPP, attracting interest from domestic and international investors. At stage two, most of the 
countries are from Europe, plus the US, Japan and New Zealand. 
Maturity in 2011 (selected 
countries) 
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2.7 PPP Law 
According to Burger and Hawkesworth (2011), PPP implementation in most countries is 
governed by existing legislation and the regulations for conventional public procurement. 
However some countries, including Spain, Ireland and South Korea, have established a 
different set of laws specifically for PPP (CMS Legal Services EEIG, 2010; PPIAF, 2012).  
A sound legal framework helps to facilitate the PPP mechanism, supports the PPP programme 
consistently, provides better enforcement of PPP policy and promotes PPP partnership (Dutz 
et al., 2006; Eggers & Dovey, 2007). Consistent specific legislation will also improve the 
understanding and interpretation between PPP stakeholders, resulting in efficient PPP 
implementation (Adair et al., 2011). Although most public procurement legislation has 
stipulations on competition, the competition policy as applied in such public procurement may 
not be adequate for PPP (Verma, 2010). For example, how do public procurement laws deal 
with unsolicited proposals? 
At stage one of the PPP market maturity curve (section 2.6), a country should develop its own 
PPP laws and establish a legal framework dedicated to supporting PPP implementation. Since 
PPP is a complex procurement process which involves: multiple dynamic activities, long-term 
contractual obligations and large contract sums, some current legislation might not be suitable 
or adequate for a PPP programme (United Nations, 2008). Suggested legislation pertaining to 
procurement, financial/budgetary considerations, competition and contract requirements 
might need to be reviewed or specifically set up for PPP. Specific legislation and regulations 
for PPP are recommended to define PPP and its arrangement, hence maintaining a consistent 
legislative framework. According to Verhoest et al. (2015), a specialised PPP law and 
regulatory framework is a form of government support for the PPP programme. 
Despite the UK being an early mover in PPP, the implementation of PPP and PFI are well 
regulated through current public procurement regulations and PPP policy issued by HM 
Treasury. As the leading nation in PPP implementation for more than a decade, the UK relied 
on existing public procurement laws, with no specific laws passed for PPP. Similarly, another 
leading PPP practitioner, Australia, did not establish any specific laws or a statutory 
framework for PPP implementation at the federal level. Although the national programme is 
guided by the National PPP Policy, most of the PPP developments are implemented and 
facilitated by state legislation; with New South Wales and Victoria the leading states in 
adopting PPP (Siddiquee, 2011; Son, 2012). 
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Currently at the second stage of the market maturity curve, Germany also did not pass any 
explicit legislation covering all aspects of PPP administration. An act was passed for 
implementation of user charge concessions including tolled highways, bridges, tunnels and 
road sections (CMS Legal Services EEIG, 2010). Other implementations of PPP in Germany 
are dependent on Federal Budgetary Regulations, the national public contract regime, a Green 
Paper; a report by the Commission of the European Communities on PPP (Essig & Batran, 
2005).  
Making good progress by moving to the second stage of the market maturity curve, India has 
no specific laws on PPP at the federal level, and the current public procurement laws allow 
PPP to be implemented. PPP was defined and included in India’s latest Public Procurement 
Bill 2012. Realising the benefits of a specific law for PPP, some states in India, including 
Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh and Punjab, have passed legislation for better implementation of 
PPP (Dutz et al., 2006).   
Belief in the need for a specific law for PPP is not strong, as the leading countries have been 
successfully implementing PPP without them. PPP is governed by their own public 
procurement laws, policy documents, and guidance notes and in the design of the PPP 
contracts. However, there are also countries that have passed new PPP law. For example, one 
of the leading nations in the PPP market maturity curve, Ireland has shown rapid progress 
since its first PPP project was introduced in 1999 (Reeves, 2013a). To facilitate the 
implementation of PPP, the Irish government established a PPP unit and passed specific 
legislation. The first was the State Authorities (Public Private Partnership Arrangements) Act, 
2002, which clearly outlined the role of the state and empowered the state authorities to enter 
into PPP agreements (Petersen, 2011). The act also dealt with other complex PPP features 
such as payment mechanism, contractual issues with financiers and the transfer of assets. 
Further legislation to complement the first act was the National Development Finance Agency 
Act, 2002, which was subsequently revised in 2007. This act established the legality of 
financing issues of PPP including raising funds via the creation of a Special Purpose Vehicle 
and providing financial advice.   
As one of the leading economies in Asia, South Korea is among the countries that have 
developed specific laws for PPP. South Korea relied on individual laws related to public 
procurement before 1994. However, the Private Capital Inducement Act was passed in 1994 
to facilitate and promote private sector involvement in public infrastructure projects. In 
31 
 
response to the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the Act on Private Participation in 
Infrastructure was introduced in 1998 to replace the former. The new act was needed to 
improve determinants for private investment in public infrastructure projects such as 
limitation on the maintenance and operation of publicly owned facilities (PPIAF, 2011). The 
new act also introduced rules dealing with unsolicited proposals and incentives to private 
investors; it was revised in 2005 but the details relevant to this research were unchanged.  
The EU has no specific legislation on PPP implementation. Given the many variants of PPP, 
different types are subjected to different sets of rules. Overall, the implementation of PPP 
comes under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), European Union 
Public Procurement Directives and relevant case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
(Ebrecht & Werner, 2012; Son, 2012). According to the PPP’s nature and mechanism, PPP 
arrangements fall under either public contract definitions and service concessions, or contracts 
that are excluded from the scope of the Directive (Commission of the European Communities, 
2004; Shaoul et al., 2008; SIGMA, 2011). 
From the context of co-operation between public and private sector agreements, PPP falls 
under the category of public contracts which are bound by the rules of public procurement 
(Kalbe, 2005). For public contract types of PPP, the relevant EU public procurement 
directives are applicable, as shown in Table 2.3. These regulations must be followed by the 
contracting authority of the country members and upheld by their judiciary. The mechanism 
of PPP does not make it an easy task to conform to standard public procurement regulations, 
since by its very nature PPP is a complex agreement.  
Table 2.3 - Relevant European Union Public Procurement Directives 
Directives Function 
New Public Sector Directive 
(2014/24/EU) 
  
Co-ordinating guidelines for procedures for the award of public works 
contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts.  
 
New Utilities Directive 
(2014/25/EU) 
 
Coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, 
energy, transport and postal services sectors.  
 
Concessions Directive 
2014/23/EU 
Procedures for the award of works and services concession contracts. 
 
 
Source: Modified from Ebrecht & Werner (2012) and Broerse, Peelen, & Vis (2013)   
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Early implementation of PPP in the EU was confused and saw cases regarding: unfair 
competition, partisanship and questions over PPP procedures brought to the European Court 
of Justice (Kalbe, 2005; Son, 2012). Although some members have suggested that the EU 
establish specific laws for clear PPP implementation between members, the EU parliament 
decided to do the opposite (Son, 2012). Table 2.4 sets out the EU members listed in the 
market maturity curve with specific national PPP laws.   
Table 2.4 - European Union Members with Specific PPP Laws 
Member States PPP Law Member States PPP Law 
Belgium ∆∆ Netherlands - 
Czech Republic ∆∆ Portugal ∆∆ 
Denmark - Spain ∆∆∆ 
Finland ∆ United 
Kingdom 
- 
France ∆∆ 
Germany - 
Greece ∆∆ 
Hungary ∆ 
Ireland ∆∆∆ 
Italy ∆ 
Latvia ∆∆ 
 
Source: Modified from PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2005),  
CMS Legal Services EEIG (2010), Petersen (2011) 
 
The difference between the UK and some other European countries which have established 
PPP laws results from national legal structures. The UK operates common law, unlike most of 
European which adopted civil law. Common law is generally based on court cases while civil 
law is based on written rules or the civil code, and both have different approaches to PPP 
implementation. In a civil law country, a new written code is needed to enable the government 
to enter a PPP contract and address other limitations on PPP implementation. On the other 
hand, common law allows parties to form a PPP agreement and govern their own relationship 
by only providing changes to existing relevant regulations (CMS Legal Services EEIG, 2010; 
World Bank Institute, 2012; European PPP Expertise Centre (EPEC), 2014). 
The next section highlights the emergence of PPP in the UK. As discussed in section 2.6, it is 
acknowledged that the UK is the father of PPP, the most advanced practitioner internationally, 
and is also actively improving PPP implementation (HM Treasury, 2012b), so it is appropriate 
to gain from its experience. Learning from the UK is not new for Malaysia; as a former 
Legend -  
∆ -               Legislation being proposed 
∆∆ -   Comprehensive legislation 
being drafted / some sector-
specific legislation in place 
∆∆∆-   Comprehensive legislation in 
place 
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British colony, Malaysia’s public administration services are based on and adopted from the 
British administration system.  
2.8 PPP in the United Kingdom 
The UK has been successfully using PPP to meet the modern demand for infrastructure, 
mainly schools, hospitals and prisons (Li et al., 2001). The idea of cooperation between the 
public and private sector in infrastructure delivery was not new, as there was extensive 
privatisation before cooperation in the form of PPP took over as a preferred partnership 
arrangement. The policy of privatisation, a paradigm shift, was mooted in the early 80s, when 
public management was introduced to replace the long-held practice of public administration 
(Eaton & Akbiyikli, 2005). Public management saw the penetration of private-sector 
involvement in public services, in an attempt to imitate the efficiency of private sector 
management (Bovis, 2013). Bovis added that the reason for the change was to improve the 
efficiency and quality of public service, to promote innovation and achieve value for money 
and flexibility in the public service. PPP seemed attractive in its ability to fulfil these aims. 
Gaining a better understanding of the background and development of PPP in the UK would 
not be complete without discussing PFI, one of the earliest forms of PPP (Allen, 2001).  
2.8.1 Before PPP 
Allen (2001) and Eaton and Akbiyikli (2005) wrote a comprehensive background to the 
progress of PPP in the UK. They identified that it all started with concern for issues clouding 
the nation’s growth, such as project delays, budget overruns and the increasing cost of 
infrastructure development in the 80s. The demand for basic amenities and infrastructure such 
as public transport, schools, hospitals, housing and roads could not be ignored (Parker, 2009). 
Thus, the situation required the government to be more creative and innovative with the 
available resources in addressing the demands for infrastructure, without contributing more to 
the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR). The government, led by Margaret 
Thatcher, introduced a privatisation policy (Heald, 2003) which encouraged the involvement 
of the private sector in infrastructure delivery. Privatisation was thus related to the pressure on 
government to reduce government debt (Pollitt et al., 2002). 
While privatisation has been embraced at the cost of some national assets (The Economist, 
2014), the involvement of private capital in infrastructure was rethought by the government 
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and resulted in formulation of the Ryrie Rules. The Ryrie Rules were established in 1981 to 
restrict the potential involvement of private finance in the nationalised industries (Akbiyikli, 
2005; Eaton & Akbiyikli, 2005). Acknowledging that private finance is more expensive than 
public finance, their basic principle was to ensure the practice of fair competition in public 
procurement, and value for money. Priority for project delivery using traditional procurement 
was to be given if the use of private financing did not economically benefit the country 
compared with traditional procurement (Allen, 2001; Spackman, 2002; Eaton & Akbiyikli, 
2005). The Ryrie Rules were revised in February 1988 with the introduction of contracting 
out, opting out, mixed funding and partnership schemes. Allen (2001) highlighted the 
fundamentals for private financing with public works upheld at that time: 
i. restricted use of private finance unless where cost effectiveness can be proven 
to be achieved;  
ii. privately financed projects for public sector programmes still had to be 
recorded by the government in its public expenditure planning or Public Sector 
Net Debt (PSND). 
However, a year later, the Ryrie Rules were rescinded by the government to permit greater 
involvement of the private sector in public investment, due to the benefits received by the 
government through efficiencies brought by the private sector (Pollitt et al., 2002; Grimsey & 
Lewis, 2005). The government also recognised the value for money offered by the 
involvement of the private sector (Allen, 2001). 
2.8.2  Second Thoughts 
With an end to the Ryrie Rules, cooperation between public and private sector was made 
possible through the introduction of PFI. In the 1992 budget statement, PFI was formally 
introduced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Norman Lamont. With the introduction of 
PFI, private finance in public-sector works was no longer restricted (Eaton & Akbiyikli, 2005; 
Chinyio et al., 2009). It was introduced after increased concern over the increasing public debt 
and public spending constraints. This amounted to a cry for help from the public sector to the 
private sector (Allen, 2001). The private sector was needed to jointly bear the responsibilities 
and risks of development. Under PFI, the role of the public sector started to change; it no 
longer provided infrastructure in the traditional way, but became a service purchaser from the 
private sector. The public sector specified the output specifications and left it to the private 
sector partner to deliver. However, the underlying principle of priority to use conventional 
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procurement unless private finance brought superior added value still stood, until it was set 
aside by the Labour government in 1997. 
Nevertheless, there was a lack of response from the private sector to the introduction of PFI, 
and the autumn statement failed to attract private sector involvement in PFI projects (Eaton & 
Akbiyikli, 2005). Further efforts had to be taken to stimulate the interest of the private sector 
to participate. The Private Finance Panel was set up. Other measures taken to promote PFI 
included the prerequisite of considering private finance for public projects as a source of 
funding for public works, and training civil servants in PFI procurement as a measure to 
develop expertise (Pollitt et al., 2002). Attracted by the ability to lure private investors, the 
Local Authority Associations of England and Wales initiated a Public Private Partnership 
Programme (4Ps) in 1997. 
2.8.3  A New Lease of Life 
When the Labour Party came to power in 1997, the PFI process was reviewed in depth to give 
the procurement a new lease of life (Allen, 2001; Eaton & Akbiyikli, 2005), and the concept 
of PPP was introduced (Spackman, 2002). New PPP guidelines were established. All public 
projects prioritised the use of PPP without the need for comparison for value for money with 
public finance (Whitfield, 2001; Spackman, 2002). A taskforce under HM Treasury was set 
up to investigate and analyse PFI implementation by appraising significant projects. Based on 
their findings, a series of documents were published in support of PFI. A follow-up review 
was made by the government resulting in the formation of Partnership UK in 2000 to replace 
the earlier task force. Partnership UK was formed with the aim of improving the PPP process, 
negotiations and completion (Allen, 2001; Eaton & Akbiyikli, 2005). Partnership UK was run 
with a 49% share by the government, the remaining shares going to private sector investors 
who qualified for PPP under Partnership UK. Since then PPP has become the most popular 
procurement mechanism to provide infrastructure (Akbiyikli et al., 2012; Kateja, 2012). 
Partnership UK was dissolved in 2011 with the formation of Infrastructure UK (IUK) which 
was absorbed in the Treasury (Ågren et al., 2013). Infrastructure UK plays a much bigger role 
than Partnership UK, focusing not only on PPP, but also being responsible for national 
infrastructure delivery (CMS Legal Services EEIG, 2010), including facilitating private 
investment for infrastructure (Istrate & Puentes, 2011). However, in a more recent 
development, Infrastructure UK was merged with the Major Projects Authority (MPA) to 
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form the Infrastructure and Projects Authority. The new agency is expected to manage and 
deliver major economic projects (Cabinet Office, 2015). 
2.9 PPP in Malaysia 
2.9.1 The Transformation of a Nation 
Thanks to the strong economy inherited from the post-colonial era, the transformation of 
infrastructure development in Malaysia has been impressive (Leeds, 1989). Since 
independence in 1957, Malaysia has adopted and adapted various methods to deliver 
infrastructure. Much effort has been made by the government to bring high-quality 
infrastructure to the people. Even though the government has been successful in meeting the 
demands for modern infrastructure, the development has not been spread equally throughout 
the country. Peninsular Malaysia flourishes more than the eastern part (Naidu, 2008), so in 
addition to building infrastructure to promote economic growth, the agenda for infrastructure 
development also focuses on upgrading accessibility for rural areas to improve lives and 
eradicate poverty.  
Systematically, Malaysia has planned development through consecutive five-year 
development plans. The Malaysia Plan is a comprehensive blueprint which incorporates 
details of a five-year macro-economic map of policies, frameworks, programmes and budget 
allocation by activity (Wang et al., 2012). The First Malaysia Plan was commenced in 1966, 
and a significant amount of money has always been allocated for infrastructure development 
in this and subsequent Plans (Naidu, 2008). In the Tenth Malaysia Plan announced in June 
2010, £13billion3 was allocated for physical infrastructure development (Mansor, 2010). The 
figure shows the commitment made by the government to spur the growth of the nation’s 
infrastructure.  
2.9.2 Malaysian Government Administration  
In explaining the development of PPP in Malaysia, the geographical context is significant. 
When Malaysia achieved independence from the British in 1957 it was named Persekutuan 
Tanah Melayu. and comprised nine states. The government inherited many of the British 
administration principles and style of governance (Berman et al., 2011; Chin, 2011).  
                                                        
3 Conversion is based on July 2016 where 1 Malaysian Ringgit is equal to 0.19 British Pound. 
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Six years later, the Federation of Malaysia was formed, with the accession of Sabah and 
Sarawak to form East Malaysia. Malaysia is a constitutional monarchy which comprises a 
parliament combined with monarchy. Currently, Malaysia comprises thirteen states, three of 
which are Federal Territory States. The formation of Malaysia saw a three-tiered government 
comprising three complementary administrations. The tiers of administration are: 
a) Federal Government  
The federal government is steered by three bodies, executive, legislative and 
judiciary, each vested with different powers. The separation of powers 
between the bodies is intended to ensure no overlap of powers (Jain, 1989). 
The executive body is the branch responsible for the government’s daily 
affairs and enforces laws enacted by the legislation. Executive power is held 
by the cabinet of ministers and headed by the prime minister, who are 
responsible to parliament where members are elected by the people. The 
cabinet is empowered to carry out their duties conferred by the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong (King) through specific statutes. Each minister in the cabinet 
has different responsibilities depending on the portfolio assigned by the 
prime minister (Harding, 1996). The ministers are advised by government 
machinery such as ministries, departments and statutory bodies to implement 
government policies. 
 
b) State Government 
The structure of the state government mirrors that of the federal government. 
The executive powers in each state are exercised by the councils of executive 
officers (EXCO) and headed by the Menteri Besar or chief minister (in 
certain states) (Siddiquee, 2005).  
 
c) Local Authority 
The term local authority refers to local government in Malaysia, the third tier 
of administration which under the Federal Constitution falls under the 
jurisdiction of the state government (except for federal territories). This 
means that the state has legislative power to control the local authorities 
(Berman et al., 2011). Prior to 1965, local councillors were elected, but this is 
no longer practised. Currently, councillors are selected by the state 
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government, and most are political appointees (Harding, 1996). However, the 
president of the council is a post reserved for a civil servant from either the 
federal or state level. According to Singaravelloo (2010), this is why the term 
local authority is used in Malaysia rather than local government. Although 
the local government seems to hold some autonomous power, it still relies on 
the higher tiers, financially (Berman et al., 2011), politically and 
economically (Nooi, 2008). 
2.9.3 Privatisation Policy 
According to Rashid (2014), the privatisation policy was the beginning of the PPP era in 
Malaysia. In line with worldwide practice, the responsibility for providing infrastructure in 
Malaysia has always been the core business of the public sector, and public finance was used 
to stimulate growth. Table 2.5 illustrates the timeline of policy development for private sector 
involvement in the national development plan. 
Table 2.5– Malaysia PPP Policy Timeline 
Market-led economy State-led economy Liberalisation Towards a developed nation - Vision 2020 
Independence 
1957-1965 
1st MP 
(1966-
1970) 
2nd MP 
(1970-
1975) 
3rd MP 
(1976-
1980) 
4th 
MP 
(1981-
1985) 
5th MP 
(1986-1990) 
6th 
MP 
(1991-
1995) 
7th 
MP 
(1996-
2000) 
8th MP 
(2001-
2005) 
9th 
MP 
(2006
-
2010) 
10th 
MP 
(2011-
2015) 
 Privatisation 
Malaysia Incorporated Policy (1983)  
Privatisation Policy (1983)  
Guidelines on Privatisation (1985)  
Privatisation Masterplan (1991) 
PFI  
PFI (2006) 
Treasury 
Guidelines 
(2006) 
Guidelines on 
PPP (2009)  
New Wave PPP 
(2010) 
 
 
 
 
*MP - Malaysia Plan 
Implementing agency 
Economic Planning Unit (EPU) 
Implementing 
agency 
Unit Kerjasama 
Awam Swasta 
(UKAS) 
  
Source : Modified from Wang et al. (2012) 
In the 1980s Malaysia was not spared from the global economic recession, which saw the 
nation’s debt worsening (Rashid, 2014). To make it worse for a country that relied on export-
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led growth, in 1985 the price of raw commodities such as rubber, tin and palm-oil declined 
significantly due to the global recession. Malaysia had relied heavily on these commodities 
since independence (Jomo & Syn, 2003; Naidu, 2008). In response to the economic turmoil, 
public spending was reassessed, and there was a shortage of available public funds for 
infrastructure development. To avoid further undesirable consequences to economic growth, 
Malaysia needed to fill the gap and utilise available resources to continue to progress. 
In response, on 25 February 1983 the Malaysian government established Malaysia 
Incorporated to encourage close ties between the public and private sectors. The private sector 
was invited to work together to build the nation and spur economic growth. The strategy was 
largely inspired by the success of the privatisation launched in the UK by Margaret Thatcher’s 
government. Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamed, launched the nation’s own 
privatisation policy in March 1983. The objective of privatisation was to ease the financial 
burden on the public sector and facilitate the return to the economic growth track.  
The decision to privatise was motivated by the need to realign the balance between the private 
and public sectors (Leeds, 1989). This policy allowed market forces to govern economic 
activities, by changing the way resources were used. Slowly the role of the government in the 
development of infrastructure was reduced. According to Economic Planning Unit (1996), 
privatisation in Malaysia is defined as transfer of activities and functions that traditionally 
rested with the government to the private sector. This definition is generic. However, based 
on its implementation by government up to the present day, privatisation involves activities 
such as transfer of government shares, takeover of public services or utility providers and 
investing in public works in return for charges to the end user (Rashid, 2014). The 
privatisation policy was mooted as an important tool for private sector involvement towards 
Malaysia Incorporated (Singaravelloo, 2010).  
Milne (1986), however, viewed Malaysian privatisation from a political context and believed 
that it was merely a language game. The decision to start privatisation was political rather 
than economic. His view was supported by other authors (Jomo & Syn, 2003; Tan, 2008, 
2012), who viewed privatisation as created to support and complement the New Economy 
Policy (NEP) which was used to empower and upgrade the socio-economy of the Bumiputera. 
Netto (2006) and Rashid (2007) observed that Malaysian privatisation was infested with 
cronyism, monopolistic practice and poor transparency. Most of the concessionaires enjoyed 
excessive profits, with the government having to bear the losses.  
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Some notable privatisation projects which can be seen as beneficial to the people are the 
construction of roads and highways. From its initiation until 2012, 1,679 km of highways 
have been completed through the privatisation programme (Wang et al., 2012). This network 
of highways connects most of the cities and rural areas in Malaysia, supporting the domestic 
economic activities, and can be seen as a positive gain and improvement to the socio-
economy of the people in rural areas. Nambiar (2009) applauded the privatisation effort by the 
government, stating that the introduction of the policy was at the right time. This view was 
shared by Anuar (2012), who suggested that the achievement within just 30 years was 
remarkable. Without the privatisation programme, today’s completed highway system may 
not have been realised (Ward & Sussman, 2005; Ong’olo, 2006).  
Table 2.6 –Highways Completed in Malaysia Using Privatisation 
 
Highway Length 
(km) 
Opened 
(month/year) 
Concession Period 
(period) 
Penang Bridge North 13.5 9/1987 24 yrs 8 months to 5/2018 
North South Highway  823.0 5/1988  48 yrs to 5/2038 
Shah Alam Highway (KESAS) 34.5 9/1998 28 yrs 9 months to 8/2022 
Seremban – Port Dickson 22.7 12/1998 Not available 
Second Link Malaysia – Singapore 44.7 8/1998 Not available 
Kuala Lumpur – Karak Highway 60.0 4/1999  27 yrs to 5/2021 
Butterworth – Kulim Highway 17.0 11/1996 30 yrs 
Cheras – Kajang Highway 11,7 1/1999 Not available 
Kajang SILK Highway 37.0 6/2004 Not available 
Damansara-Puchong Highway 40.0 1/1999 Not available 
Selat Kelang Utara Baru Highway 17.5 3/2002 Not available 
Ampang Elevated Highway  7.9 12/2000 Not available 
Sungai Besi Highway 16.7 1/1999 Not available 
Butterworth Outer Ring-road  12.1 2/2007 30 yrs 
Skim Penyuraian Trafik KL-Barat 26.0 6/2001 Not available 
New Pantai Highway 19.6 4/2004  Not available 
Guthrie Corridor Highway East 25.0 4/2005 Not available 
East Coast Highway (Phase 1) 169.0 8/2004 Not available 
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Highway (continued) Length 
(cont’d) 
(km)
Opened 
(cont’d) 
(month/year) 
Concession Period 
(cont’d) 
(period) 
East West Link Expressway 17.0 8/2003 Not available 
SMART Tunnel 3.0 4/2007 Not available 
KL-Putrajaya Highway 26.0 12/2007 33 yrs 
Senai – Desaru Highway 77.0 10/2009 Not available 
Kajang – Seremban Expressway 44.3 10/2009 33 yrs 
Duta – Ulu Klang Highway 18.0 1/2009 Not available 
Kamuning – Shah Alam Highway 14.7 8/2006 Not available 
Kuala Lumpur – Kuala Selangor 
Highway 
31.0 8/2006 Not available 
East Coast Highway Phase 2 79.0 Not available Not available 
East Johor Bahru Highway 81.0 1/2012 Not available 
North Kinrara –Shah Alam – Old Klang 
Road 
0.5 Not available Not available 
Source: Wang et al. (2012) 
Table 2.6 lists the highways completed since 1983 under the privatisation programme till to 
date. Its length suggests that Malaysia has been dependent on the private sector to build major 
networks of highways through privatisation and the PPP programme. There is no sign of the 
government of Malaysia stopping the use of privatisation and PPP in infrastructure 
development, given the number of highways built annually. Anuar (2012) suggested that the 
introduction of this privatisation marked the end of the role of the government in building 
highways, adding that most were built under a Build Operate Transfer agreement where toll 
charges are imposed on the end user.  
2.9.4 Malaysian Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
The good reputation of the privatisation programme has been smeared by critiques and 
allegations of the programme’s problem. Post-privatisation saw the concessionaire companies 
making excessive profits from the government over a long period, due to unbalanced 
agreement terms. There have been allegations of abuse of power by the ruling government, 
with a lack of procedures for competitive bidding in awarding contracts (Jomo & Syn, 2003; 
Tan, 2008; Wang et al., 2012). Following its experience of privatisation, Malaysia introduced 
42 
the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in March 2006 as part of the strategy of the Ninth 
Malaysia Plan (Public-Private Partnership Unit, 2009). According to the Economic Planning 
Unit, (2005) PFI is defined as:  
…..transfer to the private sector of the responsibility to finance and manage a package of 
capital investment and services including the construction, management, maintenance, 
refurbishment and replacement of public sector assets such as buildings, infrastructure, 
equipment and other facilities, which creates a stand-alone business. 
Considering the positive gains from private-sector involvement in previous privatisation 
programmes, PFI is another model which allows the private sector to continue to contribute to 
public-sector projects to spur economic growth. PFI was publicised as the improved version 
of privatisation (Wang et al., 2012; Abdullah et al., 2014), leading to improvement of the 
procedures and emphasising performance criteria, restructuring the implementation method, 
enhancing feasibility through distribution of risk and responsibilities, strengthening the 
institutional and regulatory framework, and increasing Bumiputera participation (Economic 
Planning Unit, 2005). These strategies show the commitment of the government in creating an 
attractive partnership model for the private sector to invest in.  
There are several versions of the Malaysian approach to implementing PFI (Rashid, 2007; 
Takim et al., 2009; Zainon et al., 2012), as illustrated in Figure 2.6. The first approach 
adopted the model widely used by the international community with the principles of 
arrangement of risk and resources in delivering a better infrastructure. According to Rashid 
(2007) this first approach was under the purview of the Economic Planning Unit and used the 
UK PFI model as its benchmark. Projects implemented were not in the Ninth Malaysia Plan 
project pipeline. It is also suggested that this approach targeted mega-projects (Zainon et al., 
2012). 
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Source: Synthesised from Aziz & Khaderi (2010) Rashid (2007), Ismail (2009) 
Figure 2.6 – Malaysian Approaches to PFI 
Under the second approach, a company owned by the Ministry of Finance Malaysia, 
Pembinaan PFI Sdn. Bhd., was established as the Special Purpose Vehicle to undertake and 
administer all PFI projects under the Ninth Malaysia Plan. Contrary to the first approach, this 
second approach to PFI targeted small and medium-scale projects (Zainon et al., 2012). 
Pembinaan PFI Sdn Bhd was responsible for seeking funding and overseeing the 
implementation of projects. £3.84 billion were provided by the Employees Provident Fund 
(EPF) for loan purposes to Pembinaan PFI Sdn. Bhd to finance the implementation of projects 
(Jayaseelan & Tan, 2006; Aziz & Khaderi, 2010). However, it was reported in the Malaysian 
Parliament that EPF invested £4.8 billion in Pembinaan PFI Sdn. Bhd. EPF is an agency 
under the Malaysian Ministry of Finance. Another government-linked source for PFI projects 
was the Pension Trust Fund (PTF) (Wang et al., 2012). Although no details were revealed, 
4 Conversion is based on July 2016 where 1 Malaysian Ringgit is equal to 0.19 British Pound. 
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these investment were said to be guaranteed by the government (The Star Online, 2015). The 
money would then be channelled to the Accountant General’s Department for management of 
progress payments.  
Under this approach, Pembinaan PFI Sdn. Bhd was not responsible for the procurement and 
construction works of the infrastructure. All projects were supervised by government 
technical agencies, such as the Public Works Department or the Department of Irrigation and 
Drainage as the implementing agency (Rashid, 2007; Ismail, 2009; Zainon et al., 2012). 
Unlike the ideal principles of PFI practised globally, the second approach of Malaysian PFI 
took its own dubious route. Instead of a genuine collaboration between the public and private 
sectors in developing infrastructure, the second approach to PFI is simply a label used by the 
government to reduce the government’s debt and spending from the annual budget sheet. 
Instead of transferring the risk of financing the development to the private sector, Malaysia 
PFI placed the financing responsibility back with government-owned agencies. It was 
confirmed by the Prime Minister that £2.25 billion was needed annually off budget until 2020 
to pay nine government-owned companies, including Pembinaan PFI Sdn. Bhd (Palansamy, 
2015). This invited much criticism of the approach taken, since most of the responsibilities 
and risks were still borne by the public sector or the people, since EPF is the Malaysian 
employees’ retirement savings (Jayaseelan & Tan, 2006; Netto, 2006; Wang et al., 2012). The 
modus operandi of its contracting methods even followed the government design and build 
(Rashid, 2007). Instead of opting for the second approach, the government could use 
traditional procurement with a cheaper borrowing rate. The decision may be closely related to 
the fact that PFI allows a different source of finance to be explored. In order to ease the 
financial burden, the government owed the money to another agency, much like a credit card. 
The strategy was also linked to the New Economic Policy to empower the Bumiputera since a 
certain number of the PFI projects should, in preference, be awarded to Bumiputera 
companies (Jayaseelan & Tan, 2006). In a way, thinking forward, the Malaysian PFI approach 
to regulate the market and expose the Bumiputera companies to PFI implementation could be 
beneficial in terms of the experience and skill gained. (Yahya & Chee, 2007). Furthermore, 
according to Zainon et al. (2012), due to the fact that the scale of the projects targeted under 
this approach is less bankable, companies may have difficulty in acquiring funding from 
commercial financial institutions. 
Similar to the second approach, Rashid (2007) revealed that another company, Pembinaan 
BLT Sdn Bhd, was incorporated under the Ministry of Finance to undertake PFI projects 
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under the Ministry of Home Affairs. Adopting the Built and Lease Transfer arrangement, 
Pembinaan BLT Sdn Bhd was responsible for financing and providing identified 
infrastructure for the Ministry of Home Affairs, such as police quarters, police stations and 
other works for the Royal Malaysian Police. It was also reported that funding for the company 
was initially provided by the EPF in the form of loans (Wang et al., 2012). The difference 
between the second approach and this one is that, besides being responsible for providing 
funding for Pembinaan BLT Sdn. Bhd to undertake a bigger role by managing the 
procurements and the construction of the infrastructures, these infrastructures were owned by 
the Pembinaan BLT Sdn Bhd and leased to the government (Ismail, 2009). 
2.9.5 Public Private Partnership (PPP) in Malaysia 
The government of Malaysia is committed to continuing the special relationship with the 
private sector in privatisation and PFI in developing the nation. Hence in the Tenth Malaysia 
Plan, the government introduced PPP targeted to increase the number of PPP projects, 
establishing a facilitation fund and achieving balance between government, Government-
Linked Companies (GLCs) and the private sector (Economic Planning Unit, 2010). Although 
the term PPP was officially introduced in 2010, Malaysia has been engaging in privatisation 
since 1983, and in other forms of PPP such as build–lease–transfer (BLT), build–operate–
lease–transfer (BOLT) and build–operate–transfer (BOT) (Rashid, 2014). PPP is described by 
the Public-Private Partnership Unit (2009) as:   
the transfer to the private sector of the responsibility to finance and manage a package of 
capital investment and services including the construction, management, maintenance, 
refurbishment and replacement of public sector assets such as buildings, infrastructure, 
equipment and other facilities, which creates a standalone business. In these PPP projects, 
there is a contract for the private party to deliver public infrastructure-based services over a 
long period of time. The private party will raise its own funds to finance the whole or part of 
the assets that will deliver the services based on agreed performances. The public sector, in 
turn, will compensate the private party for these services. In some PPP projects, part of the 
payments may flow from the public users directly. 
Eaton and Akbiyikli (2005) acknowledge PFI as a subset of PPP, as the two definitions are 
similar. Yescombe (2007) stressed that the term PFI used in Malaysia PPP is just a matter of 
46 
 
terminology which he identified as alternative to the term PPP. PPP was mentioned in the 
Tenth Malaysia Plan as a new wave of privatisation (Economic Planning Unit, 2010).  
The features of Malaysian PPP and privatisation are compared in Table 2.7. In the list, the 
government of Malaysia indicated that the difference between privatisation and PPP is the 
focus on financing, risk allocation and the role of government. The impact of private 
financing for PPP is acknowledged to be borne by the public and spread throughout the 
concession period. Second, in PPP, risks are allocated to the party who is best able to manage 
them, rather than transferring all risk to the private sector. There is also a difference in the role 
of the government in the partnership; in privatisation, the government acts as the regulator, 
and in PPP its role is identified according to agreement and spelt out as Key Performance 
Indicators in the concession. 
Table 2.7 – Features of PPP and Privatisation in Malaysia 
Procurement 
Privatisation PPP  
Funding via private resources without implicit or 
explicit public sector guarantee 
Funding via private resources without public sector’s 
explicit guarantee 
No impact on the level of public sector 
expenditure 
Impact on public budget spread over the duration of 
the concession 
Risks are entirely borne by the private sector Risks are allocated to parties which can manage 
them most efficient 
Government acts as regulator Public sector’s involvement is through enforcement of 
pre-agreed key performance indicators (KPIs) 
Long duration of relationship with private 
contractors 
Long duration of relationship with private contractors 
Applicable for projects with high commercial 
viability where public sector is not the main 
purchaser of the output 
Applicable for projects that are commercially viable 
where public sector is the main purchaser of the 
output 
Source: Public-Private Partnership Unit (2009)  
Besides the common benefit of PPP such as value for money and effective delivery, the 
government of Malaysia believes that PPP is a panacea for problems dealt arising from 
conventional procurement, such as project delay and cost overrun (Hamsa, 2014). This is 
achieved through allocation of risk to the party best able to manage it. In contrast, one survey 
found that respondents from among PPP practitioners perceived that the government adopted 
PPP because of the high demand for infrastructure, private participation and lack of public 
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funding (Ismail, 2014). These are, however, textbook drivers and no different from those in 
other countries. Ismail nevertheless admitted that this may not be the best method to identify 
Malaysian PPP drivers, since the survey adopted a questionnaire and list of drivers adopted 
from different countries. 
Table 2.8 – List of Major Projects 
1 Development of Women & Children Hospital 15 Development of UiTM Campus -  Satelit C, 
Puncak Alam Selangor 
2 Children Specialist Hospital, UKM 16 Development of IIUM Foundation Studies Phase 
3, Gambang Pahang   
3 Teaching Hospital for IIUM Kuantan Pahang   17 Development of Pagoh Higher Educational Hub 
4 Development of UiTM Campus -  Kota 
Samarahan, Sarawak 
18 Development of hostel (10,000 capacity) for 
UiTM Campuses 
5 Development of UiTM Campus -  Tapah, 
Perak 
19 Development of hostel for 7,000 Polytechnic 
students in Malaysia 
6 Development of UiTM Campus -  Puncak 
Alam, Selangor 
20 Development of hostel for University of Perlis 
Malaysia (UNIMAP) 
7 Development of UiTM Campus -  Pasir 
Gudang, Johor 
21 Extension of Damansara-Ulu Klang Expressway 
(DUKE) 
8 Development of UiTM Campus -  Seremban 3, 
Negeri Sembilan 
22 West Coast Highway 
9 Development of UiTM Campus -  Jasin, 
Melaka 
23 Kuala Lumpur Outer Ring Road (KLORR) Highway 
10 Development of UiTM Campus -  Mukah, 
Sarawak 
24 Second Penang Bridge 
11 Development of UiTM Campus -  Pusat Asasi 
Dengkil, Selangor 
25 Development of LKIM Fishing Complex in 
Kuching, Sarawak 
12 Development of UiTM Campus -  Raub, 
Pahang 
26 Little India, Brickfield, Kuala Lumpur 
13 Development of UiTM Campus – Training 
Institute in AKEPT, Nilai, Negeri Sembilan   
27 Penang Port 
14 Development of UiTM Campus -  Rembau, 
Negeri Sembilan 
28 Redevelopment of Razak Mansion Affordable 
Homes, Sg. Besi Kuala Lumpur 
Source: UKAS (2016)  
Malaysia uses PPP in numerous industries including transportation, health, highways and 
education (Baker & McKenzie, 2015). However, there is no definitive list of PPP projects 
planned or launched; the lists mentioned in most articles are cited from each other and 
confusing. However, according to the Economic Planning Unit (2010), a total of 52 projects 
with an estimated value of £12.145 billion has already been tabled for approval. In a speech by 
                                                        
5 Conversion is based on July 2016 where 1 Malaysian Ringgit is equal to 0.19 British Pound. 
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the Chief Secretary of Malaysia, he boasted that up to December 2014, 698 PPP projects had 
been successfully realised, saving the government a total of £40.93 billion (Hamsa, 2015). 
The major projects on the Malaysian PPP unit website are listed in Table 2.8. Based on this 
list, major projects focus on the social infrastructure which benefits the public at large. At the 
top of the list is infrastructure for the education sector, with 16 projects, with the health sector 
and highways development coming next. It is unfortunate that details of these projects are not 
publicly available. 
The organisational structure of a typical PPP introduced in the Tenth Malaysia Plan is similar 
with the best practice internationally. The structure comprises the government, Special 
Purpose Vehicles, lenders, private investors, works contractors and facilities maintenance 
contractors. The roles and responsibilities of the parties in Malaysian PPP are very like their 
counterparts’ worldwide. The typical PPP structure proposed by the Public-Private 
Partnership Unit (2009) is shown in Figure 2.7. 
Source: Public-Private Partnership Unit (2009) 
Figure 2.7 – Typical PPP Structure in Malaysia 
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2.9.6 Unit Kerjasama Awam Swasta (UKAS) 
One of the indicators of the PPP market maturity curve in stage one is to initiate a central PPP 
policy unit to guide the implementation of PPP. In stage two, a nation is required to establish 
dedicated PPP units in agencies (Eggers & Dovey, 2007). To be included as a measurement of 
market maturity indicates the importance of the establishment of a dedicated PPP unit in a 
nation.  
Subsequent to the Privatisation Policy of 1983, Rashid (2014) suggested that with the large 
number of privatisation projects to be supervised, a Privatisation Special Task Force was 
initiated in the Economic Planning Unit of the Prime Minister’s Department to take charge of 
the privatisation implementation. Prior to that, ten senior government officials from various 
ministries met in an inter-ministerial committee under the chairmanship of the Director 
General of the Economic Planning Unit to monitor the implementation of privatisation 
(Leeds, 1989). Since then, the government determined that a special team is needed to 
undertake the implementation of privatisation, hence the formation of the Privatisation 
Special Task Force. After the Privatisation Master Plan was introduced, the task force 
changed its name to the Privatisation Section and still operates under the Economic Planning 
Unit. Although the section was intended to be dedicated solely to the national privatisation 
implementation strategy, constraints faced at that time included a lack of expertise in the core 
subject matter, privatisation (Leeds, 1989).   
In 2009, the Privatisation Section was set to be given a bigger role and additional authority. It 
was upgraded into a new government agency under the prerogative of the Prime Minister’s 
Department and rebranded as the Privatisation and Private Finance Initiative Unit – PFI 
(Public Private Partnership Unit, 2014). Later, the name was changed to Unit Kerjasama 
Awam Swasta (UKAS) (Wang et al., 2012; Public Private Partnership Unit, 2014; Rashid, 
2014). UKAS was formed as an initiative with continuous commitment by the government to 
facilitate and ensure success of the programme. It is a federal government agency responsible 
for coordinating and supervising national PPP implementation (Saron et al., 2013; Public 
Private Partnership Unit, 2014).  
2.9.7 Malaysian Legal Framework in Relation to PPP 
Typical public procurement falls under legislation implemented at independence in 1957. 
However, since PPP projects are not financed by the government, there is uncertainty as to 
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whether they fall under the jurisdiction of the public procurement legislation. However, the 
published guidelines of UKAS stated that PPP is a public procurement model. Therefore, this 
research assumes that it falls under the public procurement legislation, with which it must 
fully comply. 
Although the highest financial authority in Malaysia is the Minister of Finance, the 
responsibility for public procurement administration falls under different ministries and 
agencies. Each ministry and agency has been delegated with different functions and different 
roles. PPP projects are also included in these ministries and agencies. The hierarchy of the 
major regulations and their roles are explained in Table 2.9.  
Table 2.9- Significant Malaysian Acts and Regulations for Public Procurement 
Laws/Regulations Descriptions 
Financial Procedures Act 
(1957) (Amendment 1972)  
The act outlines procedures for the collection, custody, and payment of the 
public monies and procedures for the purchase, custody and disposal of public 
property and related matters. 
Government Contract Act 
(1949) (Revised 1973) 
The act empowers ministers in their respective ministries to enter into contracts 
and delegate powers to government officers to enter into contracts on behalf of 
government. 
Treasury Instructions The document outlines in detail financial and accounting procedures and 
regulations that have to be followed in managing and using public funds 
including procurement. 
Treasury Circulars The circulars are issued from time to time to inform, clarify, implement, improve 
and amend certain policies, rules, and procedures regarding the management 
and use of public money. 
Federal Central Contract 
Circulars 
The circulars are issued to outline several items that are decided to be centrally 
purchased. 
Source:  Synthesised from Jones (2006) and Adham & Siwar (2012) 
Public procurement is regulated by major statutes, such as the Financial Procedure Act, 1957 
(Amendment 1972); Ministerial Functions Act, 1969; Government Contracts Act, 1949 
(Revised 1973); and Delegation of Powers Act, 1956. These statutes are reinforced for 
reference by Treasury Instructions, Treasury Circular Letters, Federal Central Contract 
Circulars, Treasury Circulars, Treasury Instruction Letters, and the manual and guidelines (a 
detailed step-by-step approach). These regulations are compulsory for federal government 
agencies, state agencies, local authorities under state administration and semi-government 
agencies (Abdullah et al., 2010; Adham and Siwar, 2012; Jones, 2013).  
UKAS was set up as the agency to spearhead the implementation of PPP in Malaysia. PPP 
project proposals are prepared by ministries or agencies and submitted to UKAS for 
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consideration and facilitation of approval. Proposals from the private sector are also 
encouraged (Wang et al., 2012). Private initiative proposals fall under the category of 
unsolicited proposals (Unit Kerjasama Awam Swasta, 2014), although there is lack of details 
available from UKAS on the policy and practice for unsolicited proposals. Based on an 
analysis of the UKAS website, the approval of unsolicited proposals is most likely to be 
processed similarly to proposals from ministries and agencies. If approved, issues of 
competition and transparency will need to be addressed by the government. The case study 
(Chapter 5) will further explore how the Malaysian government deals with unsolicited 
proposals.  
There is neither a new legal framework nor specific legislation for PPP in Malaysia. Some 
relevant statutes and regulations have been revised and specifically set up for the 
implementation of privatisation (Wang et al., 2012). Such privatisation legislation is 
statutorily applicable in the implementation of PPP proposals. The specific legislation 
involved is: 
a) The Federal Roads Act, 1959 (Revised 1989);
b) Tolls (Road and Bridges) Act, 1965 (Revised 1989);
c) Port Authorities Act, 1963 (Revised 1992);
d) Abattoirs (Privatisation) Act, 1993;
e) Sewerage Services Act, 1993;
f) Highway Authority Malaysia (Incorporation) Act, 1980;
g) Ports (Privatisation) Act, 1990;
h) Water Services Industry Act, 2006;
i) National Water Services Commission Act, 2006;
j) Street, Drainage and Building Act, 1974;
k) Town and Country Planning Act, 1976;
l) Local Government Act, 1976.
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Zen et al. (2014) applauded the ability of the government to procure infrastructure through 
PPP without enacting a specific PPP law. They believe that it is possible because Malaysia 
has a stable business environment and framework adhering to certain international standards.  
2.9.8 New Economic Policy (NEP) 
Numerous policies have been initiated by the government of Malaysia for the management of 
national economic growth. One of the most important is the New Economic Policy (NEP) 
(Economic Planning Unit, 2004). The New Economic Policy was initiated by the government 
in early 1970 in response to the race riots of 1969. These riots occurred because of the 
dissatisfaction of certain ethnic groups with the economic disparities and imbalance of the 
socio-economy (Mun, 1987; Snodgrass, 1995; Jomo, 2004; Gul, 2006). Therefore the New 
Economic Policy was aimed to achieve national unity by re-structuring the socio-economic 
position of the ethnic people of Malaysia (Economic Planning Unit, 2016). To achieve this, 
the policy was designed to eradicate poverty and eliminate the existing gap and disparities 
between the ethnic groups. Lee (2011) sees it as a wealth distribution exercise. According to 
Ramli et al. (2013), the New Economic Policy is about supporting the society and economy of 
the Bumiputera. The term Bumiputera is used for the majority Malay ethnic group. The New 
Economic Policy is an attempt by the government to increase Bumiputera participation in 
mainstream economic activities with the target of at least 30 percent Bumiputera (Ariff & 
Abubakar, 2003). 
Before the New Economic Policy, the Malaysian economy was dominantly controlled by the 
Chinese (Gul, 2006). Ramli et al. (2013) suggested that this was due to the divide and rule 
policy during British colonisation, which segregated economic activity along racial lines. The 
British supported the Chinese in trading, while the Malays were left to operate self-sustaining 
economy in the villages, mainly with agricultural activities (Ariff & Abubakar, 2003).  
Under the public procurement regulations, Bumiputera companies are given preferential 
treatment in terms of the percentage of work reserved for them, with extra points for 
evaluation purposes (McCrudden, 2004; Ministry of Finance Malaysia, 2013a). When 
privatisation was announced, one of the objectives was to fulfil the aim of the New Economic 
Policy by increasing the equity of Bumiputera shareholders and strengthening the Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs (Economic Planning Unit, 1994). This feature makes Malaysian privatisation 
unique. However, there have been mixed reviews of the implementation of the New 
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Economic Policy within the privatisation programme. Post-New Economic Policy, a more 
balanced economy emerged, with an increase in Bumiputera participation in economic 
activities, although still not achieving the corporate equity target (Roslan, 2001; Khalid & 
Abidin, 2014). Nevertheless, although the aim is to create more Bumiputera conglomerates 
and strengthen the Bumiputera role in business, in reality the programme and the policy only 
benefit small numbers of politically connected businessman (Milne, 1992; Jomo & Syn, 2003; 
Haneef, 2008). Contracts awarded to the Bumiputera companies are also leaked (sold) to non-
Bumiputera and foreign companies (Ariff & Abubakar, 2003). Jomo (2004) also suggested 
the combination of New Economic Policy and privatisation involved rent-seeking activities 
and concessions awarded based on cronyism, given the abuse of the policy and programme to 
benefit certain quarters mentioned above (Kim et al., 2014).  
There is no indication of how the New Economic Policy is implemented within PPP by 
UKAS. Abdullah et al. (2014) hinted that the practice of the New Economic Policy is also 
alive in PPP implementation. Rusmani (2010) even suggested that the preferential treatment 
of Bumiputera companies in PPP implementation has caused problems to the programme. 
Further protection for Bumiputera interests in industry is seen as restricting the benefits and 
potential growth the government can achieve in a liberalised market, such as the forthcoming 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (PPP), in which Malaysia is one of the parties involved (Su-Lyn, 
2015). 
2.10 Summary 
This chapter, reviewing the literature on PPP practice, clearly shows why PPP has been 
preferred by governments to procure infrastructure. PPP offers public authorities certain 
features that cannot be achieved through conventional public procurement. The adoption of 
PPP saw a greater involvement of the private sector, including the alternative funding which 
is very valuable to cash-strapped governments. The involvement of the private sector through 
PPP is also expected to elevate the quality of the infrastructure delivered, by exploiting the 
expertise and innovation brought by the private sector.  
PPP has been successful in the UK. The chapter examined the history and progress of 
procurement in the UK, the most advanced PPP practitioner, Although Malaysia developed its 
own form of PPP, and the initiation of the programme was similar to the UK’s. Both 
governments needed alternative funding to meet the demand for infrastructure, and both 
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realised the benefits of involving the private sector. By acquiring private-sector expertise and 
innovation, the governments were able to ensure value and efficiency. Although the 
programmes received criticism, both countries were committed and have benefited hugely 
from the implementation of privatisation. 
For Malaysia, its unique ethnicity-based affirmative-action policy means an uphill task if the 
government is to get the best out of PPP while achieving the aim of the New Economic 
Policy. Based on the literature review, the Malaysian government is succeeding in delivering 
infrastructure and reducing the inequality gap between the ethnic groups. However the 
programme suffers from alleged abuse of power and serious ethical misconduct. In order to 
understand this further, the next chapter discusses the practice of competition within the 
procurement process. 
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Chapter Three - Literature Review: Competition 
3.1  Introduction 
Money spent by the government deserves attention due to the large amount of transactions 
annually. Although there are number of options that can be employed by the government, 
driven by the motivation to attain greater efficiency and value for money, governments 
worldwide have been innovatively searching for the best methods of procurement to deliver 
goods, services and infrastructure to the public. Public procurement should always preserve 
the principle of good governance, which includes transparency, accountability and 
competition, as it is the responsibility of the government to use available resources wisely. 
Researchers have identified competition as an essential element in the public procurement to 
achieve best value for the taxpayer’s money and to safeguard the taxpayers from the danger of 
ethical misconduct. 
This chapter explores and synthesises the research subject, competition and procurement. The 
literature review is structured to examine international best practice before focusing on 
Malaysia. As the EU is deemed to be a cornerstone in organising competition in public 
procurement, the chapter pays special attention to its principles in public procurement and 
PPP. 
The chapter starts with examining the concept of competition in general and its application 
within procurement. Since the concept of competition is wide, in addressing the research 
objectives only the aspects of competition concerning policy making, governance and 
implementation in the procurement process is discussed. The procurement procedures 
employed for PPP and the procurement process are then examined. This is followed with 
presentation on the challenges faced in incorporating competition within the procurement 
process for PPP. The chapter concludes with a summary of the literature review. 
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3.2  Understanding Competition 
Competition can be related to different areas of life, from biology to economy. Competition in 
economics is the equivalent of natural selection in biology (Hodgson, 2002). According to 
McNulty (1968), competition can be considered as the most important concept in the 
economy, and the concept was recognised long before modern times. People commonly 
recognise competition by price competition and the type of market structure, such as perfect 
competition, monopoly, monopsony and imperfect competition (Dickson, 1992).  
This leads to the perception that the concept of competition is the opposite of a monopoly 
(McNulty, 1968). McNulty added that the concept of competition in a market structure is a 
combination of economic terms and business behaviour. To add to the confusion over the 
definition, Dickson (1992) pointed out that Adam Smith viewed competition as rivalry 
between sellers to satisfy the demand of a buyer in the same market. The rivalry is a result of 
the uniqueness of the supply and demand equilibrium. However, the concept of competition in 
terms of rivalry between sellers originated decades before Adam Smith (McNulty, 1967).  
Adam Smith, the classic economist, referred to competition as a regulatory force which may 
influence price by its existence or absence (Stigler, 1957; McNulty, 1967, 1968; Vickers, 
2003). In his famous Wealth of Nation (1776), he declared that competition was based on the 
race between sellers and buyers, which he described as...the forcing of market price to its 
‘natural’ level or to the lowering of profits to a minimum. Stigler (1957) points out that five 
characteristics meet Smith’s definition of competition:  
a) The competitors must be individual units and not joint ventures;
b) The number of competitors, prospective as well as present, must be adequate to
reject extraordinary gains;
c) The economic units (buyers and sellers) must have knowledge of the market
opportunities;
d) There must be freedom (from social restraints) to act on this knowledge;
e) Sufficient time must elapse for resources to flow in the directions and
quantities desired by their owners.
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On the other hand, the idea of market structure was introduced formally by Antoine Augustin 
Cournot, a French mathematician and philosopher, and was hailed by Stigler (1957) as a 
clearer view of competition. He described Cournot’s work as more precise and elegant than 
Smith’s. Considered as the modern view of competition, Cournot’s work was based on the 
predicted result of a mathematical equation between cost and price rather than as the 
behavioural process defined by Smith (McNulty, 1967). In Cournot’s work, market price and 
quantity are determined by the buyer’s demand and supply relationship. His work on 
competition leads to today’s idea of perfect competition, monopoly, monopsony and 
imperfect competition. A simple explanation of the market structure is given below: 
i) Perfect competition
Perfect competition can be recognised in a competitive industry which has a large 
number of firms competing to sell homogenous products or services. The firms in 
the relevant industry will produce the optimum number of outputs at the minimum 
possible cost per unit. No single firm will affect the price in the market (Stigler, 
1957; Mas-Colell, 1998; Hayes, 2008) 
ii) Monopoly
A monopoly exists when an industry is controlled by a single firm. Since there is 
no competition in the industry, the firm is able to manipulate the situation by 
reducing the product output and to increase the price to achieve maximum profit 
(Price, 1989; Hyman & Kovacic, 2004; Hayes, 2008) 
iii) Monopsony
As opposed to monopoly where a single firm exercises market power, in a 
monopsony market a single buyer has the absolute market power, i.e. there is only 
one buyer and multiple sellers. The buyer can choose to purchase from any seller 
(Hyman & Kovacic, 2004; Gibbon, 2005).  
This research will not redefine competition, but by reviewing available definitions it gives an 
insight into the characteristics of a competitive nature and anti-competitive conduct. 
Following the definitions of competition and the types of market related to competition, this 
research will explore and synthesise the application of competition in the PPP procurement 
process.  
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PPP is a part of public procurement. The type of market identified for PPP is neither perfect 
competition nor monopoly but has significant features of monopsony. The primary argument 
for this type of market for PPP lies in the traits of the purchaser. In perfect competition or 
monopoly, the pool of purchasers is large and a single purchaser has no effect on the product 
price in the market. However, the public sector is the single purchaser in the PPP monopsony 
market. The market structure of PPP is clearly a mirror of the public procurement market 
which carries the traits of a monopsony market (Bovis, 2010). Like monopoly, where a single 
seller controls the industry, the underlying principle of monopsony is an industry controlled 
by a single purchaser with a large pool of sellers. Given the theoretical bargaining power as 
the only purchaser, the public sector should be able to provide people with the best service at 
the cheapest option available. 
3.3  Understanding Procurement 
There is confusion over the concept and different meanings of procurement by different 
industries (Dewulf et al., 2012). The term procurement is commonly interchangeable with the 
terms purchasing and supply management (Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply, 
2013). Basically, the root of procurement is the word procure which is defined as to get 
possession of: obtain by particular care and effort (Merriam-Webster, 2016a). Meanwhile in 
Merriam-Webster, (2016b) procurement is described as the act or process of procuring. In 
practice, procurement has been described as an active process to achieve an outcome (Mak, 
2014). It was viewed as a system of organisation (Rashid, 1998) or a resourcing strategy to 
explore the supply market in order to obtain the best product or service to be delivered to 
stakeholders (Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply, 2013).  
According to McDermott (1999), a practical definition of procurement was agreed by the 
practitioners and researchers in the International Council for Building Research Studies and 
Documentation (CIB) as the framework within which construction is brought about, acquired 
or obtained. In other words, procurement comprises a wide range of activities from initial 
identification of the need for a service or item until the termination of the service or cessation 
of the item (Baily et al., 2015). Therefore, the confusion of the term procurement and 
purchasing should not arise since procurement is beyond purchasing. Purchasing is just one of 
the activities in the process. Procurement is a term to describe process and multiple activities. 
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This can be confirmed by looking at the application of the term procurement by academics 
and organisations in describing public procurement. Several describe public procurement as 
the process of acquiring goods, service and works for the government (Office of Fair Trading, 
2004; Csáki, 2008; Office of Government Commerce, 2008; Chong et al., 2010). 
Alternatively, some use the term government procurement. In detail, Abdullah et al. (2010) 
suggest that goods and services in public procurement normally include consultancy, 
professional services, construction, maintenance and material supply contracts, facilities 
contracts, capital equipment, property and leasing arrangements. Most of these acquired 
goods, services and works will be provided for the public. Contrary to this view, instead of 
providing acquired goods and services, the Office of Government Commerce (2008) sees 
government as actually buying on behalf of the public as taxpayers.   
The definition applied in practice for PPP is also in line with the term used in public 
procurement, described by Dewulf et al. (2011) as the process of selecting the private partner 
to obtain the infrastructure. Taking into consideration the discussion above, within this 
research procurement is seen as the systematic activities conducted to acquire a particular 
outcome; in this context, the outcome is the infrastructure. 
3.4 Competition within Procurement  
The public procurement market is large and central to a nation’s economy. For instance, 
public procurement transactions are estimated to be worth €1,000 billion a year (European 
Commission, 2014) in world trade. In 2013, public procurement accounted for an average of 
12.1% of OECD members’ Gross Domestic Product (GDP)(OECD, 2015). From 2013 to 
2014 the UK government spent an estimated £242 billion on public procurement (Booth, 
2015). These numbers demonstrate the significant amount spent by governments in procuring 
for the public.   
The EU public procurement is one of the largest in the world (Trybus, 2006). In 2014, its 
projects were worth £450 billion (Plimmer, 2014). The EU’s successful management of 
public procurement is something that they can be proud of. The creation of a single free 
market for 27 state members has managed to stimulate businesses in a diverse and 
competitive environment, thus benefiting member citizens. The EU has developed a 
comprehensive legal framework in the form of directives to ensure the free of movement 
goods and services. Its procurement emphasises how governments spend their resources, 
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rather than what the money is spent on (Farnell & Booth, 2014). Through EU law, the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and European Union Public Procurement 
Directives, the EU is very particular about making the procurement market between members 
open and competitive (Andersen et al., 2010; Pouncey & Brown, 2014).  
The importance of competition practised in public procurement and PPP by EU members can 
be seen in the case of Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v Telekom Austria 
AG6. There was confusion about the PPP mechanism (in this case it was the concession 
agreement) and the procurement directives. Even though the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) held that a concession is exempted from the directives’ procedural 
requirements, EU members were still restricted by the TFEU fundamentals on freedom of 
movement. In this case it was about the principles of non-discrimination and transparency in 
awarding government contracts (Kalbe, 2005; Arrowsmith et al., 2010; Sundstrand, 2012).  
Considering the large amount of money spent, the goal of the EU procurement law is to 
procure the best value on behalf of the taxpayers, thus implying that competition is the best 
tool to achieve the goal. Every member of the EU is entitled to a fair and equal opportunity to 
participate and win a public contract. None of the member states is allowed to protect their 
domestic market, which could be seen as being anti-competitive. The only way to ensure non-
discriminative and equal access to a public contract is by conducting an open contract award 
exercise which maximises competition. Competition is a substantial element in reducing the 
cost of infrastructure to a public authority (Herpen, 2002; Estache & Iimi, 2008). Advocating 
competition within procurement does not only benefit the public authority and the taxpayers, 
it also creates a fair business opportunity for the private sector. Competitive procurement 
drive innovation and efficiency from business entities as it discourages anti-competitive 
behaviour.  
The EU rules and principles for public procurement are also applicable to the implementation 
of PPP. PPP does not automatically benefit the government in terms of efficiency and value 
for money, but has to be earned. According to Burger and Hawkesworth (2011), there are a 
number of factors contributing to the success of PPP, significantly competition amongst 
private parties. Grimsey and Lewis (2005) added that competition is the most important 
determinant in achieving value for money. They insisted that without competition in PPP, 
6  Case C-324/98 [2000] ECR I-10745 
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procurement would not achieve better value for money. Failure to organise a competitive 
tender exercise prevents the market forces of demand and supply from determining prices, 
hence the government may not achieve the full benefit expected since there will be fewer 
choices of realistic bids that mirror the actual market price (Alexandersson & Hultén, 2006), 
which will encourage opportunistic behaviour by bidders in charging excessive profit from 
the public authority (Iossa, 2015). This will also prevent the economy from expanding, as the 
anti-competitive practice discourages new entries to the market and dampens existing sellers’ 
incentive to be innovative and efficient. An effective competition policy in PPP increases: 
 the propensity to attract the private sector to invest in PPP programmes
 freedom from corruption (bid rigging/kickbacks/misrepresentation, etc.)
 recognition of intellectual property rights
 ethical decision making.
According to Zitron (2006), there is a relationship between the presence of competition in 
procurement and the behaviour of bidders. The competitive tension created in procurement 
drives bidders to bid aggressively in order to enhance their chance of winning, sometimes 
with a low price. It also gives the advantage to the public authority to be able choose the most 
suitable bidder, compared to ad hoc selection. Competition in PPP can be implemented during 
selection of the private partner through a competitive procurement process which encourages 
the bidders to deliver innovative, cost-effective, commercially attractive, high technology and 
operational methods to a project. The creation of intensity of competition during the bidding 
process make it an ideal tool for the government to promote competition in PPP (Eaton et al., 
2007; Asian Development Bank, 2012). Braun (2001) believes that competitive pressure 
should be put on the service provider throughout the whole PPP development in order to 
maximise the management skills of the private sector.   
Besides giving equal access to the award of a public contract, the aim of the competitive 
tender exercise in a PPP procurement process is to encourage innovative solutions, both 
technical and financial, by the bidders to achieve improved value for money (Grimsey & 
Lewis, 2005; Infrastructure Australia, 2008; Graells, 2012; Ministry of Finance Singapore, 
2012). It is also important to ensure the appropriate use of resources and enhance efficiency 
(Zhang & Chen, 2013)  
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There are multiple ways of organising competition within procurement. Link and Scott (2001) 
suggested that competition policy in PPP should be able to stimulate innovation in the private 
sector. Vickers (2002) suggested that a good competitive exercise emphasises the bidding 
rules and the access to information. On the other hand, Amaral et al. (2009) suggested that in 
principle it should be seen as fostering competition and preventing any anti-competitive 
behaviour. Furthermore, they relate in their case study that these measures were taken in 
organising tenders in the bidding for bus routes in London and France. The measures are:  
a. Promoting competition: the public procurement process should be designed to
promote competition. The most common strategy is to create competition intensity
between the bidders, achieved by organising large-scale competitive bidding where a
higher number of bidders results in reduction in the bidding price. Therefore,
attracting bidders to participate in the bidding exercise should foster competition in
procurement. In order to attract participations, the public authority should facilitate a
platform where bidders can believe that they are competing in a sound and transparent
framework with little barrier to entry. This motivates bidders to bid effectively, hence
benefiting the public authority by acquiring high quality bids. Another type of
incentive to attract participation is compensation for tendering costs.
b. Eluding collusive behaviours: collusive behaviour is a strategy adopted by bidders to
circumvent competition. Among the collusive behaviour that can be found within a
procurement is price fixing. One of the methods of collusive behaviour is restricting
new entrants to the bidding exercise, keeping the number of bidders low and with the
same companies participating. A small number of bidders makes the process
vulnerable to collusion, as it is easier for the bidders to make an arrangement. It can
also lead to corruption. Organising a large competitive procurement to achieve
sufficient competition is a good strategy, hindering collusion through conspiracy and
receiving smaller shares.
c. Eliminating corruption: there is always a threat of corruption in public procurement,
and PPP is no exception. Lack of transparency and competition within the process
tends to corruption. Corruption in a procurement may result in distortion in
competition due to impartiality of the contract award. The impact of corruption can
greatly impair the whole system for society and the nation. Corruption leads to
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inefficient use of resources. Hence to achieve competition in the procurement process, 
it must go hand-in hand with efforts to combat corruption.  
d. Exploiting economies of scale and scope: through competition, the public authority
may achieve best value reflecting the actual market price. This may be realised by
exploiting economies of scale and the scope of the project. Besides financial benefit,
the client may also benefit in terms of increased standards of bids and innovation.
It is worth noting that the measures explained above indicate that government support to 
stimulate and uphold competition within procurement is essential. Such commitment from the 
public authority is needed to safeguard the public interest, including obtaining value for 
money, discouraging corruption and encouraging innovation resulting from high-quality 
offers and efficiency. 
3.5 Selection of the Private Sector Partner 
Selection of an appropriate private partner for PPP is vital in order to achieve value for money 
(Office of Government Commerce, 2008; Craven, 2011), and may determine the failure or 
success of the concession (EPEC, 2011b). There are many different views of how a private 
partner in PPP should be chosen. On one side are those in favour of fully open competition 
procedures, and on the other are the parties in support of direct appointment and negotiation 
(Saussier et al., 2009). In certain countries, adopting a competitive procedure to select the 
private partner is required by law (Yescombe, 2007). As PPP is categorised as public 
procurement, the selection of the private partner commonly falls under the public procurement 
procedures (United Nations, 2008). 
As one of the largest markets for public procurement in the world, the EU has developed 
broad regulations with which its members must comply. Members are free to choose the 
method of awarding the contract, but they are bound by the underlying principles and 
requirements of the TFEU (Commission of the European Communities, 2004; Essig & 
Batran, 2005; Kalbe, 2005), such as the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services, and the encompassing principles of transparency, equality of treatment, 
proportionality and mutual recognition. Stolfi and Murniati (2014) suggested that these 
qualities should be emulated by developing countries, including Malaysia. 
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Under the EU directives four types of procurement procedure are commonly used by 
contracting authorities to procure public contracts and PPP (EPEC, 2011b). These are open, 
restricted, negotiated and competitive dialogue procedures. According to Yescombe (2007), 
under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement on General Procurement (GPA) three 
types of procurement are allowed for PPP. These are classified under public procurement as 
open, selective and limited procedures. Similar to the principles adopted by the EU on 
procurement, the WTO GPA aims to create a liberal, competitive and fair procurement market 
among its members (Andersen et al., 2010). The difference between the WTO GPA and the 
EU procurement procedures is that the EU has introduced the competitive dialogue procedure 
as an option to deal with PPP complexity. This is designed to address the lack of flexibility in 
dealing with the complex nature of PPP; within the competitive dialogue, the public authority 
is permitted to discuss and refine its need (Andersen et al., 2010).  
Table 3.10 - Comparison on Key Attributes of Four Procurement Procedures in the European Union 
Source: European PPP Expertise Centre (EPEC), (2011a) 
Open Procedure Restricted Procedure Negotiated Procedure Competitive Dialogue 
Possibility to 
limit number 
of bidders 
No prequalification 
or pre-selection is 
permitted. Any 
interested 
companies may 
submit a bid. 
The number of bidders 
may be limited to no 
less than five in 
accordance with criteria 
specified in contract 
notice. (Pre-qualification 
and     shortlisting 
permitted). 
The number of bidders 
may be limited to no 
less than three in 
accordance with criteria 
specified in contract 
notice. (Pre-qualification 
and     shortlisting 
permitted). 
The number of bidders 
may be limited to no less 
than three in accordance 
with criteria specified in 
contract notice 
(prequalification and 
shortlisting permitted) 
Discussions 
during 
process 
The specification 
may not be 
changed during 
the bidding 
process, and no 
negotiations or 
dialogue may take 
place with bidders. 
Clarification is 
permitted. 
The specification may 
not be changed during 
the bidding process, 
and no negotiations or 
dialogue may take place 
with bidders. 
Clarification is 
permitted. 
Negotiations permitted 
throughout process. 
Successive stages can 
be used to reduce the 
number of bidders 
(further short-listing) 
Dialogue with bidders 
permitted on all aspects 
(down-scaling bidders 
permitted between 
successive stages of the 
dialogue). When dialogue is 
concluded, final complete 
bids must be requested 
based on the solution(s) 
presented during the 
dialogue phase. 
Discussions 
after final 
bid is 
submitted 
No scope for 
negotiations with 
a bidder after bids 
is submitted. 
No scope for 
negotiations with a 
bidder after bids are 
submitted 
Not relevant because 
The negotiations can 
continue until the 
contract is agreed. 
There need be no “final 
bid” per se 
Only permitted to clarify, 
fine tune or specify a bid or 
confirm commitment. No 
changes permitted to basic 
features 
Basis for 
award 
Lowest price or 
most 
economically 
advantageous 
tender 
Lowest price or most 
economically 
advantageous tender 
Lowest price or most 
economically 
advantageous tender 
Lowest price or most 
economically 
advantageous tender 
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There is no one-size-fits-all procedure, and the selection of procurement procedures to adopt 
depends on the characteristics of the project and the suitability of the attributes of the 
procedures to meet the objectives of the public authority or stakeholders (Jeppesen, 2013). 
However, competitive procedures give the public authority an advantage to gain economic 
benefit (Polydoropoulou & Roumboutsos, 2009). The European PPP Expertise Centre 
(2011b) indicated that with the introduction of competitive dialogue, EU members adopted 
this procedure more often than any other, followed by open and negotiated procedures. A 
comparison of the key attributes of these four procurement procedures is given in Table 3.10. 
Among the differences among the procedures is, in an open procedure, a contract is awarded 
in a full competitive bidding exercise, while in the other three it is awarded through a 
combination of pre-qualification and subsequent negotiations. Another difference is that an 
open procedure is conducted without a dialogue or negotiation process. These procedures are 
discussed further in the following sections. 
3.5.1 Open Procedure 
The open procedure gives opportunities to interested parties to participate in the tender 
exercise within specifically defined parameters (Soliño & Gago de Santos, 2010). As 
highlighted in Table 3.10, one of its key attributes is that the proposal or offer submitted by 
the bidders is considered binding, with no, or rare, opportunity for negotiation (Craven, 2011). 
The open procedure promotes the values of competition, transparency, non-discrimination and 
at the same time achieves value for money (Trybus, 2006). Together with the restrictive 
procedure, the open procedure is regarded as the most transparent process in EU directives. 
This is also in line with international best practice set out in the WTO GPA. Contracts are 
normally awarded either to the lowest price or to the bidder with the most economically 
advantageous offer.  
Although the fundamentals of the TFEU and the directives prefer open procedures, they best 
suit simple, non-complex contracts (Pouncey & Brown, 2014). The contra-argument is that a 
complex contract arrangement such as PPP might not be suitable for the open procedure since 
it usually involves a large-scale project (European Commission, 2003) involving driving up 
administration costs (Trybus, 2006; Zhao et al., 2011), a minimum numbers of bidders to 
ensure the competition is intense (Shaoul et al., 2008), and the need for negotiation between 
parties (SIGMA, 2011). Some scholars have a different view, that an open procedure is not 
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immune to corruption, collusion and even favouritism (Pashev et al., 2002; Chong et al., 
2010). Although an open procedure is regarded in the literature as the most recommended 
route for EU member states, it has been identified as the most preferred PPP procedure only in 
Spain (EPEC, 2011b; Zhao et al., 2011)  
3.5.2 Restricted Procedure 
The restricted procedure involves two-stage tendering. Similar to the open procedure, an 
invitation to interested parties to join the bidding is advertised (Broerse et al., 2013). This 
stage is also known as the prequalification stage (Hartmann, 2006). The objective of this first 
stage is to shortlist the qualified interested parties to enter the second stage. The participants 
will be filtered based on financial and professional capabilities. A minimum number of five 
bidders is required for the next stage of bidding (Braun, 2001).  
Following the evaluation of the first stage, short-listed bidders will be invited to participate in 
the second round where the contract will be awarded based on the most advantageous offer. 
Similar to open procedures, the contracting parties are not allowed to negotiate before the 
contract is awarded (Pouncey & Brown, 2014). The shortfall of this exercise is the possibility 
of obsolete data about shortlisted parties, if there is a long gap between the first and second 
tendering stages. Again like open procedures, the restricted procedure is seen as suitable for 
straightforward cases where the public authority is definite on the specification at the outset of 
the procedure, enabling bidders to submit a comprehensive offer (Craven, 2011).  
Contrary to the EU restricted tender exercise which needs to be publicly advertised, under the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model on 
procurement of goods, construction and services, a limited number of participants can be 
invited to tender exercise (Arrowsmith et al., 2010). Although this would shorten the tender 
exercise period, this move is against the principles of competition and transparency. 
3.5.3 Negotiated Procedure 
A negotiated procedure in an option when the public authority prefers to conduct a 
negotiation with their preferred party or parties (Bovis, 2010). As PPP is a complex 
procurement with a large requirement for investment, according to the World Bank Institute 
(2012) direct negotiation may be suitable in these situations: 
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i. Where, normally in small projects, the cost to the bidders of entering the competitive
process is higher than the expected revenue from the project;
ii. Lack of competition in a certain industry means there are only a few main players;
iii. The need for speedy execution rather than value for money, normally for disaster or
emergency procurement.
There are two types of negotiated procedures in the EU procurement directives: with and 
without prior publication of a contract notice (Arrowsmith et al., 2010; Ebrecht & Werner, 
2012). Member states are only allowed to conduct a negotiated tender exercise without notice 
in exceptional cases, as laid down in the EU procurement directives; for example, when there 
is only one possible bidder, failure of the chosen procurement process (open or restricted), or 
a huge degree of extreme urgency (Broerse et al., 2013). For a negotiated procedure with prior 
publication of the contract notice, a minimum of three candidates must be shortlisted (Bovis, 
2010). The difference between the negotiated procedure with notice and without notice is the 
degree of competition and transparency applied in the selection of parties to negotiate with; if 
possible, there must be at least three shortlisted parties (Pouncey & Brown, 2014). 
This procurement procedure involves negotiations between the public authority and the 
prequalified or selected company with the aim of finding the best solution to fit the need of 
the public authority. It may take one or a series of negotiations until the public authority 
manages to identify the right candidate to proceed to the final phase of negotiations 
(Yescombe, 2007; Soliño & Gago de Santos, 2010). During the negotiations, it is essential for 
the contracting party to stay focused on the aim and scope to avoid a lengthy process 
(European Commission, 2003).  
Even though the negotiated procedure offers some flexibility for PPP, there are concerns over 
the perceived misuse of the procedure that may lead to issues of transparency and limited 
competition. Lengthy negotiations with a single preferred bidder after the contract has been 
awarded are seen as undermining the competitive process (World Bank Institute, 2012). 
Instead of an opportunity to clarify terms with the preferred bidder, in practice the final 
negotiation phase may result in substantial amendments made to the original bid, hence 
distorting competition and being unfair to the unsuccessful bidders (HM Treasury, 2006; 
Yescombe, 2007; Soliño & Gago de Santos, 2010). Often, the final negotiations phase may 
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leave the public authority with little bargaining advantage and a less favourable decision for 
the public (Burnett, 2005). 
3.5.4 Competitive Dialogue 
The implementation of the EU public sector procurement directives on PPP has become 
blurred by the complexities of the contractual and financial nature of PPP. The difficulties of 
producing a definite intended output specification before the tendering procedure makes the 
use of open and restricted procedures for PPP inappropriate (Andersen et al., 2010). 
Therefore, prior to the introduction of the competitive dialogue, PPP frequently resorts to 
awarding a contract under the negotiated procedure. To make this permissible under the EU 
public sector procurement directives, PPP has been justified as being complex with no 
sufficiently precise specifications, and classified as a services contract (Craven, 2011).  
Combining elements of competition and negotiation, the competitive dialogue procedure was 
introduced as a procurement procedure for the award of particularly complex projects which 
includes PPP (Burnett, 2009; Petersen, 2010). Competitive dialogue was an attempt by the EU 
to balance transparency and flexibility for members pursuing PPP. The flexibility comes from 
the interaction with pre-qualified bidders and discussions to ensure clarity of information; 
especially on the requirements of the public authority (Sundaraj & Eaton, 2013). According to 
Brennan et al. (2016), the competitive dialogue procedure was introduced to restrict the use of 
the negotiated procedure, given its misuse in PPP. As in the EU’s competitive dialogue, 
public authorities in Australia may opt for an interactive tender process in which the authority 
is also allowed to hold a series of dialogue sessions with the shortlisted bidders to discuss the 
proposals in detail with the aim of producing a high-quality outcome (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2008; Infrastructure Australia, 2008). 
The competitive dialogue procedure is not exclusively for use with PPP. It can also be applied 
in different types of contract arrangement. According to the European Commission (2005) the 
description of particularly complex in the directives is described as: 
Contracting authorities which carry out particularly complex projects may, without this being 
due to any fault on their part, find it objectively impossible to define the means of satisfying 
their needs or of assessing what the market can offer in the way of technical solutions and/or 
financial/legal solutions. This situation may arise in particular with the implementation of 
important integrated transport infrastructure projects, large computer networks or projects 
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involving complex and structured financing the financial and legal make-up of which cannot 
be defined in advance. 
This description of particularly complex is suitable to the nature of PPP (EPEC, 2011b), 
although the procurement is not exclusive to PPP. The competitive dialogue procedures 
comprise three phases: advertising and short listing, dialogue and the final award. The 
contracting authorities are permitted to start a dialogue with short-listed potential private 
partners (a minimum of three) to identify a suitable partner based on the requirements. The 
dialogue phase is considered the key element in the procurement since all aspects of the 
proposed contract will be discussed and negotiated (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2004; European Commission, 2005). The need of a dialogue for PPP before 
award of the contract is necessary since there is a need for flexibility to clarify a party’s 
proposal, which might be different from others’ making comparison difficult.  
The parties will be required to submit their final offer or proposal to be evaluated with the 
same criteria and requirements stated in the notice (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2004). Although there is a view that the negotiated procedure has not changed 
in any way (Commission of the European Communities, 2005b), since the introduction of 
competitive dialogue one positive effect is better communication between parties, with 
enhanced competitive tension and better price discipline (EPEC, 2011b). According to the 
European PPP Expertise Centre, (2011a), competitive dialogue is the preferred PPP procedure 
in the UK, France and the Netherlands.  
Despite similarities between the negotiated and competitive dialogue procedures in allowing 
for dialogue, one of the difference is that the latter does not allow further substantial 
negotiation after the submission of final bids (Shaoul et al., 2008). These substantial 
negotiations are common practice in the negotiated procedures, where dialogue with the 
preferred bidder often involves substantial negotiation and major amendments to the original 
bid before finalising the deal. On the other hand, after submission of the final bid, dialogue 
with the preferred bidder focuses on clarification and refining the agreement (Bovis, 2006; 
Sundaraj & Eaton, 2013). A similar practice of competitive dialogue is practiced in Australia 
and Canada under the label of interactive tender process (KPMG Corporate Finance (Aust) 
Pty Ltd, 2010; The World Bank et al., 2014) 
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3.6 Procurement Process for PPP 
The procurement process is essential in the development of any project since it defines the 
inputs and outputs of the development. The complexities of PPP makes conventional 
procurement process appear largely irrelevant. The PPP procurement process is lengthy, 
costly and complicated for both public and private sectors (OECD, 2013). Distinguishing 
features of PPP, such as bundled contracts, a long contract period and multiple stakeholders 
make the procurement process much more complex than conventional procurement. 
Complexity in PPP is added to by difficulties in determining the specifications and technical 
requirements (Hartmann, 2006), and arrangements for the financial structure (Shaoul et al., 
2008). 
Summarising the case studies conducted by Songer et al. (2012), the PPP procurement process 
is a multiphase arrangement from prequalification to shortlisted bidders and the award of the 
concession. Bing et al. (2005) suggested that a PPP cycle consists of three stages: preparation, 
procurement and contract management. The preparatory stage covers project identification 
and detailed preparation; comprehensive planning and preparation ensure that the PPP cycle 
runs smoothly. The second stage is the critical process of acquiring goods or services. Last is 
the contract management stage. Although competition can be applied to the whole process, as 
suggested by the Office of Government Commerce (2008), for public procurement the 
procurement process stage is the most crucial since it is here that intense competition occurs. 
Besides achieving value for money, competition in the procurement process demonstrates the 
integrity of the whole procurement procedures and can be used as a measure to deter 
corruption (Anderson et al., 2011; Zhang & Chen, 2013).  
There are numerous procurement processes practised globally. Table 3.11 demonstrates the 
different term used to describe them, and the different activities or processes involved. PPP 
procurement, like most other schemes in PPP, is country specific. This is due to multifaceted 
factors such as the legal framework, political landscape and economic situation. Nonetheless, 
in promoting good governance, PPP procurement should share the conventional public 
procurement processes, structured to achieve transparency, public accountability and market 
competition (Office of Government Commerce, 2008).  
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Table 3.11 -Comparison of Procurement Processes Globally 
Term 
Used 
Sources 
Procurement Process 
The World Bank et al. 
(2014), KPMG 
Corporate Finance 
(Aust) Pty Ltd, (2010) 
Procurement Process 
Bing et al. (2005) 
Transaction Phase 
Eggers & Dovey, (2007) 
Selection of preferred 
bidder 
Rashid (2007) 
Procurement Process 
KPMG Corporate 
Finance (Aust) Pty 
Ltd, (2010) 
Procurement Process 
Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (2014) 
Ac
tiv
iti
es
 in
vo
lv
ed
 
a) Pre-qualification
b) Bid process
c) Negotiation with
bidders
d) Basis for award.
a) Issue OJEC notice
b) Shortlisting bidders
c) Discussion with
bidders on
requirements
d) Issuance of
Invitation to Tender
(ITT) or Invitation to
Negotiate (ITN)
e) Evaluate tenders
f) Select preferred
bidder
g) Conduct final
negotiations
h) Award contract
a) Transaction process
b) Shortlist qualified
bidders
c) Risk transfer and
value for money
d) Payment
mechanism/performa
nce
e) Request for proposal
f) Finalise project
agreement
g) Preferred bidder
selection and
negotiations
h) Financial close
a) Invitation to tender,
b) Tendering
c) Evaluation and
selection the
preferred bidder
a) Advertisement
b) Tendering
c) Assessment and
award of tender
based on price
a) Request for
Qualification
b) Shortlist bidder
c) Request for
Proposal
d) Proposal
Evaluation
e) Award Contract
Notes  Generic
suggestion by
three established
bank
 Similar practice
by the UK, Canada
and Australia.
 Suggested findings
from the United
Kingdom practice
 Suggested findings
from the United
States of America
practice
 Suggested practice
of Japanese PFI
Association
 Suggested practice
in Spain
 Suggested practice
in Canada
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As reflected in Table 3.11, there are similarities and differences between the procurement 
processes practised globally. Even though the label used by certain countries may be different, 
nonetheless such labels are used to illustrate the activities required by the public authority to 
obtain the infrastructure. This research will adopt the term procurement process as it is widely 
used by the PPP community, to describe the activities established to obtain the infrastructure.  
The differences identified mainly result from different terminology and the amount of 
activities involved, while the processes themselves comprise similar basic activities with 
some variation. The number of activities is distinguished by the level of competition 
incorporated in the procurement process (Felsinger & Miranda, 2008). A competitive 
procurement process is typically adopted by the government to avoid favouritism by giving 
equal opportunity to interested parties to participate. Generally, the selection of the 
procurement procedures determines the subsequent procurement process (Sulaiman, 2008). 
Most of the processes featured in Table 3.11 are generic, summarising common procurement 
procedures. This can be seen by the inclusion of prequalification and negotiation in some. On 
the other hand, Carbonara et al. (2012) suggested that the procurement process is not standard, 
the design of the procurement process depending on the objective of the public authority. In 
examining competition within the PPP procurement process globally, this researcher 
acknowledges that the PPP industry is heterogeneous and most of the PPP procurement 
processes are unique. The discussion focuses on the procurement process with particular 
reference to competition incorporated within it. 
3.6.1 Official Notification 
For EU state members, a work concession procurement process starts formally with official 
notification by the public authority: advertisement of a procurement notice (EPEC, 2011b). 
The official notification is required to be published in the Official Journal of the European 
Union (OJEU) (Andersen et al., 2010). Among the reasons for official notification is 
announcing to interested companies and the public the intention of the authority to obtain the 
infrastructure (Arrowsmith et al., 2010; Craven, 2011). For a business entity, participation is a 
business opportunity. In open competitive bidding the advertisement calling for participation 
is called the Request for Proposal. An advertisement for the prequalification exercise is called 
an Expression of Interest or Request for Qualifications (Yescombe, 2007). The 
prequalification exercise is commonly conducted for restricted, competitive dialogue and 
negotiated procedures. For open competitive bidding, through the promulgation of a 
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procurement notice, the public authority is able to attract a wide range of participation for the 
bidding exercise, choosing the best bidder from the private sector. For procurement 
procedures that involve prequalification of bidders, the advertisement calls for prospective 
bidders to join the prequalification process to demonstrate their capability and qualification to 
undertake the contract opportunity (Yescombe, 2007).     
Advertisement is one of the ways the public authority gains best value for money, through the 
competition tension created in the open invitation to the private sector to participate in the 
tender or bidding exercise (HM Treasury, 2010; Dinapoli, 2014). It can be considered as the 
core task in seeking competition, as the advertisement enables competition to take place 
(SIGMA, 2011; Dinapoli, 2014). Braun (2001) commented that the European Court of Justice 
ensured that competition was created through advertisement when every interested party was 
given an equal chance to bid for the project. The advertisement is also an opportunity for the 
public authority to demonstrate their commitment and capability to conduct an efficient 
procurement process, hence increasing the private sector’s confidence to participate (HM 
Treasury, 2010).  
According to Gordon et al. (1998), the advertisement is also in line with the principles of EU 
public procurement, transparency and non-discrimination. Although the content of the 
advertisement depends on the legal requirements of a country (Felsinger & Miranda, 2008), 
within the advertisement the public authority should disseminate project information, 
specifying the requirements with enough information to elicit interest from the private sector 
(Farquharson et al., 2011). The information contained in a procurement notice should also be 
optimal for the private sector to produce a custom solution. In line with the principles of 
transparency and competition, equal information such as prerequisite qualifications and 
evaluation criteria should be included in the advertisement to ensure that the award of the 
concession is on an objective basis and eliminating any discriminatory decisions (Gordon et 
al., 1998; Braun, 2001). 
3.6.2 Request for Proposal 
The term Request for Proposal is used in PPP, similar to the request for tender used in 
conventional tendering (Chamberland, 2012). Vrooman (2012) describes the Request for 
Proposal as the exercise to solicit the potential private sector partner. In unsolicited proposals, 
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the exercise of soliciting proposals from other interested parties is called the Request for 
Alternate Proposal (RFAP) ( Kim et al., 2011). 
The exercise of Request for Proposal allows the public authority to procure competitive offers 
from the private sector and select the one that best suits the requirements and is in the best 
interests of the public (Farquharson et al., 2011). Submissions from the private sector often 
comprise comprehensive details, including technical and financial proposals (Dewulf et al., 
2012). At this stage, Quium (2010) suggested that the submission should include: 
a) Proposed concept;
b) Approximate cost;
c) Business plan with forecast;
d) Proposed financing package or model;
e) Risk management plan;
f) Technical and financial capability of the proposer.
In an open procedure, the Request for Proposal document is issued to interested parties who 
respond to the advertisement calling for participation. In contrast, with restrictive, negotiated 
and competitive dialogue procedures, the document is issued to prequalified bidders. 
The quality of the information made available to the bidders affects their competitiveness in 
putting forward a proposal to win the concession (Drew, 1994). The content of a high-quality 
Request for Proposal document should include the background of the project (World Bank 
Institute, 2012), public authority requirements, performance expectations, how the shortlist 
will be compiled (Ho & Hsu, 2012) and the payment mechanism (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2008). In other words, the document notifies potential bidders of the governance of 
the proposed concessions, the expected submission from the bidder and the basis of selection 
of the bidders, sufficient for the bidders to conduct a due diligence preparation of a 
comprehensive proposal. The inclusion of the evaluation criteria in the Request for Proposal 
document is essential to demonstrate transparency.  It will also establish that, although there is 
competition, the selection of a Special Purpose Vehicle is objective according to the 
evaluation criteria set out. This will attract participation from the private sector. A Request for 
Proposal document may also include a pro-forma concession agreement (World Bank 
Institute, 2012; Zen et al., 2014).  
Competition within the Request for Proposal exercise is dependent on the number of bids 
received (Drew, 1994; Clerck et al., 2012). Competition is engendered by the tension created 
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between the bidders to produce a fresh and innovative proposal to win the concession 
(Farquharson et al., 2011; Iossa, 2015). In a comprehensive study, Amaral et al. (2013) 
suggested that the bidding price be reduced with the increased number of bids received, as a 
small number of bidders might not guarantee value for money in the bidding exercise 
(McAfee, 1986) and may lead to collusive behaviour (Marques & Berg, 2011). In the absence 
of competition, the public authority might not be able to drive the bidders to offer the best 
solution and value for money (HM Treasury, 2008b). On the other hand, although a large 
number of bidders increases competition (Ho & Hsu, 2012), it might also deter some bidders 
from participating due to the increased possibility of losing. Hence, for PPP the aim of 
competitive bidding is to maximise competition rather than maximise the number of bidders. 
There is no agreed minimum number of bidders to achieve the required degree of 
competition; it is subjective. Multifaceted considerations need to be considered, including the 
nature of the project, the PPP market and the choice of procurement procedures. This is where 
the role of the public authority in stimulating competition is vital. EU member states are 
governed by the public sector procurement directives to ensure genuine competition in the 
bidding exercise (Craven, 2011). It is stated in Directive 2014/24/EU that the minimum 
number of candidates to invite for a restricted procedure is five, and for competitive and 
competitive dialogue procedures, three (European Parliament, 2014). These numbers can be 
reduced if the number of participants is limited or there is evidence that competition is 
achieved with a lower number of bidders (Hartmann, 2006). Similarly, in the UK, under the 
recent Public Regulations Contracts 2015, the minimum number of shortlisted bidders for 
restrictive procedures is set at five, and three for competitive dialogue and negotiated 
procedures (UK Parliament, 2015). Amaral et al. (2006) suggested that the minimum number 
to achieve competition is five bidders. The importance of competition in EU public 
procurement can be seen with the requirement for negotiating with a suggested number of 
shortlisted bidders.  
3.6.3 Dialogue with Bidders 
As discussed in section 3.5.4, in the EU both negotiated and competitive dialogue procedures 
permit interaction between the public authority and the prequalified bidders before final 
submission of the bid. The interaction process is commonly known as dialogue and 
negotiations. Despite the similar pattern of the dialogue phase before submission of the final 
bid, Losch (2007) indicated that the dialogue for the negotiated procedure is based on initial 
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tenders which include the contract specifications and expected requirements. On the other 
hand, the dialogue phase for competitive dialogue is based on open output specification 
(Petersen, 2010). Therefore, the dialogue is used as a platform to discuss development of a 
proposal to meet the needs of the public authority. This research will use the term dialogue to 
describe the dialogue session under competitive dialogue, to avoid confusion with other types 
and phases of interaction with bidders.  
Dialogue sessions within competitive dialogue were designed for the parties to discuss 
matters regarding the formation of the contract, and finalising the project specification 
(Shaoul et al., 2008). According to Sundaraj and Eaton (2013), the dialogue should be 
comprehensive, covering all aspects related to the project. These dialogues may benefit both 
the public authority and the potential bidders. Foster (2013) suggested that interaction with 
bidders before the submission of bids is essential to ensure that the bidders are able to 
understand the requirements of the public authority. As PPP itself is complex, the public 
authority itself needs the dialogue to consult with potential bidders on available solutions to 
address their needs (Andersen et al., 2010). Through clear communication between both 
parties, higher-quality bids are expected as the end product. 
The introduction of competitive dialogue was publicised to fill the gap left by the absence of a 
proper mechanism to deal with the complexity of PPP; the gap includes the alarming misuse 
of negotiated procedure that is said to undermine the principle of competition. Hence the 
dialogue in competitive dialogue process emphasises the principle of equality in dispersing 
information to all bidders to ensure a healthy competitive environment. Bidders who obtain 
more information may have an advantage over competitors (Burnett, 2005). Under the 
Directive7, the confidentiality of each bidder’s solution and ideas should be preserved and the 
information may not be transmitted to other bidders, as each bidder uses his own resources 
and invests time in participating in the dialogue stage. This will create an environment in 
which bidders compete in proposing the best solution for the public authority (Hodkinson & 
Essen, 2015). 
7 Art. 29 par. 3 
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3.6.4 Tender Evaluation 
The impact of evaluation criteria in creating the market appetites is substantial. To attract 
participation from the private sector requires a platform where they can have a greater 
certainty of the impartiality and transparency of the procurement process so they can compete 
fairly and estimate their chance of winning (Iossa, 2015). This includes openness in 
evaluating and selecting the best bid process where the evaluation criteria are known in 
advance to the bidders (Mandri-Perrott & Stiggers, 2013).  
Advance notification of the evaluation criteria and method makes the bidders aware of the 
basis on which their proposal is evaluated, so they can fairly determine their own score for the 
solutions they propose (Mak, 2012). In some legislations such as the EU, advance notification 
regarding the evaluation criteria is obliged by directives to be included in the official 
notification and the Request for Proposal document (Arrowsmith et al., 2010). Furthermore, 
under the EU directives8, the member states shall disclose the evaluation criteria and the 
methods used in evaluating the proposal; even to the detail of the range of weighting fixed for 
each criterion. Besides motivating the bidders to submit high-quality bids, the obligation for 
advance notification upholds the principle of transparency and equality of treatment between 
bidders. It is demanded by the Court of Justice of the European Union (Procurement Lawyers’ 
Association, 2010; Sundstrand, 2012) 
For procedures involving a pre-qualification exercise, the evaluation criteria focus on the 
capabilities of bidders, such as their financial and technical capacity, while the proposal is 
scrutinised during the evaluation for award phase. Numerous available evaluation criteria are 
used in assessing a proposal. According to Zhang and Chen (2013), the public authority 
commonly translates their objectives into a set of criteria to evaluate the capability and offer 
from the bidders. The evaluation criteria determined by the public authority should be robust 
and the criteria set should avoid encouraging bidders to propose speculative and unrealistic 
bids (Department of Economic Affairs, 2010). It is also recommended that the evaluation 
criteria be designed to be objective and to stimulate competition between the bidders (Kim et 
al., 2011). Table 3.12 summarises evaluation criteria suggested by guidelines, the literature 
and actual projects. 
8 Art. 53 par. 2 
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Zhang (2004) suggested that among the methods used in evaluating competitive PPP tenders 
are the Net Present Value (NPV) method, simple scoring method, Kepner-Tregoe decision 
analysis technique, multi-attribute analysis and the two-envelope method. There are also cases 
where multiple methods are combined. This is also supported by Wang and Dai (2010), who 
also added another method, the Least-Present-Value of Revenue (LPVR) method.  
Under the simple scoring method, each criterion is given predetermined maximum points. The 
proposal is compared with the criteria selected and given marks against the predetermined 
maximum. The concession is awarded to the bidder scoring the highest total. Multi attribute 
analysis also identifies criteria by which to evaluate bids, but it is more detailed and includes 
packages with sub-criteria. The tender is compared with these packages and awarded scores, 
and the highest wins. The NPV method is used to evaluate financial packages and the 
commercial aspects of a tender, commonly for toll/tariff-related projects (Zhang, 2004) where 
the difference between the value of the concession is compared with the present value. The 
tender with the lowest positive NPV will be selected. The Kepner-Tregoe decision analysis 
technique is the most difficult (Wang & Dai, 2010). It identifies the MUST and WANT 
criteria from the proposal, appropriately weighted, before a decision is made.  
There is no right or wrong evaluation method. Through a survey conducted with experts and 
practitioners, Zhang (2004) identified that the NPV and multi-attribute methods are the most 
frequently used. The Kepner-Tregoe decision analysis technique has been used in Hong Kong 
projects (Wang & Dai, 2010), and the UK government uses NPV and multi-attribute analysis 
in evaluating tenders (Kwak et al., 2009). Torta (2005) highlighted the use of the simple 
scoring method for the Brescia-Milano highway concession.
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Source 
The World 
Bank et al. 
(2014) and 
World Bank 
Institute, 
(2012) 
Hong Kong 
Institute of 
Surveyors (2009) 
Zhang, (2004)  Wang et al. 
(2007) 
Kumaraswamy 
& Zhang (2001) 
Torta (2005) Iossa (2015) 
Evaluation 
Criteria 
 Price offered;
 Financial
 Technical
elements
 Compliance and
conformity
 Tenderer’s
presentation
 Financial
Evaluation
 Infrastructure
proposal
evaluation
 Service delivery
 Financial;
 Technical;
 Health, safety
and
environment
issue
 Managerial
 Financial
 Ability to
perform
(design, build,
manage and
operate),
 Sustainability
of health,
safety and
environment
issues
 other factors
 Robustness
of the solution
proposed
 Financial
sustainability
 Impact of the
proposed
solution to the
society.
 operation procedure
 technical ability
 evaluation toll level
for users
 concession period
 construction period
 economic return
(operative
costs/charge
revenues average
ratio, with reference
to concession period)
 sub-concession
transfers
 Tariffs charged to
users;
 Governmental
contribution and
shadow tolls;
 Net present value
(NPV)/Present
Value of Revenues
(PVR);
 Duration of the
contract;
 Allocation of risks;
 Government
revenue share.
Remarks 
 The aim is to
achieve
value for
money
 Guideline by
reputable
financial
institutions
 Guideline by the
Hong Kong
Institute of
Surveyor for the
government of
Hong
 Four major
category
suggested
based on 83
criteria.
 Suggestion
was based on
comprehensive
literature
review and
interview with
practitioners.
 Suggestion
based on
highway
project in
Hong Kong
 Awarded
using BOT in
the 90’s.
 Suggestion based on
A4 highway project
(Brescia-Milan)
 Author focus on
the economic
variables
evaluation criteria
 Suggested for 
highways project
Table 3.12 - Comparison of Evaluation Criteria from Selected Literature
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3.7 Unsolicited Proposals 
Unsolicited proposal is acknowledged and recognised in the biggest international procurement 
frameworks, including the United National Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Asian 
Development Bank and The World Bank (Hodges & Dellacha, 2007; Verma, 2010). In PPP, 
an unsolicited proposal is an attempt by the private sector to submit a new idea or initiative 
with the request for an exclusive award from the public authority. It is a business entity 
seeking a business opportunity (Yun et al., 2015). The practice is acceptable in certain 
countries where it can be a source of innovation, for example Indonesia, India, Philippines, 
South Korea, Argentina, Chile, and others where public needs go unnoticed by government 
(Hodges & Dellacha, 2007a; Infrastructure Australia, 2008; Meyer, 2012). It is also accepted 
practice in most states/territories in Australia (Chew, 2015) and some US states. A direct 
negotiated unsolicited proposal is claimed by Yun et al. (2015) and Liu et al. (2016) to be 
faster in certain departments. For example, in one highway development project, preparation 
of an unsolicited proposal took only 34 months compared to 54 months for a solicited 
proposal. Despite the benefits, country such as the UK and do not permit unsolicited 
proposals, for their anti-competitive aspects and lack of transparency (UNESCAP, 2010). 
There are also legal concerns about the proposal’s intellectual property rights (Søreide, 2006).  
Perception of unsolicited proposal practices tends to be negative, linked with anti-competitive 
behaviour such as favouritism, corruption, abuse of government resources and incompetence 
(Farquharson et al., 2011; Delmon, 2015). However, the practice may not always be anti-
competitive, and despite lingering issues, there are countries that have managed to introduce 
effective frameworks to authorise unsolicited proposals and at the same time incorporate 
transparency and competition. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of unsolicited proposals still 
depends on the nation’s whole PPP system. General anti-competitive conduct and lack of 
transparency may lead to abuse of power, corruption and a diminution of the competition 
nature of the entire PPP procedure.  
Those countries, listed above, which anticipate maximising the competency of the private 
sector and potential of PPP, encourage the private sector to approach the government with 
beneficial unsolicited proposals (Hodges & Dellacha, 2007). 
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Common procurement procedures identified as being practised internationally to manage 
unsolicited proposals are the Bonus System, the Swiss Challenge System (UNESCAP, 2010)  
and the Best and Final Offer System (Hodges & Dellacha, 2007). These mechanisms involve 
multiple tendering in order to incorporate competition within the procurement process. 
Depending on the mechanism adopted, incentives are offered to the original proposer to be 
used as an advantage during the bidding stage.  
The process is similar to that for the procurement process of government-initiated proposals. 
Hodges and Dellacha (2007a) suggested that after the approval stage, the procurement process 
includes competitive bidding and challenge or counter-proposal. Generally, upon receiving an 
unsolicited proposal, the public authority will conduct a preliminary assessment on its 
viability. If the proposal is deemed to fit the nation’s development plan, a pre-defined 
advantage will be offered to the proponent in consideration of the execution of a competitive 
bidding exercise. Request of Alternative Proposal is obtained whether through an 
advertisement or by invitation. How the procurement process is conducted depends on which 
procedure is selected.  
In a Bonus System, the advantage given takes many forms. Common forms are adding 
theoretical value to the proposer in the bidding process. Proposers may join the competitive 
bidding process with an advantage, possibly winning by being within a stipulated percentage 
of a lower bid, by additional points in the technical and financial evaluations or even by 
additional points added to the total evaluation score (Hodges & Dellacha, 2007). In Chile, the 
original proponent may also sell the bonus and transfer it to another bidder. The original 
proposal is normally selected as the winner if in the competitive process it falls within a 
certain percentage of the defined best offer (Hodges & Dellacha, 2007b). Among Bonus 
System practitioners are Korea and Chile.   
The Philippines and India adopted the Swiss Challenge method. As in the Bonus System, the 
proposer may join the competitive bidding exercise with an agreed advantage. However, 
instead of an added theoretical value, the advantage is in the form of the ability to counter-
match the best offer received by the public authority (Quium, 2010). In the Best and Final 
Offer System the proposer is given advantage to advance of the final stage of the tendering 
exercise, even though he may have failed in earlier rounds (Hodges & Dellacha, 2007a; 
Delmon, 2015). The first round of bidding would be a screening process, ranked based on 
their offer. Two of the best offers progress to the next stage where they must submit their best 
82 
offer before the preferred bidder is selected (Hodges & Dellacha, 2007b). Furthermore, in the 
event that the winner is not the original proposer, the winning bidder must compensate the 
original proposer by an agreed amount. 
Despite the effort to introduce competition for unsolicited proposals, Hodges & Dellacha 
(2007a) stressed that the original proponent will always have the competitive advantage in 
terms of time and resources already spent on the proposal. However, they added (2007b) that 
it is still worth the effort even if the original proposer wins the concession. In the event that 
the original proposer fails to accomplish the financial closure or deliver the contract, the 
public authority will have extra leverage of choices.  
3.8 Challenges in Incorporating Competition 
PPP features such as bundled contracts, a long contract period, multiple numbers of 
stakeholders, the determination of specifications, technical requirements, the financial 
structure arrangement, makes the PPP procurement process complex. Therefore, to strike a 
balance between introducing competition within the procurement process and getting the best 
out of PPP is indeed challenging. This research examines the challenges faced by public 
authorities globally in incorporating competition within the procurement process. These 
challenges are seen as the factors that might hinder a competitive procurement process from 
been organised. 
3.8.1 Complexity of PPP 
PPP procurement is significantly more complicated than traditional procurement. Although, 
as revealed in section 3.5, there are several common procedures that can be adopted by the 
public authority in acquiring infrastructure through PPP, the features of PPP as described in 
section 2.2 require specialised resources and custom protocols, increasing complexity.  
A procurement process under open and restricted procedures is best suited when the public 
authority is able to provide clear and comprehensive requirements for bidding purposes 
(Soliño & Gago de Santos, 2010). This is quite challenging since the scope of PPP is so wide 
and subjective as it involves financing, design, constructing and operating the infrastructure. 
Although the procurement process under open and restricted procedures injects competition 
into the process, it leaves little space for flexibility to address the complexity of PPP (Doni, 
2006) hence making it less preferable among practitioners. In contrast, the negotiated 
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procedure is adopted for its flexibility. However, the alleged misuse of the negotiation process 
with the preferred bidder undermines the competition principle upheld in public procurement 
(Yescombe, 2007; Soliño & Santos, 2010).  
In an effort to balance the need for competition and to reduce the complexity of PPP, 
competitive dialogue was introduced by the EU for its member states for complex projects, 
including PPP. The procedure aims to preserve competition and achieve the benefits of 
flexibility (Mandri-Perrott & Stiggers, 2013; Iossa, 2014). Flexibility within the process is in 
the form of dialogue where the public authority is permitted to discuss and develop solutions 
with the bidders (European Commission, 2005; Mandri-Perrott & Stiggers, 2013). 
Nevertheless, competitive dialogue is not without criticism. In the early years of its 
introduction practitioners compared its flexibility with negotiated procedures, concerned 
about the confidentiality of data transferred between bidders and the complexity of the 
process (Commission of the European Communities, 2005b). Other feedback regarding 
competitive dialogue (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2005) includes concern over the ability of 
the public authority to organise an efficient procurement process and equal treatment of 
bidders throughout the whole process. Notwithstanding the efforts undertaken to uphold 
competition within the complex PPP procurement process, complexity itself may restrict the 
use of the competitive exercise. As a result, public authorities might be tempted to take the 
easy way by continuing the use of negotiated procedure, for its flexibility. 
3.8.2 Tendering Cost 
The high cost of bidding is mentioned in the majority of publications. As discussed in section 
3.4, the tension created in a competitive procedure impacts the behaviour of bidders and 
motivates them to produce innovative and attractive proposals. Nevertheless, in preparing 
their proposals, bidders invariably incur high costs (Saussier et al., 2009; The World Bank et 
al., 2014). According to KPMG Corporate Finance (Aust) Pty Ltd, (2010), the cost of bidding 
in Australia can be 0.5 to 1.2% (winning bid) and 0.35-1.0% (losing bid) of the project’s 
capital value. It is higher in the UK, 5-6% and 2-3% of capital value respectively. However, 
this depends on variants such as the size of the project. The cost of tendering grows in 
proportion to the size of the project (Yescombe, 2007; Farajian, 2010). 
Grieken and Morgan-Payler (2014) suggested that in preparing the proposal the highest costs 
are for design, followed by the cost of conducting due diligence, and seeking legal and 
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financial advice (Zhao et al., 2011). Iossa (2014) suggested that the PPP proposal is different 
from traditional procurement as it is more complex. The proposal needs to address the 
complexity of the bundling nature and long term of PPP contracts, which requires more time, 
effort and huge resources in preparing the proposal. These constitute hurdles for interested 
parties, resulting in a small number of bidders. Competition works when there is participation, 
but a small number of bidders undermines competition and encourages anti-competitive 
behaviour such as collusion.  
Nonetheless, although most of the literature mentions that the cost of bidding is high for PPP, 
Muineacháin (2008) suggested that it is still bearable by large companies bidding as a 
consortium. For PPP supporters, the high cost of bidding can be seen as a grievance, 
undermining the benefits (Ball et al., 2000). Realising the importance of competition, some 
approaches address the issue of high cost of tendering by including reimbursement of part of 
the cost of bid preparation (Yescombe, 2007; The World Bank et al., 2014). In Canada, losing 
bidders are reimbursed for the cost for design and the legal components, to a maximum of half 
the external bid costs. Losing bidders may also be reimbursed for the design cost and 
according to the stages in which they participated. This is adopted in France (KPMG 
Corporate Finance (Aust) Pty Ltd, 2010), where the costs of winning bids are often recovered 
throughout the concession, reflected in the concession agreement signed (Pollitt et al., 2002; 
Farquharson et al., 2011). Another approach, apart from reimbursement, is the practice where 
the bid preparation is funded by a special budget or even a third party (Farquharson et al., 
2011).  
Besides the transfer of capital expenditure costs incurred by the winning bid, the public 
authority might also need to bear part of the financial consequences incurred by losing bids. 
According to Dudkin and Välilä (2005), like the private sector bidders, the public authority 
also incurs high costs in organising the bidding process, especially if it involves hiring 
external legal, financial and technical advisors. 
3.8.3 Lengthy Process 
The PPP procurement process is not only complex but is also protracted. Despite all the 
methods described above to ensure competition within the procurement process, the bidding 
and negotiation stage in a competitive exercise is deemed to be lengthy and demotivating 
(Gunnigan, 2007; Yescombe, 2007; Reeves, 2013b). The longest time PPP procurement 
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process exercise in the UK took nearly five years, and the shortest just under two years (HM 
Treasury, 2012). In Ireland they found that the average procurement process is almost three 
years and in Canada 16 to 19 months depending on the sector (KPMG Corporate Finance 
(Aust) Pty Ltd, 2010; Reeves et al., 2014). The risk of a lengthy procurement process is that it 
presents the bidders with an expensive bill and requires a discouragingly large amount of 
resources, financial and in personnel (Saussier et al., 2009). Failure to achieve a sufficient 
number of bidders undermines the essential competition. 
According to Craven (2011), besides the high cost incurred by bidders, other risks are 
associated with a lengthy process, including deterioration of the financial capacity of a bidder. 
For example, a prequalified bidder may be shortlisted with a strong financial resources, but 
the situation might be different by the time the bidder is awarded the concession. Another risk 
is change of ownership or management in any of the companies, affecting the financial or 
technical capacity. These changes in key variables may have a significant impact on the whole 
process of establishing the partnership. 
Public authorities have nothing to gain from a lengthy process. The longer the time taken in 
finalising the deal with the private sector, of the greater the cost to the public authority, 
including construction costs and related fees (Yescombe, 2007). Prices submitted by the 
bidders reflect the actual market with forecast estimates. Nevertheless, they are still subjected 
to inflation indexing and variable interest rates charged by financial institution. Failure to start 
the project within a certain target date might lead to changes in the key terms and even 
renegotiation. 
3.8.4 Renegotiation 
Renegotiation in PPP is conducted if there are variations to the terms of the concession 
agreement (Guasch et al., 2014). This can be seen either as a flaw in PPP or an opportunity to 
amend the needs of the project (Delmon, 2015). Numerous reasons have been identified in the 
literature for renegotiation: an unexpected economic recession (Ward & Sussman, 2005), 
discovery of errors (Engel et al., 2010), the Special Purpose Vehicle having financial 
difficulties (World Bank Institute, 2012; Iossa, 2015), requirements changes and new 
information, unjustifiable repayment levels (Pollock & Price, 2013) and contract restructuring 
to address contract incompleteness (Nikolaidis & Roumboutsos, 2014). Some renegotiation 
may be seen as ensuring the continuity of the development and keeping the Special Purpose 
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Vehicle from insolvency. In Korea, renegotiation is also pursued when the government feels 
there is a need to strike a balance with the PPP project (Kim et al., 2011). Finally, the public 
authority should pursue renegotiation if it is necessary to safeguard the public interest. 
In practice there is potential for renegotiation during the post-award period (Chong, 2006; 
Iossa, 2015; Menezes & Ryan, 2015). The diversity of PPP arrangements and the long-term 
concession period makes the competitive procurement process challenging and vulnerable to 
renegotiation post-award. Often the winning bid is based on unrealistic beliefs based on too 
many uncertainties (Alexandersson & Hultén, 2006; Lalive & Schmutzler, 2008; Saussier et 
al., 2009); in addition to the complexity of PPP, these might be the result of a lack of 
information access during the bidding exercise, with dissimilar and incomparable assumptions 
made by bidders (Marques & Berg, 2011). Offers might underestimate or overestimate key 
variables in the concession agreement, such as forecast revenue or the cost of construction. 
For this reason, the winning bid might not have been the best bidder. In this event, either party 
may seek renegotiation shortly after the award, undermining the principle of competition. 
Engel et al. (2010) suggested that a thorough contract conveyed to the bidders in the bidding 
exercise may avoid the possibility of renegotiation.  
Renegotiation is often triggered by the private sector and is seen as opportunistic behaviour 
(Chong, 2006; Guasch et al., 2014). There are instances where a low-cost strategy was 
planned all along during the bidding stage, with the expectation of renegotiation later to 
recover the intended profit margin or an opportunity to make extra profit (Engel et al., 2010; 
Marques & Berg, 2011). According to Iossa (2015), the private sector knows that the public 
authority will normally try to save the project by avoiding any termination process, and accept 
the request to renegotiate the concession agreement in favour of the Special Purpose Vehicle. 
Amendment due to renegotiation is obviously a distortion to the competitive procurement 
process. It also diminishes the benefit gained from the competition effect. The winning bid is 
no longer the best offer, as other bidders might submit different offers. 
3.8.5 Intellectual Property Right 
The need for dialogue before the award of the concession is acknowledged to address the 
complexity of PPP by being more flexible. Competition is retained by conducting dialogues 
with more than one bidder. The introduction of dialogue with more than one bidder before the 
award no doubt stimulates the competition tension between bidders. However, there are 
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concerns over how these dialogues are conducted, especially with the possibility of 
unauthorised circulation of any intellectual property and any sensitive commercial 
information from one bidder to another (Commission of the European Communities, 2005b). 
A comprehensive list of items constituting intellectual property in this context is well 
described by Commonwealth of Australia (2008):  
Inventions, original designs and practical applications of good ideas protected by statute law 
through copyright, patents, registered designs, circuit layout rights and trademarks; also 
trade secrets, proprietary know-how and other confidential information protected against 
unlawful disclosure by common law and through additional contractual obligations such as 
confidentiality agreements. 
In the event that a bidder may acquire any unauthorised transfer of intellectual property, the 
prospect of gaining a competitive advantage over rival bidders is high, again undermining the 
competitive process (Foster, 2013). This will no doubt discourage bidders from participating 
in any competitive dialogue exercise. Andersen et al. (2010) stressed the importance of 
protection of certain information, but it is crucial that this does not prevent any competition. 
Throughout a dialogue process, bidders need to obtain information on the required 
specification and the output expected, in order to propose the best solution to the public 
authority. A clear identification of secrecy and an appropriate manner in handling the 
intellectual property issue will allow the competition pressure to exist, while the public 
authority is able to achieve value for money from the project (Public Accounts Committee, 
2006). Convincing potential bidders of a fair procurement process with a guaranteed 
protective policy for intellectual property attracts bidders.  
As discussed in section 3.7, unsolicited proposals encourage submission of innovative 
proposals from the private sector, but dealing with them can be difficult (Delmon, 2015). 
With unsolicited proposals, the challenge in organising the competitive tender exercise is due 
to the request for an exclusive award of the project, given the original proposer’s claim to 
safeguard his intellectual property rights (Hodges, 2003). Some proposers also claim 
proprietary rights to a technology or technique proposed, to avoid their proposal being 
exposed in a competitive process.  
The dilemma faced by the public authority is whether to reward innovation by directly 
awarding the concession to the original proposer without any competitive process, or if 
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permitted to organise a competitive procurement process in order to uphold good governance. 
Preferring to award the concession directly to the original proposer results in losing 
bargaining power with a potentially excessive price. However, failure to give the award to the 
original proposer discourages the private sector from submit innovative proposals (Yescombe, 
2007). Countries which regularly accept unsolicited proposals seem to be able to manage to 
retain the competition pressure, while addressing the concerns over intellectual property. In 
Victoria, Australia the original proposer is required to identify any information or intellectual 
property that is sensitive and needs protection before the call for competitive bidding. 
Typically, according to Hodges and Dellacha (2007b), compensation is given to the original 
proposer in the event of their not being the winning bidder, to ensure the transfer of ownership 
of the proposal to the public authority.  
3.9 Governance of Malaysian Procurement 
Despite the current global uncertainties, Malaysia’s economy is performing steadily (Asian 
Development Bank, 2015). Although hit by global economic stagnation, which affected the 
nation’s export trade, Malaysia turned its direction to strengthening its local domestic demand 
and domestic economic growth. Public procurement has been used to stimulate the economy 
with the launch of projects under the country’s Economic Transformation Programme (ETP) 
(IMF, 2013), and government procurement has been identified as one of the core components 
of the ETP activities. 
The public procurement system as practised by the Government of Malaysia complies with 
international standards (Jones, 2013). This is a result of the nation’s efforts to improve its 
public procurement process (Economic Planning Unit, 2010) by being actively involved in 
international organisations such as the Government Procurement Experts Group (GPEG) 
under the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping; the Procurement Working 
Group under the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL); and 
as a party to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) (Ministry of 
Finance Malaysia, 2014a).  
Public procurement in Malaysia is defined as in other nations, referring to the process of the 
acquisition of goods and services (Adham and Siwar, 2012), practising the underlying 
principles of good governance, public accountability, transparency, best value for money, 
open competition and fair dealing (Ministry of Finance Malaysia, 2007; Adham and Siwar, 
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2012; Jones, 2013). PPP shares the same vision. Although there might be different methods of 
procuring and administrating PPP, the objectives of procurement are to provide infrastructure 
to the people. According to the official document by UKAS, PPP is considered a public 
procurement model (Public-Private Partnership Unit, 2009). 
Despite the vision and targets by the government for good governance of the procurement 
regime, there are still weaknesses that have a negative impact on the campaign and efforts by 
the government. Identified weaknesses in Malaysian procurement are: fragmented 
procurement procedures; the lack of procurement expertise; the absence of open and 
competitive tendering, especially for foreign suppliers; widespread corruption; lack of 
transparency (Adham & Siwar, 2012; Jones, 2013); corruption; bid rigging; kickbacks; 
misrepresentation of facts; proxy companies (Othman et al., 2010); and unethical decision 
making (Hassim, 2012).  
To demonstrate that the government is committed to improve current policies, the government 
intend to remove barriers to such competition and creating a more liberalised market 
(PEMANDU, 2010). The government also passed its first Competition Act in 2010 to show 
its commitment to improving competition, whereby businesses will compete on the basis of 
quality, innovation and value. UKAS has acknowledged that competition in PPP 
implementation is one of the most important components in achieving value for money 
(Public-Private Partnership Unit, 2009). 
The government’s procurement plays an important role in infrastructure delivery in Malaysia 
(Adham & Siwar, 2012). Procurement is divided into three categories: works, supply and 
services. In line with its objectives, this research focuses on procurement for works, which 
includes: civil engineering works such as new construction or upgrading infrastructure; 
building facilities; and associated mechanical and electrical activities. 
For work procurement, methods are categorised according to the value of the proposed 
contract. For low-value procurement, the acquisition of works can be made through the petty 
cash, direct purchase, quotation, federal central contracts/panel contracts, requisition and 
communal work. Under the government procurement regulations, to qualify for procurement 
for infrastructure works, a company set up under the Malaysia Company Act (1965) should be 
registered with the Contractors Service Centre (PKK) and Construction Industry Development 
Board (CIDB). This registration is related to government monitoring of construction 
companies. There are three broad types of procedure:  
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i. Open tender;
ii. Selective tendering;
iii. Direct negotiation.
Each infrastructure project is unique, so each case should be assessed on its own 
requirements.   
3.9.1 Open Tendering Procedure 
This approach for choosing a private sector partner can be seen as the most competitive. 
According to the Ministry of Finance Malaysia, (2013), an open tender should be conducted 
for work above the threshold of £95,0009. Work not exceeding £5.6 million is reserved to 
Malaysian-owned companies, while work exceeding this threshold may be carried out by a 
Malaysian owned company with certain foreign equity. 
A large number of bidders would benefit the government in terms of lower prices and 
innovative solutions. The invitation to tender for a specific job is advertised in major 
newspapers and on government websites. Along with their offer, interested bidders need to 
submit supporting documents to demonstrate that they possess the necessary financial and 
technical capabilities. Tenders are filtered based on the submitted price and shortlisted before 
an evaluation of the technical and financial capabilities is conducted.  
During this process, no interaction or dialogue with the bidders is allowed until the decision is 
made known to the public (Hui et al., 2011). The challenge in this bidding process is to 
identify the bona fide bidders. Although on paper most of the bidders appear well qualified,  
they might be a shell company or a proxy company (Hassim, 2012), leading to the work being 
sub-contracted. To date, there is no efficient way to remedy this matter.  
Another issue raised by Jones (2006) in Malaysia’s open tendering exercise concerns the 
factors and criteria used by the relevant tender boards in choosing the winning bid; there are 
publicised cases where the contract was awarded to a bidder who did not appear to provide 
the best value for money offer. Although the winning bidder is commonly chosen based on 
9 All Conversion is based on July 2016 where 1Malaysian Ringgit is equal to 0.19 British Pound. 
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the offer most beneficial to the government, Hui et al. (2011) found that there are cases where 
the decision for awarding a contract may be made to avoid the creation of a monopoly.  
The lowest price does not necessarily win the tender; holistically, the government will choose 
the winning bidder based on a combination of factors if the offer fulfils the technical 
specification and the bidder possesses the financial and technical capability required (Ministry 
of Finance Malaysia, 2014b). For example, one bidder may demonstrate exceptional 
innovation, but this might incur additional costs over a more traditional solution. 
A competitive selection process is recommended for PPP if the goal is to achieve value for 
money (World Bank Institute, 2012). Given the mandate by the Malaysian people, the 
government should always ensure that the public procurement process is conducted with 
effective competition, although this does not necessarily imply the lowest initial bid. Ensuring 
the procedural fairness of the procurement process is also required. Research by Ismail (2013) 
showed that a competitive tendering is one of a number of important drivers for value for 
money in Malaysian PPP. A minimum of three shortlisted companies is required under 
traditional regulations, and Ismail (ibid) recommended that the government should increase 
this number to put more pressure of competition. In contrast, Lubis and Majid (2013) state 
that since PPP is significantly different from conventional procurement, open competition is 
not suitable for PPP in Association of South East Nation (ASEAN) countries, including 
Malaysia. They justified this because of the relatively small pool of potential bidders in the 
PPP market, making open tendering uneconomical in the Malaysian context.  
3.9.2 Direct Negotiations Procedure 
Malaysian procurement legislation allows the possibility of direct negotiation with one party 
under certain circumstances (Abdullah et al., 2010; Stolfi & Murniati, 2014). According to the 
Ministry of Finance Malaysia (2013b), an application for direct negotiation is allowed if any 
of these conditions is fulfilled: 
i. There is urgency or desperation to acquire the work in the public interest; 
ii. In conjunction with previous contracts, there is a need to obtain proprietary 
supplies for uniformity, and these are only available from one source; 
iii. There is only one expert or supplier in the area; 
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iv. The project involves national security;
v. The contract is with a Bumiputera company.
According to Jones (2013), the reports of the Malaysian Auditor General’s Office regarding 
direct negotiation practice are negative, allowing situations where the contract price is higher 
but performance is unsatisfactory. PPP projects in Malaysia are also identified for award 
through this mode (Naidu, 2008; Abdullah et al., 2014). According to Beh (2010), 38% of the 
£40.810 billion approved for PFI/PPP projects allocated under the Ninth Malaysia Plan was 
awarded through direct negotiations  
This mode of awarding a contract will no doubt limit competition in public procurement 
(Abdullah et al., 2014). However, according to the European Commission (2003), negotiated 
tenders have been used internationally in certain circumstances and with certain PPP 
arrangement, if they can secure an adequate combination of: value for money; optimum risk 
allocation; innovative solution; and low bid price. In PPP, direct negotiation is considered if 
the proposal comes from the private sector. Whereas some countries prohibit unsolicited 
proposals, Malaysia welcomes and encourages them (UKAS, 2009). 
Contrary to maximum competition in an open tender exercise, and due to its restrictive 
competition nature, negotiable tendering is most vulnerable to potential corruption (Doyle, 
2012). The continued use of direct negotiation by the Malaysian government is linked with 
political interference by politicians with vested interests in the projects. The perception of 
direct negotiation procedures is also due to cases of alleged irresponsible abuse of power, and 
the exaggerations of bad publicity concerning lack of transparency (Jones, 2013).  
3.9.3 Selective Tendering Procedures 
Another alternative to open tendering in the Malaysian public procurement regime is selective 
tendering. A small number of qualified companies are invited to participate in the 
government’s tendering process, drawn from a prior prequalification process or selection from 
the government’s own independent prequalified bidder’s database.  
The criteria and selection determinants for choosing the subsequent winning bidder are 
similar to those practised in open tendering. In PPP projects in Malaysia, either a specific 
10 All Conversion is based on July 2016 where 1Malaysian Ringgit is equal to 0.19 British Pound. 
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prequalification exercise or a request for a general proposal exercise for approved status on 
the government’s database is normally conducted. Resulting from the government assessment 
of bids submitted under the exercise, potential prequalified companies may be shortlisted for 
further elements of the selective tendering process for the specific project. These further 
elements should be faster since the technical and financial evaluation process was done during 
the prequalification procedures. 
Understanding the available procurement procedure used by the Malaysian government helps 
in understanding the procurement process involved. The procurement process for Malaysian 
PPP is discussed in Chapter 6. 
3.10 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter is to address Research Objective 1: to understand and analyse the 
PPP procurement process with particular reference to competition; and Research Objective 2: 
to evaluate the challenges to incorporate competition within PPP procurement processes 
globally. This chapter therefore investigated competition within the procurement process 
practice globally and the challenges faced in incorporating competition within the PPP 
procurement process. Literature on the procurement process involved in PPP procurement 
was reviewed. Further, within the procurement process discussed, the researcher examined the 
competition element and its relevance within the process.  
Throughout the literature, competition between private bidders is acknowledged to be 
significant within the PPP procurement process. Although the nature of PPP is different from 
the traditional procurement to finance infrastructure, institutions such as the EU and 
governments worldwide have been seen trying to uphold competition within PPP. In the event 
that competition is absent or weak, the public authority is vulnerable, with the private sector 
gaining more advantage from the PPP programme. Challenges faced by governments globally 
in incorporating competition within the PPP procurement process were positively identified. 
These challenges may deter governments from emphasising competition for PPP. With 
regards to the challenges identified, the chapter also presented some of the ways other 
governments have addressed them. The chapter ends with a snapshot of Malaysian 
governance of PPP procurement obtained from the literature review. In the next chapter, the 
research methodology is discussed. 
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Chapter Four - Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
There is certainly no easy way to achieve the aim and objectives of this research. This chapter 
discusses the rationale and justifications for the research design selected, with the objective of 
providing an understanding of the setting for the research. Although many labels are used by 
different schools of thought for research methodology concepts and stages, one similarity is 
the acknowledgement of the significant impact of the choice of methodology used to fulfil the 
research objectives (Saunders et al., 2015).  
This chapter will describe and clarify the chosen research strategy, what data is required and 
how the data will be collected and analysed; the details of the research process are considered. 
The chapter is structured as follows: 
 Research design;
 Research philosophy;
 Research approach;
 Choice of methodology;
 Research strategies;
 Time horizon;
 Data collection procedures.
4.2 Research Design 
This research adopted the research 'onion' approach by Saunders et al. (2015). The onion 
layers (Figure 4.8) demonstrate the research design clearly and will be discussed in detail in 
the following sections. The research onion is layered in six stages comprising the outer layers: 
the research philosophy and approach; and the core layers: the choice of methodology, time 
horizon; techniques and procedures. The decisions made or assumptions that can be formed 
from the outer layers will define the context and boundaries for selection of the core layers, 
such as data collection techniques and analysis procedures. It is recognised that the 
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implementation of an inappropriate research methodology may produce outcomes that are 
beyond the context of the research (Holden and Lynch, 2004). This is due to the tenets and 
underlying principles that come under each chosen paradigm which outlines the assumptions 
that the thesis will rest on. The layers of the research onion adopted here are presented in 
Figure 4.8. They act as a guide and framework of reasoning for the researcher in his search for 
answers. The details of these layers are discussed further in a subsequent section in this 
chapter. 
Figure 4.8- The Research Onion 
Source –Modified from Saunders et al. (2015) 
Interpretivism (Philosophy)
Abductive (Approach)
Qualitative (Methodological Choice)
Case Study (Strategies)
Cross Sectional (Time 
Horizon)
Data Collection 
and Data 
Analysis 
(Technique and 
Procedure)
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4.3 Research Philosophy 
The outermost layer of the research onion is represented by the research philosophy, the 
representation of the researcher’s view of what constitutes acceptable knowledge; this view 
will have a great impact on the validity of the research  through the strategy and methods 
chosen (Saunders et al., 2015). Positivism and interpretivism have been described as the 
primary opposite poles of a continuum with selection of the research philosophy aligned 
between them (Easterby-Smith, 2003; Saunders et al., 2015). The difference between these 
two paradigm is clearly justified by Robson (as cited in Petty et al., 2012a). The attributes can 
be seen in Table 4.13. 
Positivism Interpretivism 
Ontology 
 One objective reality.
 Social reality is ordered and these
uniformities can be observed and
explained.
 Deterministic view of social life such
that social action and interaction are
the product of external forces on
social actors.
 Multiple realities (perspectives).
 Reality is socially constructed.
 Reality is preinterpreted,
intersubjective world of cultural
objects, meaning and social
institutions
Epistemology 
 Only accepts what can be directly
observed by the senses. Observation
is theory neutral.
 Discover a reality that will be known
imperfectly and probabilistically due
to limitations of the researcher.
 Absolutist: objective knowledge
possible through observation,
uncontaminated by theory. Value-free
knowledge.
 Understand the multiple social
constructions of meaning and
knowledge.
 Requires insider status; researcher
being immersed, to learn the local
language, meanings and rules.
 Relativist: ultimate truths are
impossible.
 Knowledge is value laden
Knowledge 
 Objective knowledge (facts) can be
gained from direct observation or
experience, but is imperfect and
fallible.
 Theories, hypotheses, background
knowledge and values of the
researcher influence what is
observed.
 Observation involves interpretation
Purpose of research 
 Deductive reasoning strategies tests
hypotheses.
 General laws and theories that explain
and predict.
 Results can be generalized.
 Inductive reasoning strategies to
explore, describe, understand, explain,
change, evaluate.
 Analysis of the frames of meanings of
social actors obtained from everyday
concepts, meanings and accounts;
abstraction leads to explanation.
 Findings are specific to time and place
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Positivism (continued) Interpretivism (continued) 
Research question 
and hypothesis 
 Explicitly defined at the start of the
study
 Broad research question that
becomes refined during data analysis.
 Does not identify hypotheses.
Research Instrument  Often uses external instruments that
ideally are valid and reliable.
Researcher may also act as observer.
Subjects
 The researcher.
Respondents  Subjects are passive.  Respondents actively involved in
constructing the ‘reality’ with the
researcher
Relationship between 
researcher and 
respondents 
 Detached and impersonal.
Researcher to remain objective.
 Respondents are subjects to be
studied
 Involved, immersed in the
respondent’s world. Respondents are
actively contributing.
Data  Measure. Quantitative data (numbers)
is derived from strict rules and
procedures
 Interpret words (spoken or written)
and meanings to gain understanding
of phenomena.
 Use of thick description
Variables  Controlled  Not controlled
Credibility  Replication.  No attempt to replicate studies.
Table 4.13 – Comparison of Assumptions Underpinning Positivism and Interpretivism 
Source: Modified from Petty et al., (2012a) 
As shown in Table 4.13, in order to explore and comprehend the phenomena of competition 
within the Malaysian PPP in depth, the researcher believes that it is appropriate that the 
current PPP implementation in Malaysia is reviewed from the point of view of social actors 
who have lived the experience themselves. Key aspects will include enquiries from various 
individuals’ perspectives on the subject matter. The social actors will comprise the main 
players who are responsible for developing, implementing and executing all available and 
relevant law, statutes, financial authorities, and regulations regarding PPP procurement.  
The research focuses on the dynamics formed by the social actors involved. Diverse decisions 
are made by these insiders deliberately for different situations and consequences. 
Furthermore, different individuals involved may have different interpretations of the same 
relevant subject. Therefore, interpretivism is the philosophy best suited for this research. 
Interpretivism principles allow the research subject to be explored in detail in its own context 
to gain rich inside understanding (Saunders & Tosey, 2012; Yin, 2014) which is an advantage 
for the researcher in identifying key issues. The researcher seeks understanding of the motives 
by questioning, interpreting actions of the social actors assigned to the reality, and revising 
the meanings they put to it (Christie et al., 2000).   
This may not be possible through positivism, since positivism seeks to settle on generalising 
the law and this does not fit well with the researcher’s target. Positivism is unsuitable to 
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achieve the aim and objectives of this research since the philosophy has been criticised for its 
ability to enable in-depth understanding of human behaviour and involvement but does not 
consider these factors as objects’ (Crossan, 2003). Positivism is frequently used by 
researchers to identify causes and test causal relationships. Interpretivism is therefore applied 
to this research, and the effects of this selection of the next level of the research onion are 
discussed below. 
4.4 Research Approach 
There are three research approaches as described by Saunders et al. (2015): (i) deductive, (ii) 
inductive and (iii) abductive. Deductive research leans towards positivism and the inductive 
approach towards interpretivism. Also known as a top-down process, the deductive approach 
is used by researchers to describe causal relationships by testing hypotheses or empirical 
observations. It begins the process from the broad area and moves into more specific research 
areas. Contrary to the deductive approach, the inductive or bottom-up process moves from a 
specific observation to the formulation of a theory. The abductive approach combines the 
process of deduction and induction. 
This research adopted an abductive approach to investigate the PPP phenomena. It starts with 
the deductive approach through the literature review and advances towards induction by 
developing a framework. Although the abductive approach shares the mutual goal with 
induction approach in producing a theory, the distinction lies at the point of the final 
conclusion of the research. The ultimate goal of the abductive approach inclines towards 
discovering new results through understanding of a new or existing phenomena in a fresh 
way, while the inductive approach aims to establish generalisations of the final outcomes 
(Dubois & Gadde, 2002; Kovács & Spens, 2005). Considering the aim of this research, the 
abductive approach is most suitable.  
4.5  Methodology Choice 
Determining the choice of methodology is, according to Saunders and Tosey (2012), 
fundamental. There are two major choices, quantitative and qualitative, which determine the 
data collection techniques and corresponding analysis procedures. Some researchers prefer the 
quantitative methodology where data are represented numerically, or the qualitative 
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methodology where data are represented textually or illustratively. Table 4.14 summarises the 
main features of both methodologies. 
Table 4.14 - Features of Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Inquiry from the outside Inquiry from the inside 
Underpinned by the completely different set of 
epistemological foundations from those in 
qualitative research 
An attempt to take account of differences between 
people 
Are simply different ways to the same end Aimed at flexibility and lack of structure, in order to 
allow theory and concepts to proceed in tandem 
Involves the following of various states of the 
scientific research 
The result is said to be “hard generalisable data” The result is said to be, through theoretical 
generalisation “deep, rich and meaningful.” 
Inductive – propositions may develop not only from 
practice or literature review, but also from ideas 
themselves 
An approach to the study of the social world, which 
seeks to describe and analyse the culture and 
behaviour of humans and their groups from the point 
of view of being studied 
Sources- Amaratunga et al., (2002) 
A qualitative approach was adopted to execute this research. Although a multi or mixed-
method approach is available, this research focuses on the organisational process and public 
policy. The qualitative approach is more appropriate for exploring the actual UKAS practice 
in addressing the research objectives. The researcher’s choice of methodology inherently 
stands on the foundation of the chosen philosophy and the issues addressed in this study. As 
mentioned earlier, this research seeks to understand the implementation of competition in PPP 
at different policy-making levels by personnel and practitioners involved in PPP 
implementation, thus making the qualitative method an obvious and appropriate choice. The 
selected approach allows the research to gain the best of the qualitative features. It is 
highlighted as so influential that it can be used to study in depth any process (Amaratunga et 
al., 2002). 
On the contrary, the quantitative approach’s weakness is the inability to provide data that 
reveals the deep underlying meanings of this research. Positivism requires generalisation of 
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the results gathered from large volumes of quantitative data which researchers will assume to 
represent reality (Myers, 2013; Saunders et al., 2015), and that is not the aim of this study. It 
is acknowledged that a mixed or multiple method may be used for built environment research 
with positive features, but the proposed research objective can be accomplished by using a 
qualitative method. Within the overall qualitative approach, it is still possible, when deemed 
necessary within the research, to utilise quantitative analysis for specific details of the 
research. Having defined and justified the analytical approach it is now necessary to select the 
most appropriate research strategy. 
4.6  Research Strategies 
This layer is described by Saunders and Tosey (2012) as the layer where the development of 
an answer to the research questions will take place. There are abundant strategies a researcher 
may use to provide acceptable answers to research questions. Notable and common strategies 
include: experiments; surveys; archival research; case studies; grounded theories; 
ethnography; action research; cross-sectional; and longitudinal studies as well as descriptive 
and exploratory studies (Easterby-Smith, 2003; Creswell, 2008; Myers, 2013). In order to 
select the most appropriate strategy, Yin (2014) suggested considering three conditions. The 
first condition is the type of research questions posed; the second is the extent of control an 
investigator has over behavioural events; and the third condition is the degree of the focus on 
contemporary events. The relevant situations for different research strategies are shown in 
Table 4.15. 
Table 4.15 - Qualitative Research Strategies 
Research 
strategy 
Forms of research 
question 
Requires control of 
behavioral events 
Focuses on 
contemporary events 
Experiment How, Why? Yes Yes 
Survey Who, What, Where, 
How many, How 
much? 
No Yes 
Archival analysis Who, What, Where, 
How many, How 
much? 
No Yes/No 
History How, Why? No No 
Case Study How, Why? No Yes 
Source –Yin (2014) 
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The methodological choice of this research is a qualitative study, and Myers (2013) suggested 
that the qualitative method focus on these strategies: ethnography, action research, case study 
and grounded theory. Each of the methods has its own strengths and weaknesses in addressing 
different types of research. For example, experiment as a research strategy allows the 
researcher to control the variables for repetitive experiments with the purpose of observing 
causation and consequences (Kumar, 2011; Yin, 2014). As this is most suitable for scientific 
research, it is not applicable to this research since the researcher has no control over the 
subject research. Meanwhile, ethnography requires the researcher to be part of the research 
subject in order to observe and engage with the research subjects in their natural surroundings 
(Myers, 2013). This too can be set aside since the researcher did not intend to immerse as part 
of the context and it is definitely outside the research subject. On the other hand, the action 
research goal is to identify and solve real-life problems of the organisation under 
consideration, but it is unsuitable here due to the constraints of time and the limitations of 
authority of the researcher. Grounded theory is inclined towards grounded issues of reality 
and theory building from first-hand data and is said to contain both deductive and inductive 
elements (Myers, 2013; Saunders et al., 2015). Furthermore, the aim and objectives of this 
research do not require pure grounded theory as a strategy. 
Since the primary research is exploratory in nature, a case study approach is used. The 
research emphasises the practitioners’ input on his/her views or experience. Therefore, in line 
with the characteristics described in the above table and the research context, a case study is 
deemed to be the best approach to the questions of the how and why of this research, and to 
gain a greater understanding of real-life instances (Yin, 2014). Furthermore, the researcher 
has no control over any aspect of the research subject, which is the UKAS procurement 
process and the competition policy engaged within the procurement process. In addition, 
research by Tang et al. (2010) suggested that case study is the preferable research strategy 
used to study PPP phenomena.  
The case study designed for this research is based on the four choices suggested by Yin 
(2014): (i) single case study (holistic) designs; (ii) single case study (embedded) designs; (iii) 
multiple case (holistic) designs; and (iv) multiple case (embedded) designs. A case can be 
anything which Yin describes as a contemporary phenomenon….in its real-world context. 
The decision to select a single case (holistic) was influenced by the context of this study. This 
research focuses on UKAS under the Prime Minister’s Department, as it plays such an 
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important role in promoting and executing PPP in Malaysia. UKAS was set up by the 
Government of Malaysia as the core agency given the responsibility to plan, coordinate and 
monitor the implementation of the majority of the PPP projects in Malaysia. Particulars of 
UKAS were given in Chapter 2. As advocated by Yin (2014), a single case study is suitable 
for a critical, unusual, common, revelatory or longitudinal case. He added that the approach 
is suitable when the objectives of the research are to capture the circumstances and conditions 
of everyday situation. UKAS reflects the description of a case to be studied since it is the sole 
agency set up as a PPP unit in Malaysia and responsible for PPP implementation. As there are 
no comparable PPP units in Malaysia, multiple case studies within the Malaysian context are 
out of the question. Dubois & Gadde (2002) suggested that in employing a multiple case 
study rather than a single case means breadth is chosen over depth. Siggelkow (2007) and 
Farquhar (2012) suggested that a single case study is capable of covering greater depth in 
understanding a phenomenon. Although single case study is mentioned for its lack of law-like 
generalisation ability, the goal of this research is aimed to understand in depth rather 
generalising the findings.  
The unit of analysis in this research is narrowed down to competition within the UKAS 
procurement process. The selection of UKAS as the holistic case enable exploration of how 
competition is applied within the UKAS procurement process. The selected unit of analysis is 
closely related to the research objectives and will assist in shaping the range of data collected 
in the later stage (Yin, 2014).  
4.7 Time Horizon 
This layer explains the time horizon over which the research is executed (Saunders & Tosey, 
2012). Even though the tenure of a PPP project may be 25-30 years, this research does not 
take a longitudinal approach. Instead, it was designed for a cross-sectional time which focuses 
on the details and objectives of the subject at one point of time. The research focuses on the 
specific timeframe of the procurement process. As the advantages of cross-sectional study 
include less time consumption and cost (Mann, 2003), it is also more suitable for the status of 
this research as a doctoral study than longitudinal research. 
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4.8 Data Collection Procedures 
There are multiple ways by which data can be obtained. One of the strengths of using the case 
study approach is that it permits the researcher to exploit a mixture of sources of evidence 
(Yin, 2014; Saunders et al., 2015). Saunders et al. (2015) and Kumar (2011) categorise data as 
primary and secondary. Both types can contain a wealth of information. Primary data is the 
data collected from a researcher’s own study, and can be obtained through observation, 
interviews and questionnaires. Secondary data comes from someone else’s study. In this 
research, secondary data came mostly but not exclusively from books, articles, legislation, 
past theses, magazines, newspapers and relevant websites, while primary data was collected 
through interviews.  
Although claimed as the most common method of data collection in conducting a case study 
(Yin, 2012), observation is not suitable for this research as it will not help the researcher to 
understand what is happening in UKAS. It is also susceptible to the researcher’s bias 
(Saunders et al., 2015). No physical artefacts were identified for use in this research. Another 
preferred data collection method is the questionnaire, a set of pro-forma questions distributed 
to individuals in order to gather information. It is usually administered through mail, e-mail, 
electronic surveys or phone. As this research intends to go deeper into UKAS practice based 
on the experience of the social actors, the lack of opportunity in a questionnaire to ask for 
clarification will defeat the purpose. The data acquired from questionnaire may also lack 
clarity. Interviews are recommended to achieve rich data for the Malaysian PPP research 
(Ismail, 2013a, 2013b, 2014, Ismail & Haris, 2014a, 2014b).  
The researcher therefore selected a combination of interviews with a review of documentation 
and archival records. The benefits of combining these two sources of evidence is that the 
methods complement each other. For example, there are limitations in interpreting the text in 
the documents reviewed. However, combined with the interviews and actual experience and 
knowledge of the participants, the researcher is able to put value and context to the text of 
documents for more informative results. Flick (2014) suggested that combining two data 
collection methods may result in discrepancies of information. It is therefore important to 
validate and verify the information in documents against UKAS actual practice, whether it 
agrees with or contradicts with the policy set. In addition, selection of interviews over other 
primary data collection methods was its capability to probe UKAS actual practice, allowing 
the researcher to receive clarification of any unclear answers from respondents (Kumar, 
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2011), and obtain access to unpublished sensitive information. The selected sources of 
evidence were tailored carefully to address the research objectives and achieving the aim of 
the research. The synthesis of all gathered information is expected to form important elements 
for the framework for this research. The case study will be conducted in two stages: document 
review and interviews.  
4.8.1 Document Review   
Although interviews are the primary source of evidence for this research, archival records and 
documents kept by the relevant agencies and parties are equally necessary. Collection of 
archival and current documents as empirical field data is recognised as being significant (Yin, 
2014). Data will be gathered on the PPP implementation adopted by the UKAS. These 
reviews of existing information are needed to enhance the reliability and triangulate the 
research interviews. This is complemented by a process of semi-structured interviews with 
individuals involved with the UKAS PPP procurement process.  
4.8.1.1 Identification of Documents 
In the context of this research, the archival records and documents to be analysed were 
identified from the literature review and interviews. The published archival records and 
documents were used to understand the established PPP practice and the competition policy 
adopted by UKAS. In line with the ambitious plan to access UKAS documents and files, the 
researcher applied for permission from the Economic Planning Unit to undertake the research 
into UKAS, and was granted permission. 
The literature review led to the belief that the PPP implementation is based on the Malaysian 
public procurement regulations. Despite the permission granted by the Economic Planning 
Unit, UKAS has a very strict policy of documentation control which limits access to the 
agency files and internal material, hence limiting the ability of the researcher to access 
material to examine the procurement process for past concessions. The main document used 
and referred to by UKAS is its own PPP guidelines. Other sources reviewed includes the 
Privatisation Master Plan and UKAS website. Documents are available to the public via the 
UKAS website, and details are further discussed in Chapter 5. 
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4.8.2 Interviews 
As one of the most common sources of evidence for case study, data will be collected through 
a series of interviews. In built environment research, interviews are considered to be the 
favoured method (Amaratunga et al., 2002) and are the most critical source of evidence in this 
research. According to Saunders et al. (2015), interviews can be conducted in three ways: 
structured, semi-structured or unstructured. Each type of interview has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. A structured interview limits the responses from the individual, leading to less 
rich data. At the other extreme, unstructured interview allow the respondents to express 
themselves freely without limitation, hence making the process of analysing the data more 
difficult since there are no consistencies (Myers, 2013). A semi-structured interview elicits 
valuable information of actual experiences, the respondent’s interpretation, and 
recommendations on the research matter. Since this study involves an in-depth study of the 
government’s procedures and policy, a semi-structured interview will allow the respondents 
to be more flexible in giving their feedback from different perspectives, with consistency 
coming from a similar set of questions. A few sets of pro-forma interview questions were 
prepared. Due to the uniqueness and different decisions made by human actors in the case 
study, follow-up questions were asked for further clarification and justification. This was to 
ensure that the objectives of the interview, to obtain facts and the meaning of events, are met. 
4.8.2.1 Sampling of Respondents 
Saunders et al. (2015) explained that sampling is necessary, given the limitation in obtaining 
information from the entire population. The selection of the sample depends on the research 
objectives. Factors such as accessibility to the resources, and financial and time limitations 
should not be ignored in deciding the sampling technique. There are two strategic sampling 
options: probability sampling/random sampling and non-probability/non-random sampling. 
Kumar (2011) drew the border between the use of sampling within a quantitative research and 
a qualitative research. In quantitative research, a sample represents the study population, 
while sampling in qualitative research is less significant, used to achieve a diverse yet 
comprehensive set of data (Sandelowski, 1995). Both approaches are valuable. Based on the 
nature of the research outlined in Chapter 1, the research requires quality in the sample rather 
than quantity. Thus purposive sampling was selected. This is a sub-set of non-probability 
sampling where a specific sample is selected in a non-random way to acquire rich and 
specialised information (Kumar, 2011; Saunders et al., 2015). Purposive sampling is 
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consistent with the research philosophy and the research strategy. If a probability/random 
sampling technique is deployed in identifying the interview respondents, it might not achieve 
the objectives of this research. The researcher had a clear idea of the research respondents, 
and those identified are presented in Table 4.16.  
Table 4.16 - Respondent Sampling  
Sampling 
type 
Criteria Respondent identifier Objective Numbers of 
Respondents 
Purposive UKAS 
Personnel 
UKAS Tactical – 
Respondent 1 (R1) 
To understand the PPP 
implementation and the 
competition policy 
adopted from the policy 
making perspective. 
Further to confirm the 
actual practice with the 
published guidelines and 
regulations 
5 respondents 
UKAS Tactical –  
Respondent 2 (R2) 
UKAS Technical – 
Respondent 3 (R3) 
UKAS Operational – 
Respondent 4 (R4) 
UKAS Operational – 
Respondent 5 (R5) 
Purposive PPP 
Practitioner 
who 
experienced 
with UKAS 
procurement 
process 
Client – Respondent 6 
(R6) 
To learn about the 
benefits, experience and 
perceptions of these first 
line of UKAS PPP 
5 respondents 
Consultants to Financier 
– Respondent 7 (R7)
SPV - Respondent 8 (R8) 
SPV - Respondent 9 (R9) 
Project management 
company for SPV - 
Respondent 10 (R10) 
Purposive PPP Expert Academic Expert – 
Respondent 11 (R11) 
To learn about the 
expert’s view on PPP 
phenomena in Malaysia 
3 respondents 
Academic Expert – 
Respondent 12 (R12) 
Industry Expert – 
Respondent 13 (R13) 
Respondents were deliberately selected based on their knowledge, experience and 
involvement with the UKAS procurement process. Each identified respondent has his own 
role and experience with the UKAS procurement process, so the researcher opted for 
individual face–to-face interviews. The rationale of the criteria mentioned above is to have an 
in-depth exploration of the Malaysian context as prescribed by people with experience or 
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knowledge about the UKAS procurement process. The research segregates the sample into 
three groups with divergent backgrounds, according to their activity and contribution to the 
UKAS procurement process. Through this sampling selection and thorough identification of 
respondents, the researcher is able to maximise the amount of information expected on 
Malaysian PPP.  
Table 4.17 – Minimum Non-Probability Sample Size 
Nature of Study Minimum Sample Size 
Semi-structure/in-depth Interviews 5-25 
Ethnographic 35-36 
Grounded Theory 20-35 
Considering a homogenous population 4-12 
Considering a heterogeneous population 12-30 
Source: Saunders et al. (2015) 
Deciding on the sample size in qualitative research is difficult. Too small a sample might 
affect the quality of the data collected (Sandelowski, 1995). However, Kumar (2011) stressed 
that sample size in qualitative research is not as crucial as in statistical research. Instead of 
achieving a specific sample size, an adequate sample size for qualitative research is one that is 
sufficient to satisfy the research objectives and to build arguments for the study (Suter, 2011). 
An adequate size is achieved when the data collected reaches saturation point, that is when no 
new information is received or new themes discovered (Kumar, 2011; Saunders et al., 2015). 
Although the saturation point is subjective and dependent on the judgement of the researcher, 
Table 4.17 demonstrate the minimum non-probability sample size as recommended by 
Saunders. 
During the interviews, there was a suggestion by one respondent of a snowball sampling 
exercise, by recommending another individual to be interviewed; however, when contacted 
this individual was not interested in contributing to this research. In fact, the sample already 
included an individual with the same role and experience. 
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4.8.2.2 Interview Questions 
The interview questions were designed to ensure richness gained through the sources of 
evidence mentioned in the above procedures. The classic questions of who, what, when, 
where and why were used as a basis from which to develop the interview questions.  
The choice of interview as the source of primary data made the process of designing the 
questions critical (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2008). They were based on the literature review, with 
different sets of interview questions designed for each category in order to achieve the same 
goal but seen from different perspectives: policy maker, practitioner and expert. The 
advantage of using pre-determined questions is in providing a consistent basis for the data 
analysis phase. All interview questions can be seen in Appendix C, D and E. The interview 
questions were divided into two major themes: PPP and competition. In the PPP section, the 
questions were drafted to seek: 
i. Understanding of the people involved in the PPP legal status of UKAS;
ii. The actual procurement process practised;
iii. The objective of the PPP programme under UKAS.
For the second research theme, competition, questions were designed to ascertain the 
importance of competition in the procurement process. The questions in each set focused on: 
i. The relevance of competition within the PPP procurement process;
ii. Respondents’ views on the current competition policy incorporated by UKAS
in the procurement process;
iii. Considerations in deciding the type of procurement;
iv. Unsolicited proposal implementation;
v. The implementation of the New Economy Policy within UKAS PPP.
Several follow-up questions were also asked during the interview sessions, to seek 
justification and clarification of unclear responses. As mentioned above, different sets of 
questions were put to each group, the UKAS personnel, PPP practitioners and PPP experts, as 
follows:  
• The first set was designed for the UKAS personnel and aimed at gaining
information about PPP, competition and its implementation. To gain this
information, respondents were asked their views on the policy and
implementation of PPP. Further questions were about the parameters used by
109 
the unit to justify using this procurement process and the initiatives taken to 
uphold competition in PPP implementation. 
• The second set was designed for the managers of selected companies involved
in PPP by UKAS. The interview attempted to assess their involvement in PPP
and to gain their views and perceptions of the current UKAS policy.
• The third set was designed for the identified experts in PPP from academic
institutions or from industry. These interviews were intended to gain an
understanding on the PPP phenomenon in Malaysia, especially through UKAS,
and their views and opinions on the applicability of competition in the PPP
procurement process.
4.8.4 Pilot Study 
A pilot study is commonly conducted in social sciences research for two reasons: as a small-
scale trial run in preparation for a larger study; and pre-testing the feasibility of a research 
instrument or methods and procedures (van Teijlingen & Hundley, 1998). Since this research 
adopted the single unit case study, the pilot study is vital to anticipate any potential concerns, 
allowing any improvement or enhancement to be made. Prior to the actual interviews with the 
respondents, a pilot study was therefore undertaken to test the precision of the research 
instrument in addressing the research question and hence to increase its validity and 
reliability. The pilot study was also intended to estimate the time required for actual 
interviews.  
One respondent who matched the criteria as outlined was interviewed in November 2014. 
This respondent worked for UKAS and also had the privilege to be seconded to one of the 
concessionaires. The interview lasted approximately 30 minutes. Based on the feedback from 
the respondent, the research instrument was considered clear in terms of language and easy to 
comprehend the content. The respondent advised on the researcher’s interview technique in 
extracting information from future respondents, since there are questions regarding their 
experience and personal opinions of government policy. The data collected from this 
respondent will not form part of the case study as the pilot was only a feasibility study. Since 
the interview was conducted in several languages, it was translated and transcribed. The same 
procedure was carried out for the actual interviews.  
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4.8.5 Conducting the Interviews 
The interviews were carried out in February and March 2015. Personal arrangements were 
made through telephone and e-mail with each respondent. All interviews were held face to 
face and conducted at the most convenient time and location for respondents. Each respondent 
was given an interview guideline comprising research information, the management and 
security of the respondents’ responses and the interview questions. Respondents were 
volunteers and no incentives were offered in the invitation to participate. Respondents could 
refuse to participate and were permitted to withdraw at any time without giving any specific 
reasons. Due to the sensitivity of the research subject, they were assured that no information 
or any clue would lead to their identification. All personal information was anonymous and 
would not be discussed with other parties without consent.   
The interviews lasted from 40 minutes to 2 hours, averaging of 1 hour of talking. For some 
respondents, follow-up questions were asked for clarification and to give the respondents the 
opportunity to develop the point made. The interviews were audio recorded, with permission 
from the respondents. These recordings are important to make certain of the accuracy of the 
translation from the different languages used during the interviews into acceptable English. 
The translation is presented in the form of a paper transcription for analysis purposes. All 
interviews ran smoothly as planned. 
4.8.6 Data Analysis 
Qualitative data analysis emphasises understanding in depth the meaning of the collected data, 
focusing on the context (Schutt, 2012) The process of analysing the collected data is 
significant as it draws the answers from the textual data collected into something meaningful 
(Saunders et al., 2015). In qualitative research, data analysis needs to be executed in a non-
routine, original, iterative, non-linear and complete manner (Suter, 2011; Petty et al., 2012b). 
Without the analysis, qualitative data would be just a mass of texts collected from the data 
collection process. 
Although there are numerous methods of data analysis, there is no specific method for case 
study (Petty et al., 2012b; Yin, 2012). Case study allows the flexibility to use any method. For 
this research, content analysis is employed to uncover patterns, identify themes and categories 
in order to understand the research subject. 
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4.8.6.1 Content Analysis 
Content analysis is widely used in qualitative research. It is a tool or method to extract 
significant desired raw information (implicit or explicit) from texts or images and organise it 
into systematic concepts before making valid inferences and interpretation (Krippendorff, 
1989, 2004; Smith, 2000; Kulatunga et al., 2007; Colorado State University, 2014). Content 
analysis is also capable of quantifying qualitative data (Kulatunga et al., 2007; Vaismoradi et 
al., 2013). The advantage in using content analysis of data is its systematic ability to deal with 
raw and overwhelming amounts of data (Joffe & Yardley, 2004).  
Kulatunga et al. (2007) discussed four approaches to content analysis. The first is word count, 
in which the frequency of identified words is counted, with the assumption the most frequent 
words used indicates the importance of these words. The second approach is conceptual 
content analysis, in which text or sets of text are examined for the presence and occurrence of 
identified concept and/or themes (Colorado State University, 2014). The concepts or themes 
can be predetermined from the literature review or may emerge from the data itself. The third 
approach is relational analysis, which analyses the relationship between the concepts inside 
the text (ibid). The fourth approach is referential content analysis, in which the text is 
examined for its underlying meaning and interpreted based on the judgement of the 
researcher.  
Content analysis was selected for this research as it offers the possibility to examine the 
respondents’ responses through multiple approaches in order to find statements which are 
significant to the research. As this study aims to explore UKAS, the published documents 
related to its practice and the experience of the respondents were investigated. Considering 
the irrelevant and limited functionality of word count and relational analysis here, this 
research utilises conceptual content analysis to provide insight into UKAS practice. Using 
conceptual content analysis allows the researcher to interpret the text and identify the 
presence of explicit information that is relevant and essential to build up the case. Dealing 
with a large amount of text, conceptual content analysis is appropriate since it is a systematic 
approach to limit the subjectivity in the interview transcriptions.  
4.8.6.2 Coding of Data 
During the analysis of the pilot study, the researcher experimented with analysing the 
transcript manually and by using the Nvivo 10 software, deciding on the latter since it proved 
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to be an appropriate tool in managing the interview transcription and aiding the execution of 
the content analysis. The amount of categories/nodes and coding created during the analysis 
process is enormous, hence the use of specialised software was appropriate. Nvivo 10 has no 
doubt assisted the coding process to be systematic and more precise. Despite limitations in the 
graphic presentation produced by the software, the researcher accepted this, with the intention 
of integrating it with other available software. 
Coding is the process whereby the data collected is interpreted and defined by the researcher, 
an important step (Robson & McCartan, 2016). The analysis process began with 
familiarisation with the raw data. The audio recordings of the interviews were listened to 
repeatedly, until the researcher was accustomed with them. Documents were read and re-read 
to understand the context. The next step was to categorise the data through the process of 
coding, that is organising and sorting the raw data (Kohlbacher, 2006) 
The categories used in the analysis are a combination of pre-determined and open categories. 
Pre-determined categories were identified during the familiarisation stage through the 
documents referring to UKAS, while open categories emerged from analysing the data itself. 
Both were created as nodes in Nvivo 10. These nodes were important in classifying the data 
into meaningful categories. Through the process of coding the text into relevant categories, 
sub-categories emerged as more refined categories were identified; these are sub-nodes in 
Nvivo 10. 
The process of coding the raw data into nodes and sub-nodes depends on the interpretation of 
the researcher. The codes were identified for the potential and relevance of the raw data to 
existing or new categories. In Nvivo 10, the process involves the researcher examining each 
interview transcript for relevant text and patterns which fit any category, then assigning it 
under respective nodes and sub-nodes.  
These processes were done repeatedly; similar relevant texts from other respondents was 
examined, coded and collated under existing or new categories until the subject crystallised to 
address the research objectives. The analysed data was then presented and arranged in a 
consistent order, as illustrated in Figure 4.9, for ease of understanding.  
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Figure 4.9 – Example of Data Presentation Using Nvivo 10 
The result of the analysis corresponds well to the purpose of examining PPP implementation 
in the Malaysian context through the experience of the actors involved. The results were then 
used to develop the frameworks aimed to enhance the procurement process for infrastructure 
delivery in Malaysian PPP by incorporating competition. 
4.8.7 Validation of the Frameworks 
A validation exercise was carried out on the frameworks developed, in order to acquire a 
broader view regarding: 
i. the clarity of the proposed frameworks;
ii. the possibility of the frameworks being used in practice;
iii. barriers in implementing the frameworks; and
iv. recommendations to enhance the frameworks.
After the development of the frameworks, a second phase of semi-structured interviews was 
conducted in December 2015 with specific respondents, identified as representing different 
types of important stakeholder in UKAS PPP implementation. The stakeholders were the 
public (taxpayer), government (policy maker), the practitioner (industry) and the client 
(ministries/agencies). The implication from the frameworks will affect these stakeholders in 
different ways. Respondents participating in the validation exercise were the chairman of the 
Public Accounts Committee (representing the public), the Director of Policy Section for 
UKAS (representing government), the Deputy Director of the PFI unit for a higher education 
institution (representing clients) and a project director of the largest concession under UKAS 
PPP (representing practitioners). The framework validation process ensured the framework 
Example 
of nodes 
Example of 
sub-nodes 
Blue highlighted 
means nodes in 
discussion 
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developed is appropriate for the application of Malaysian PPP, with consideration of the many 
trade-offs from the view of the highest authority. The detail of the validation process is 
discussed further in Chapter 6. 
4.9 Validity and Reliability 
The importance of having accurate data and solid results in achieving quality is very much a 
concern in any research (Creswell & Miller, 2000; Golafshani, 2003; Suter, 2011; Yilmaz, 
2013). Yilmaz (2013) describes validity as accuracy of data and, on the other hand, reliability 
as consistency or the degree to which a research instrument measures a given variable 
consistently every time it is used under the same condition. Yilmaz added that to achieve 
reliability and validity, the research needs to satisfy certain standards in measuring and 
collecting data. Golafshani (2003) pointed out that in qualitative research, validity and 
reliability are also about eliminating bias in the research. Validity and reliability are also 
important to accomplish rigour in case study research (Atkins & Sampson, 2002; Gibbert et 
al., 2008; Thomas & Magilvy, 2011). In more simple terms, Neuman (2014) pointed out that 
validity is all about how truthful is the research. 
Yin (2014) suggested four tests commonly used in social research to maximise validity and 
reliability: (i) construct validity; (ii) internal validity; (iii) external validity; and (iv) reliability. 
Construct validity should be considered in the data collection phase. The aim is to establish 
the precise operational measures for the research context. It is vital for a researcher to identify 
the required data to be collected, appropriate and suitable methods of collecting the identified 
data and the best way to describe the data in the context of the research. Suggested tactics 
include the use of multiple sources of evidence, establishing a chain of evidence and having 
the draft reviewed by key stakeholders. The second test, internal validity, is applicable when 
there is need to find a relationship between events, mainly in causal studies and experiments 
(Gibbert et al., 2008). The third test, external validity, concerns whether the findings can be 
applied to other research. The reliability test is about the possibility of repeating the same case 
study and achieving a mirror result. Table 4.18 demonstrates the strategy adopted to achieve 
validity and reliability. 
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Table 4.18 – Research Validity and Reliability Strategies 
Test Case Study Tactic Actions 
Phase of research 
in which action 
taken 
Va
lid
at
io
n 
 Multiple sources of evidences
were used.
 Establish Chain of Evidence
 Have key informants review
draft case study report
 Interview was conducted with
three different groups. UKAS
personnel, practitioner and
expert
 Use of interviews and
authoritative documents.
 Interviews were audio recorded
and transcribe in real time
 The develop framework will be
validated by identified key
stakeholders in a second
interview process.
Data Collection 
Data Collection 
Composition 
Re
lia
bi
lit
y 
 Develop case study database
 Multiple run of data analysis
 Database for interview
transcript, document reviews
and other relevant sources was
developing
 Multiple run of data analysis for
reliability check
Data Collection 
Data analysis 
In the test of construct validity, Yin (2014) suggested using multiple sources of evidence 
instead of a single source, in order to increase validity. Thus, during the data collection stage, 
interviews were conducted with three different identified groups, allowing the researcher to 
collect different information from different experience and viewpoints of UKAS practice, to 
be corroborated later. The approach is also strengthened by the use of interviews and 
documents identified as sources of evidence. Another approach applied in this research was 
establishing a chain of evidence. All the interviews recorded, documents reviewed and 
literature referred to were well documented and cited to permit interested parties to trace the 
process of data collection. The final techniques applied to the case study was to have key 
informants review the draft report to validate the framework before it was finalized. 
For reliability, the researcher applied the technique suggested by Riege (2003), creating a case 
study database by systematically documenting the data collected. All material in the database 
is kept securely in electronic form and is accessible only by permission of the researcher. Data 
analysis was also performed several times to ensure reliability.       
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4.10 Reflexivity 
Besides validity and reliability, reflexivity is essential to enhance the credibility of the 
research. Symon et al. (2004) use the term reflexivity in qualitative research to acknowledge 
the active role played by the researcher and how it might affect the research process and the 
knowledge produced. As it is established that the researcher is part of the instrument in 
qualitative research, he might be expected to bring personal and professional experience to its 
execution (Baillie, 2015). Nevertheless, there is a danger that the researcher might be 
influenced by his own preconceptions, values and norms, affecting the results (Bowen, 2009; 
Thomas & Magilvy, 2011; Wright et al., 2016). Malterud (2001) added that even the 
background and position of a researcher can profoundly affect the research design and should 
not be ignored.  
Baillie (2015) suggests that reflexivity is one of the techniques used to promote rigour in 
qualitative research, where the “researcher consciously recognises and addresses their effect 
and influence of the research”. She added that this technique requires the researcher to be self-
aware and critical of any potential bias and preconceptions. Through reflexivity, the 
researcher attempts to be honest, reporting his position on the subject matter (Creswell & 
Miller, 2000). 
Although it could be argued that he is employed by the government of Malaysia and 
sponsored by them to pursue the Doctoral study, this researcher is not part of the agency 
studied and has never been involve with their activities. Even though the government of 
Malaysia has awarded him a scholarship, they never dictated the research subject or interfered 
with the research at any time. All interpretations and conclusions made were drawn from the 
findings and the researcher’s own work. 
In adopting an interpretive approach to understand the practice of UKAS, it was established 
that a multiple reality exists, constructed by the respondents, in their own words. As discussed 
and justified in the methodology chapter, this is nevertheless the most appropriate approach to 
synthesise the actual practice of PPP in Malaysia. The respondents’ replies contains rich, in-
depth data which is not available publicly, hence are appropriate to achieve the aim of this 
research. The use of semi-structured interview questions allows the respondents to talk 
without restriction within the study context (Saunders et al., 2015).  The researcher did not 
interfere or exert any influence on the interviewees’ responses or views. Although the 
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interpretation of these responses during the analysis process is that of the researcher, a large 
number of the original replies are quoted verbatim in the analysis chapter.  
4.11 Research Ethics 
As part of the requirements for a doctoral thesis at the University of Salford, it is the duty of 
the researcher to maintain the ethical standards set by the University. An application was 
submitted to the College of Science and Technology Research Ethics Panel, and approval was 
granted to conduct this research. The approval letter is attached as Appendix A. Guided by the 
research ethics, at all times the researcher is expected to perform his duty to responsibly use 
and share the data collected, respecting the anonymity and confidentiality of the respondents 
and preserving the privacy of the data.  
The research was also granted approval by the Malaysian Economic Planning Unit, as 
required by the Malaysian Prime Minister’s Department General Circular 3/99 for conducting 
research in Malaysia.  
4.12 Summary 
This chapter discussed the research design and methodology. The discussion comprises 
several considerations made before selecting the most appropriate philosophy, approach, 
methodology, research strategy, time horizon and research techniques. In the next chapter, the 
findings of the case study are presented. 
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Chapter Five –  
Case Study: Document Review and Interview Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapters 2 and 3, the researcher provided a glimpse of Malaysian PPP development, public 
procurement procedures and the competition policy adopted, based on the literature review. In 
contrast, this chapter is centred on the case study, examining the data collected from multiple 
sources of evidence. As this study aims to examine the practice of UKAS, relevant published 
documents were reviewed and the experience of respondents was investigated through 
interviews. The purpose of the document review is to examine the documents used by UKAS 
in governing its procurement process and competition policy incorporated. Although 
interviews are seen as the primary means of acquiring knowledge of the actual practice of 
UKAS procurement process and the incorporated competition policy, document reviews were 
salient to verify and supplement the findings from the interviews in order to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of the subject studied. Both sources of evidence are crucial in 
addressing the research objectives and for the development of the framework.  
This chapter consists of three main sections. The first examines published material regarding 
the procurement process and competition policy incorporated by UKAS. The second section 
presents the analysis of the findings from interviews regarding the procurement process 
adopted by UKAS for its PPP programme. The last section presents the analysis of the 
findings on the competition policy practised by UKAS in its procurement process. The 
documents reviewed are presented individually in this chapter, with comparison of the 
published information and the practice on the ground in Chapter 6. 
5.2 Selected Documents 
Different documents serve different purposes and were carefully identified for the review 
exercise. The selection was based on the literature review and response received from the 
interview respondents. The researcher acknowledges that there are other documents used by 
UKAS which are not accessible to members of the public. Request for Proposal documents, 
for example, are classified as private and confidential by the government; bidders are required 
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to sign a confidentiality agreement. Nevertheless, the documents reviewed in this chapter are 
those most frequently mentioned by the respondents as the main reference for UKAS PPP. 
For the purpose of this research, only content identified as relevant to understanding and 
addressing the research objectives will be highlighted. The documents reviewed are as 
follows: 
5.2.1 UKAS Guideline (2009) 
The UKAS guideline was the document most talked about by the respondents as the main 
reference for UKAS operation, including the procurement process. The guideline was 
published in 2009 to elucidate the UKAS principles and the concept of PPP. In the absence of 
specific statutory regulations, UKAS guideline is one of the main references for UKAS day-
to-day operation. It states that it is not a detailed document, yet it is to be referred to by any 
interested parties participating in the programme. 
The guideline starts with an enlightening brief of the PPP programme as a continuation of the 
PFI programme, acknowledging that the previous PFI programme is a subset model of the 
current PPP programme. Any PFI programme by UKAS shall be known as PPP. The 
guideline then explains the UKAS conceptual framework of PPP. In general, UKAS PPP 
involves a shift of responsibilities from the public to the private sector to finance, manage, 
construct and maintain the public sector’s asset for an extensive period of time. In return for 
the services delivered by the private sector, the public sector/user is responsible for paying for 
the service over the concession period. Notably, the guideline indicates that PPP is part of the 
public procurement model. 
Furthermore, the guideline confirms four characteristics of the PPP proposal to be considered 
by UKAS. These are:  
i. Beneficial to socio-economic conditions;
ii. Value for money and cost saving for the government;
iii. Fast and efficient delivery;
iv. Enhancement of accountability, efficiency and effectiveness.
Pointing out value for money as the UKAS PPP main driver, the guideline describes it as the 
optimal combination of whole life cost and quality to meet the users’ requirements (Public-
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Private Partnership Unit, 2009). The guideline lists the UKAS approaches to achieving value 
for money:  
i. Optimum risk transfer between public sector and private partner;
ii. Comprehensive concession contract, including life cycle of asset;
iii. Innovation of bidders through specifying output specifications;
iv. Competitive prices for projects;
v. Performance-based payments;
vi. Maximisation of private sector expertise and skills.
The guideline then puts forward a section for proposal development for interested parties. A 
proposal should include: 
i. Proposal justifications;
ii. Commercial plans which includes business and financial;
iii. Proof of financial strength and capability;
iv. Suggested payment mechanism;
v. Risk management plan.
In detailing these requirements of the proposal, there is a disclaimer warning interested parties 
to refer to specific tender documents for additional information. Proposals are to be submitted 
to relevant ministries or agencies. The guideline then itemises the general criteria for proposal 
assessment:  
i. Clear output specification;
ii. Minimum of 20 years’ economic life of proposed infrastructure;
iii. Fresh innovative technology
iv. Financially solid; minimum 10 per cent paid up capital from the project value
fixed for Special Purpose Vehicle.
Other than these general criteria, there is a lack of detail or explanation for interested parties 
to participate in the programme. The guideline then describes the structure of UKAS PPP and 
anticipates the roles for all parties. It presents a flow chart of the process flow for UKAS 
projects, as illustrated in Figure 5.10. The guideline does not provide further explanation for 
the flow chart as it is assumed that it is self-explanatory.  
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Figure 5.10– Process Flow in UKAS Guideline
Source: UKAS (2009) 
The guideline does not specify whether the flow chart is meant for government-initiated or 
unsolicited proposals. It starts with submission of the PPP proposal from ministries or 
agencies to be brought to the cabinet to obtain approval in principle for the proposed project 
to proceed under the PPP programme. In the event of any proposal failing to obtain cabinet 
approval for PPP implementation, the submitting ministry or agency may continue with other 
government procurements, subject to approval from the relevant authority. Meanwhile, 
successful applications shall continue through the procurement process. There is a lack of 
detail in the flow chart explaining how UKAS decides on the suitable procurement process to 
be adopted. It only shows that, subsequent to approval of the principle by cabinet, ministries 
may proceed to prepare bidding documents and an invitation to bid. Through the procurement 
process, ministries and agencies are required to shortlist three names to be submitted to 
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UKAS. Subsequently, the guideline mentions an evaluation process to choose the best 
company, conducted by a committee. Nonetheless, there is an absence of detail of the 
committee in the flow chart or the guideline itself. Although endorsements are made by the 
committee, the decision still needs to be brought to a cabinet meeting for the final decision. 
Once the private partner has been selected, the process moves to the negotiation of terms and 
conditions with the private partner. As with the previous steps, the finalisation of the agreed 
terms and conditions will be decided by cabinet before any concessions can be signed. The 
flow chart ends with the stage of project implementation. After the flow chart, the guideline 
provides the contact details in the event of any enquiries from the reader.  
5.2.2 UKAS Website 
More organisations opt for digital media for public relations purposes, using a website as a 
medium to deliver announcements and convey updated facts (Verčič & Tkalac Verčič, 2015). 
UKAS maintains a website with various items of information for members of the public, the 
private sector and UKAS personnel. The content is available in two languages, Malay and 
English, although the latter sometimes incorporates Malay. The researcher has no problem in 
focusing on content regarding the UKAS procurement process and competition policy. The 
website covers UKAS history, vision, mission, objectives, organisation strategy, structures, 
role of UKAS and their customer charter.        
Under the menu option MyPartnership is information regarding UKAS operation including 
the procurement process. The section briefly defines UKAS PPP and explains a model they 
adopted. It also compares conventional and PPP procurement. Two flow charts associated 
with the UKAS procurement process are presented, which may create confusion for industry 
newcomers and potential stakeholders. Their dissimilarity with the flow chart in the guideline 
may also lead to inconsistencies in practice by UKAS. The first flow chart is shown in Figure 
5.11 below.    
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Figure 5.11– Stages of UKAS Procurement Process. 
Source: UKAS (2015a) 
This flow chart is found under the heading end to end process under the MyPartnership menu. 
The website does not offer any description of the procedures involved in this flow chart. 
However, observation establishes that this chart is a simplified version of the flowchart in the 
guideline, discussed above, displaying the stages that a party will undergo with UKAS PPP.  
Consequently, UKAS offers the reader another diagram under the heading approval process 
flow chart. Divided into two parts, this is illustrated in Figures 5.12 and 5.13. Part two 
describes the UKAS framework process in more detail than that in the official UKAS 
guideline. Figure 5.12 starts with receipt of PPP proposals from ministries or agencies and 
from the private sector, suggesting that this flow chart is meant for both government-initiated 
and unsolicited proposals. 
After the receipt of a proposal, an assessment of completeness is conducted before the 
proposal is evaluated for feasibility and bankability under the UKAS PPP programme, 
although the website does not detail the evaluation mechanism conducted or adopted by 
UKAS for this assessment. In the event that the proposal is considered acceptable in meeting 
all of the government’s requirements, it will be tabled before an inter-agency committee 
comprising Jawatankuasa Awam Swasta (JKAS) and Jawatankuasa Tertinggi Awam Swasta 
(JTAS). At both levels, the inter-agency committee is only authorised to endorse and make 
124 
recommendations to cabinet and still requires the cabinet minister’s decision. If approved by 
cabinet, the proposal will go through the phases illustrated in Figure 5.13.  
A
Received PPP Proposal from the private 
sector or PPP application from 
Ministries or Agencies
Assess the completeness of the 
proposal
Complete?
Yes
No
Analysing feasibility and 
bankability of the proposal to be 
executed using PPP
Get more info
Feasible using PPP?
Yes
No
Reject proposal 
Tabled up the proposal to JKAS/
JTAS
Endorsed?
Yes
No
Reject proposal 
Tabled up the proposal to 
Minister’s Cabinet Meeting for 
Principal Approval
Approved?
Yes
No
Reject proposal 
Figure 5.12 - Approval Process Flow Chart Part (i) 
Source: UKAS (2015b) 
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A
Conduct Value Management Workshop
Recommendation of most qualified SPV to 
JKAS/JTAS
Evaluation of proposals
Prepare Request For Proposal (RFP) 
documentation
Invitation for RFP
Recommendation of most qualified SPV to 
the Minister’s Cabinet Meeting
Negotiation and finalisation of Concession 
Agreement (CA)
Notice to successful SPV
Endorsement of CA by the Minister’s 
Cabinet Meeting
Signing of Concession Agreement
Figure 5.13 -Approval Process Flow Chart Part (ii) 
Source: UKAS (2015b) 
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This second flow chart starts with a value management workshop, of which no particulars 
were given on the website. After the workshop, the diagram indicates the Request for 
Proposal document preparation and procurement process stages. Yet again, the diagram and 
other website content offer no explanation of the Request for Proposal invitation bid or the 
procurement process. Following the procurement process is the proposal evaluation stage, 
again without explicit rules as to how a proposal is evaluated. Proposals will be scrutinised 
and discussed in detail in the JKAS and later JTAS. Once more, the inter-agency committee 
can only recommend to the cabinet, which makes the decision. Once a decision has been 
reached on the most qualified private partner, the government and selected Special Purpose 
Vehicle will have multiple discussions and negotiations on the details of the terms and 
conditions of the whole concession agreement. Agreement between both parties is to be tabled 
for finalisation by the cabinet. Subject to the approval of the cabinet, the next step is signing 
the Concession Agreement. 
The website has a section describing in detail the role of the inter-agency committee, JKAS 
and JTAS. JKAS was established to perform the decision-making role for policy matters 
regarding PPP proposals received, with weekly meetings. The website does not specify under 
which statutory act or any other regulation JKAS was formed. In describing the role of JKAS 
in detail, the website lists further responsibilities:  
a. Reviewing PPP proposals (including application for facilitation fund) by 
ministries/agencies and from the private sector; 
b. Endorsing PPP proposals for cabinet or the Prime Minister’s final decision; 
c. Evaluating proposals for government’s facilitation fund; 
d. Endorsing shortlisted/qualified companies for Special Purpose Vehicle 
consideration by the cabinet or Prime Minister; 
e. Validating concession agreement terms and conditions (and also for facilitation 
if applicable) for cabinet decision; 
f. Determining PPP project negotiation in detail; 
g. Acting as the parent committee for the Project Steering Committee (JPP), the 
Finance Sub-Committee (JKK) and the Technical Sub-Committee. 
The guideline further lists the members of JKAS in detail (Table 5.19). As discussed above, 
after a matter has been endorsed at JKAS level, every discussion is brought to a higher-level 
committee called JTAS. The UKAS website lists the role of JTAS as: 
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a. Obtaining the principal approval and any decision from the cabinet regarding
PPP proposals, including the procurement process;
b. Endorsing high-impact proposals for the award of facilitation funding for the
consideration of the Prime Minister;
c. Mediator for disputes regarding PPP proposals (including facilitation fund)
between agencies or ministries during negotiations and project implementation.
JKAS Members 
Chairman Director General of UKAS 
Secretary Director or Principal Assistant Director of Secretariat Subsection, Project Monitoring 
and Secretariat Section of UKAS 
Permanent Members Representative of Attorney General 
Representative of Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Department 
Representative of Investment, MKD and Privatisation Division, Ministry of Finance 
Malaysia 
Deputy Director General (Policy), UKAS, JPM 
Deputy Director General (Development), UKAS, JPM 
Invited Members 
(implementing 
ministry/agency) 
Section Director (project negotiation supervisor), UKAS, or representative 
Specialist Officer, UKAS,  
Certain individuals to give their views and advice on Facilitation Fund projects 
(Facilitation Fund Meeting only) 
Meetings involving 
Facilitation Fund 
Representative of Loans Management, Financial Market and Actuary Division, Ministry 
of Finance Malaysia 
Representative of Economic and International Division, Ministry of Finance Malaysia 
Representative of Finance and Development Division, Prime Minister's Department 
Representative of Bank Negara Malaysia 
Senior Director of PPP Policy and Corridor Development Section 
Facilitation Fund Section Director 
Meetings not Involving
Facilitation Fund 
Representative of Budget Management Division, Ministry of Finance Malaysia 
Representative of Government Procurement Division, Ministry of Finance Malaysia 
Representative of Department of Lands & Minerals Director General 
Representative of Department of Valuation and Property Services 
Director of Technical Section, UKAS, or its representative 
Table 5.19 – List of JKAS Members 
Source: UKAS (2015c) 
The website also lists the members of JTAS. Although JTAS has a similar composition to 
JKAS, JTAS includes the head of the organisations invited, as shown in Table 5.20. The 
remaining information under the MyPartnership menu consists of statistics on PPP 
achievements, major PPP projects undertaken, links to the available guidelines, current tender 
advertisement and information on the facilitation fund. 
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The researcher also discovered relevant information regarding the procurement process 
adopted by UKAS in the Frequently Asked Questions menu. One question was whether PPP 
proposals only come from the private sector, and the answer was that two routes are accepted 
by UKAS: proposals initiated by the government, which originate from the ministries or 
agencies and are known as solicited proposals, and unsolicited proposals initiated by the 
private sector.  
 JTAS Members 
Chairman Chief Secretary to the Government of Malaysia 
Secretary UKAS 
Permanent Members Attorney General 
Secretary General of Treasury 
Director General Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Department 
Director General of UKAS,  
Director General of Department of Lands & Minerals Director General 
Director General of Department of Valuation and Property Services    Deputy Director of UKAS
Invited Members Relevant Secretary General of ministries and/or Director General of agencies 
Table 5.20 - List of JTAS Members 
Source: UKAS (2015d) 
The website does not contain any timeline for the stages in the flowchart. Nevertheless, under 
the menu Client’s Charter, UKAS promises to inform the proposer of the government’s 
decision within three months of receiving a complete proposal. Within 12 months of the 
approval, UKAS promises to negotiate and finalise the concession agreement, although this is 
still subject to non-pending issues such as land matters and approval of the relevant authority.  
5.2.3 Privatisation Master Plan 
According to the respondents, the UKAS PPP programme is a continuation of a privatisation 
programme mooted by the Government of Malaysia in the 1980’s. Although decades earlier, 
and the details of PPP implementation not necessarily being the same, respondents stressed 
that the Privatisation Master Plan is an important document and is still considered relevant to 
the current PPP programme. The Master Plan was authored by the Malaysian Economic 
Planning Unit, aiming to educate the public regarding the privatisation programme and to 
serve as a guideline for interested parties to participate and take hold of the opportunity 
offered by the programme (Economic Planning Unit, 1994). 
The Privatisation Master Plan comprises a general privatisation framework, procedures, and 
other information on the privatisation programme such as the background, progress, 
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achievements and its future direction. The research focuses on information that is relevant in 
addressing the research objectives and understanding the link between conventional 
privatisation programmes and the current PPP programme. The Privatisation Master Plan
defines the programme’s drivers clearly. There were five drivers: to facilitate the nation’s 
economic growth; to relieve financial and administrative pressure on the government; to 
enhance efficiency and production; to downsize the public sector in the economy; and as a 
tool to achieve the National Economic Policy objectives. 246 projects were identified as 
suitable for privatisation (infrastructure and non-infrastructure). They were all government-
initiated proposals, subjected to competitive bidding, either from the public at large or specific 
target players. The plan also stressed that any private proposals attempting to hijack any of the 
246 projects before the competitive bidding process would not be entertained. No regulatory 
framework was linked to implementation of any of the listed projects, although centralised 
planning for government-initiated projects was to be steered by the Economic Planning Unit. 
Identified potential privatisation exercises were executed by relevant ministries or agencies.  
5.2.3.1 Private-Initiated Proposals 
Besides the government-initiated proposals, the Privatisation Master Plan acknowledged 
proposals from the private sector, but only if the proposal was considered unique. According 
to paragraph 89 in the Privatisation Master Plan, unique is characterised as follows: 
a. A feasible proposal comprising a cost-effective solution to save cost for the
government.
b. A private proposer in an advantageous position if holding exclusive patent
rights or sole technical capabilities; this is the key to a privatisation proposal;
c. In the event that a proposer is reliant on another proficient party, the
privatisation would be granted to the proficient party.
If the private proposal did not meet this definition of uniqueness, the proposal had to go 
through a competitive bidding process. Private-initiated proposals were considered on a first-
come-first-served-basis to reward the private sector for innovation and ingenuity. If any 
proposal was deemed unique and viable for execution through privatisation, it was promoted 
and further scrutinised by the Malaysian Economic Planning Unit. If the proposal suited the 
government’s requirements, negotiation was conducted with the original proposer. The 
government conducted an open bidding exercise for the proposal if the negotiation failed to be 
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finalised between both parties. Nevertheless, the original proposer was to be compensated by 
the successful bidder for the cost of the study incurred. The amount of this compensation was 
to be agreed between the government and the original proposer and specified in the bidding 
documents.  
5.2.3.2 Evaluation of Bidders 
Both private- and government-initiated proposals were scrutinised to ensure compliance with 
government policies and achieving positive implementation. Proposals from both routes were 
assessed for technical and financial capability. The Privatisation Master Plan did not describe 
how a proposal was to be assessed. Nonetheless, a form requesting important information 
regarding the proposer and the proposal was attached to the Plan, to be filled in by the 
proposer; it is assumed to be used as part of the evaluation. The information requested is 
shown in Table 5.21. 
Table 5.21- Information Requested from Proposer as in Privatisation Master Plan
Information 
Requested 
Detail 
Proposer Company profile (including paid up capital, authorised capital, particulars of shareholders, 
information on insolvencies, type of activity and business performance in past 3 years, 
information on new entity set for the privatisation, detail of employees) 
Proposal Particulars on the privatisation proposal, proposed model of privatisation, price offered, future 
investment plan,  
Finance Detail on source of finance, projected cash flow, profit projections for first 5 years 
Source: Economic Planning Unit (1994) 
The information required as per Table 5.21 suggest that the bidders might be assessed base on 
their company background, particulars on the proposal and the financial aspects.  
5.2.3.3 New Economic Policy 
Privatisation programme was one government vehicle to achieve the national agenda, 
including the New Economic Policy. The Privatisation Master Plan stated that a majority of 
the privatisation projects had to have 30 percent Bumiputera participation. Privatisation was 
anticipated to create more business opportunities for the Bumiputera, thus motivating 
Bumiputera entrepreneurs to be more innovative. According to the Economic Planning Unit 
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(1996), to safeguard this Bumiputera participation, a condition was imposed in the concession 
agreement for 30 percent of the work contracts to be reserved to Bumiputera companies. This 
was an attempt by the government to ensure the privatisation benefited society by balancing 
the socio-economy.  
Foreign company participation was also accepted to assist implementation of the privatisation 
programme. However, foreign companies’ participation was subjected to:  
i. non-availability of local experts;
ii. foreign participation was needed to promote export industry;
iii. the domestic market was insufficient to captivate shares offered and to
distinguish international partnership.
Foreign companies’ participation, however, was capped at 25 percent of its share capital in a 
privatised entity.  
This ends the review of relevant documents used in the UKAS procurement process. Overall, 
the documents provided for members of the public and interested parties are too broad. The 
lack of information on the procurement process and other UKAS practices reflects a lack of 
transparency in UKAS practice. Nonetheless, the findings from the document review will in 
the chapters be compared and contrasted with actual UKAS practice, as obtained through the 
interviews. The next sections will present the analysis of the interview findings regarding the 
procurement process adopted by UKAS and the competition policy incorporated within the 
procurement process. Figure 5.14 illustrates the cognitive mapping of UKAS implementation 
in relation to understanding the UKAS procurement process. 
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Figure 5.14 – Cognitive Mapping for UKAS PPP Implementation 
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5.3 UKAS PPP 
Participants were asked about the status of PPP implementation by UKAS and its legitimate 
authorisation. The feedback received was interesting in that most of the respondents were 
themselves uncertain about this. In essence, none of the respondents was able to show legal 
evidence to support their view. Their opinions were explicitly divided into two; PPP under 
UKAS is part of public procurement, or is not part of public procurement. The status of PPP 
implementation is important as this should determine the governance of PPP by UKAS. The 
response to the status of PPP under UKAS is as illustrated in Figure 5.15. 
Figure 5.15– UKAS PPP Status 
5.3.1 Non-Public Procurement 
Respondent R4 said that the status of UKAS PPP as public procurement has been debated for 
quite some time, further acknowledging the non-existence of a statutory act defining the status 
of PPP in Malaysia, whether it is public procurement or otherwise. According to Respondents 
R1 and R2, PPP by UKAS is not considered part of Malaysian public procurement, justifying 
why UKAS use their own guideline and are not bound to the Malaysian public procurement 
regulations set out by the Ministry of Finance. Respondent R2 added that although UKAS did 
not follow the public procurement regulations, they always exercised good governance. 
Respondent R5 stressed that UKAS tried to adhere to the public procurement regulations 
available and pointed out that the UKAS guideline is in accordance with and does not 
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contradict any existing regulations. Respondent R4, however, admitted that the guideline is 
very brief compared to the public procurement regulations.  
From a different perspective, Respondent R10 believed that PPP should not be treated in the 
same way as conventional procurement because of its complex nature. Respondent R12 
shared this sentiment on the complex nature of PPP, demarcating it from public procurement. 
Respondent R12 said, PPP is not typical public procurement like the government would do 
with annual development expenditure. If they do that, they would not need UKAS. Respondent 
R12 however added, nevertheless there are rules and regulations that they still need to 
observe like the Ministry of Finance rules. When it comes to project implementation, UKAS is 
quite complicated situation to a certain extent. The same view was shared by Respondent R2, 
comparing it with a public procurement project, It’s quite challenging. If it is a public 
procurement project, we can just follow the available public procurement regulation. 
Respondent R11 believed that PPP is a hybrid procurement, saying By right it should be a 
public procurement. But there are some elements in PPP that can also be justified as not a 
public procurement.  
5.3.2 Public Procurement 
Despite certain respondents considering UKAS PPP not to be part of public procurement, 
Respondent R13 stressed that it is no doubt for the public, even though no statute, circular or 
guideline states that the procurement is or should be part of public procurement.  
Respondent R12 stated that if it is all down to the intent and purpose of the PPP, it can be 
considered as public procurement, adding, however that it is more complex than that. The 
status of PPP has been argued and manipulated even in advances PPP practitioners ‘countries. 
Respondent R12 further explained that the one of the reasons why PPP is not executed strictly 
in accordance with the process and procedures of public procurement is that countries are 
trying to circumnavigate public procurement rules including transparency, advertisement, and 
strict participation under public procurement regulations. Even though it is acknowledged that 
the infrastructures built through PPP are public infrastructures, the source of funding 
technically does not make it fall under public procurement. 
Respondents R4 and R5 suggested that government will still pay for the end product, so PPP 
by UKAS is part of public procurement. Respondent R4 added that the requirements and 
approval for infrastructure facilitated by UKAS still come from the government.  
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Figure 5.16 - UKAS PPP Drivers 
5.4 Identifying the Drivers of UKAS PPP 
Identifying the range of motivations for PPP is important as it shapes the overall 
implementation. Most governments adopt PPP for its funding mechanism and ability to 
achieve value for money. The researcher investigated the drivers of PPP by UKAS by 
questioning the respondents on the reason why Malaysia resorted to PPP. The interview 
outcomes led to the response illustrated in Figure 5.16. Similar to other nations, 
Malaysia resorted to use PPP due to:  
a. Private sector participation
b. Funding mechanism
c. Urgency and high demand of infrastructure
d. Comprehensive scope
e. Risk sharing
f. Reduce outflows
g. Global trend.
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5.4.1 Private Sector Participation 
In discussing the drivers of PPP, eight respondents mentioned that PPP benefited from private 
sector participation. Citing the Ninth Malaysia Plan, Respondent R11 said that there is a need 
for private sector participation in developing the country. Respondent R2 added that the 
economy of the country should be driven by the private sector instead of solely by the 
government.  
Respondent R12 believed that the government benefited from an increase in efficiency 
resulting from the private sector’s participation in building the nation since privatisation was 
introduced. Respondent R2 said I see that the private sector has a better capacity to deliver 
more efficiently than compared to the public sector. They have the resources such as: money; 
experience; and the latest technology. The private sector is driven by profit; hence they 
usually come with innovative ideas on how to save on the cost of delivery. PPP is an 
instrument to tap those resources from their side. Respondent R8 considered that selected 
infrastructures were pushed to the private sector since they are able to deliver and sustain the 
facilities better than the government. 
Given the modus operandi of PPP, Respondent R10 said the private sector must be creative 
and proficient to ensure completion and delivery of the infrastructure on time and 
consequently collect their revenue. Respondent R4 agreed that private sector companies were 
always creative with their proposals, injecting new technology and innovation into the project. 
Significantly, Respondents R9 and R10 claimed that under PPP, most participating private 
companies develop a sense of belonging and build passionately since under most PPP models 
the private sector is still responsible for the maintenance of the infrastructure. Respondent R9 
stated this resulted in the private sector being more accountable in designing, constructing and 
maintaining everything they installed. In addition to specific financial return, Respondent R9 
believed private companies are concerned about their reputation and need to ensure the whole 
concession is profitable. 
5.4.2 Funding Mechanism 
It is not surprising that most countries adopt PPP for its funding mechanism, Malaysia 
included. Respondent R4 stated that the government resorted to PPP for its tight budget in 
providing infrastructure. Respondent R9 explained that some of the projects were initially 
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listed under the development budget to be built using conventional procurement, but that the 
government was cash strapped and needed to find alternative funding. Respondent R13 
believed, Well actually the whole idea, in my personal opinion the government does not have 
the money at the point of time and yet wanted the private sector to come in so the government 
can get the projects going and pay later. Sharing the same sentiment, Respondent R10 said, 
The government will be stretched if the entire social needs projects are to be constructed. But 
we can’t ignore the importance of these projects to society. The way I see it, the government 
can buy time on the funding since they will only start to pay upon the delivery of the 
infrastructure. Through PPP also, the government is assured of completion. 
Despite the respondents’ belief that the government’s use of PPP is comparable to the credit 
card mechanism, the government obtains a better infrastructure through private funding. 
Respondent R1 emphasised … if we rely solely on the government/public funding, we can't 
explore many mega-projects. By using the PPP approach, we can really expand and extend a 
lot of mega-projects, particularly infrastructure.   
5.4.3 Urgency and High Demand for Infrastructure 
Another driver for Malaysian PPP is closely related to the funding mechanism. Due to the 
high demand and urgent nature of public infrastructure, the government resorted to alternative 
procurement. Six of the respondents agreed that given the high demand for public 
infrastructure such as schools, universities, hospitals and highways when the government 
budget is limited, PPP seems to be the key to achieving them all rapidly. Citing the UKAS 
website, Respondent R12 explained the reason that the government adopted PPP was Among 
others, socio-economic engineering, high demand for modern socio-economic infrastructure 
for which the government could not afford to provide within such a short span of time. 
Respondent R2 commented that Malaysia had previously managed to expedite most of the 
existing infrastructure through privatisation programmes. Such infrastructure might not exist 
if the government had decided to ignore the demand. This opinion was shared by Respondent 
R8, who commented … if we don’t use that means to obtain the infrastructure, we might not 
get it. At that point of time, the government needed the infrastructure and the private sector 
was seen able to deliver them. 
Nevertheless, the desperation to obtain the infrastructure seems to cloud other important 
factors which should be considered. Respondent R6 claimed, Once we decided to go for PPP, 
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the rental/leasing rate will be much higher compared to the rental/leasing rate if development 
were to be built using conventional procurement. But we need the facilities as soon as 
possible. Respondent R6 added … since our objective was to get the facility, we were not too 
concerned on the selection of the procurement process. The procurement might be able to 
facilitate stakeholders in obtaining the infrastructure the soonest, even though it may burden 
the government in the future due to the high cost of leasing the infrastructure later on. 
5.4.4 Comprehensive Scope 
Infrastructure projects built through PPP tend to have a comprehensive scope, from funding, 
operation and maintenance to collecting revenues, which government sees as an advantage. 
Respondent R9 repeated that asset maintenance for government projects is not given enough 
consideration by the government, although Respondents R5 and R10 added that the 
comprehensive scope contributes to higher costs for UKAS projects.  
5.4.5 Risk Sharing 
One of the motivations for adopting PPP is optimising risk transfer from the government to 
the private sector. When the government and the private sector enter into a PPP agreement, 
risk will be allocated to the party best able to manage and control it. Respondent R9 insisted 
that the risk allocation exercise gives a holistic impact to the partnership. Parties are more 
responsible and are seen to be working together rather than blaming each other. Once one 
party has been allocated with a risk, the other party will trust it partner; for example, 
Respondent R5 stated, In general, we will leave the construction matters to the Special 
Purpose Vehicle, we do not interfere. However, when the infrastructure is complete, then we 
will assess the end product with the specifications agreed. 
5.4.6 Reduce Outflows 
Benefiting from the funding mechanism of PPP, governments manage to reduce cash outflow 
in providing infrastructure. Based on the literature review, most countries see this as a main 
driver in adopting PPP. On the other hand, only two respondents brought up reducing 
expenditure as one of the UKAS drivers. R11 stated that easing the national financial burden 
could be a key reason for Malaysia adopting PPP, while another respondent commented that 
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through the programme, government indeed manages to save on capital and operational 
expenditure. 
5.4.7 Global Trend 
Two respondents were of the opinion that one of the reasons Malaysia adopted PPP was the 
global trend at that time. When Malaysia saw other nations flourish by adopting PPP, they 
followed suit. Respondent R11 stated … the spirit of having PPP in the year 2006, is due to 
following the global trend. That is why we don’t really appreciate or fully maximise the 
benefit of PPP. When PPP was used by other countries, Malaysia didn’t want to miss out. 
That’s why we don’t follow the fundamental concept of PPP. They don’t really understand 
what PPP is. In the end, it will be a typical conventional public procurement. Respondent R4 
held the view, At that point in time, our national economy was not so good, we had a quite 
tight budget especially for infrastructure development, therefore the government decided to 
find other alternatives to boost the economy. One of the alternatives at that time was the PPP 
UK model and concept. We were told to study and look into the possibilities of adapting the 
model here. After we did some research including PPP projects in the UK. We adapted the 
UK model and altered it to suit our environment.  
5.4.8 Additional Drivers for Malaysian PPP 
In addition to the textbook drivers for PPP, the researcher identified the following: tools to 
achieve the national agenda; and problems with conventional procurement. 
5.4.8.1 Tools to Achieve National Agenda  
The respondents identified: 
a. Socio-economy engineering – As alluded to in the document review, the objective of 
the privatisation programme in Malaysia was to help the nation to achieve the New 
Economic Policy. This policy was introduced by the government to eradicate poverty 
and balance the socio-economic conditions of the people. It was confirmed by 
Respondent R2 that PPP is also one of the instruments for the government to achieve 
this goal. While not dismissing the government’s effort, Respondent R11 pointed out 
one concern, that UKAS does emphasise Bumiputera. It’s good to achieve the national 
agenda, to empower the socio-economy of the Bumiputera, but there will be restrictive 
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competition. Sharing this view, Respondent R12 said One fundamental area that makes 
ourselves complicated, but it is a necessity, is the social engineering bit. That socio-
economic engineering so far it has been useful in terms of having it achieved through 
PPP but it is so problematic. Although it may be debateable, Respondent R9 was of the 
opinion that through PPP the government emphasised socio-economic engineering over 
monetary return, adding The government also knows that the private sector needs to 
make a profit, but not supra-profit. It has to be in a partnership spirit. Win-win 
situation. 
b. Develop local entrepreneurship – Among other drivers of PPP mentioned, Respondent
R2 stated that PPP has been used to develop more local entrepreneurs. Respondent R9
claimed that, in many instances, less complicated projects such as university hostels and
campuses were allocated to Bumiputera companies, adding Nevertheless it worked for
smaller scale projects and not complex and big projects such as hospitals. Furthermore,
Respondent R9 stated that even though a project is awarded to a Government Link
Company (GLC), they will still hire technical consultants as part of their responsibilities
to develop local entrepreneurship although they already have their technical expert.
Describing a different experience, Respondent R6 claimed that for his project, The
concession was decided to be awarded to the original proposer due to the reason of
reducing the domination by existing major players and to train new players. While the
decision could be debated, it has always been the government’s objective to achieve the
New Economic Policy and this is maintained in the current PPP programme.
c. Economic development – Respondents R2 and R4 said that the government adopted
PPP to facilitate and boost national economic growth at that point in time. The private
sector was seen as a catalyst for economic growth and to lead the market.
d. Ruling party performance - The government is expected to provide infrastructure or
services to the public. It will be a benchmark or an indicator to measure the success of
any political party in power. When asked whose interest was being promoted through
PPP, Respondent R11’s response was, I would say number one is the government
agenda, which also relates to politics. An example is one of the universities in Malaysia;
they want to achieve a certain number of graduates by the year 2020, so they develop
many new university branches through PPP. PPP is the in thing to achieve the
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government agenda. Indirectly it will benefit the public. Nevertheless, the government 
agenda is still beneficial for the public. 
5.5 Governance of UKAS Procurement Process 
The feedback from the respondents revealed unpublished practice of the UKAS procurement 
process. The analysis of the respondents’ feedback is demonstrated in Figure 5.17. 
Figure 5.17 – Governance of UKAS Procurement Process 
5.5.1 Role of UKAS 
The day-to-day role of UKAS in the PPP programme is less well known. There is limited 
knowledge apart from that in the published official documents. An example of lesser known 
UKAS practice that might be expected from UKAS as the central agency assigned to manage 
PPP is as a party to the contract or involvement until the lease of the asset. As Respondent R1 
explained, the concept of UKAS PPP is centralised planning and decentralised 
implementation. Respondents R5, R7 and R8 further explained that UKAS’ involvement is 
only until the signing of the concession agreement. As shown in the document analysis, 
initiation of development comes from the ministries, agencies or from the private sector. 
Respondent R4 said UKAS did not dictate the needs of a project. When they receive a 
proposal, they facilitate it and bring it to the Minister’s Cabinet Meeting for a decision.  
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Respondent R5 said projects are returned to the relevant ministries or agencies for the post-
contract phase once the concession agreement is agreed, since UKAS is not a party to the 
contract. Respondent R8 described UKAS as a coordinating agency.  
5.5.2 Continuity of Privatisation 
As discussed in an earlier chapter, the privatisation programme in Malaysia was identified as 
the beginning of the PPP era in Malaysia. Responses below are feedback from respondents on 
this matter. 
a. The PPP in Malaysia is a continuity of the earlier Privatisation Master Plan.
(Respondent R8)
b. The only thing that UKAS had was a continuity from privatisation implementation.
There are similarities in PPP and privatisation such as BLMT, BOT. (Respondent R9)
c. The government has been using privatisation to accomplish its own agenda. Details
can be found in the Malaysia Privatisation Master Plan. PPP is a continuity of the
Privatisation Master Plan. (Respondent R2)
d. From the initiation of privatisation in the 1980’s, we wanted the private sector driven
type of economy. PPP is still in line with that vision. (Respondent R2).
5.5.3 Each Model is Unique 
Respondents R1, R2 and R3 stressed that each PPP model is treated differently by UKAS. 
Any proposal, whether initiated by the ministries and government agencies or as unsolicited 
proposals, will be considered thoroughly. Respondent R1 said Each model is difference. We 
really need to have a thorough understanding; comprehensive knowledge of what are the 
elements that will lead to a better outcome of the thing, then and from macro to micro, from 
micro to macro. Respondent R1 added, The context of each project is important. You can't 
generalise every project. However, a project may be generalised and characterise in the same 
sector. Then only you can say that, “This is a good PPP project for infrastructure of a 
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highway project”. Even so, there are still differences between highway projects, urban 
highway and interstate highway. Isn’t it? 
Since UKAS treat each proposal according to its suitability, Respondent R3 believed that, 
regardless of the procurement process adopted, they are still capable of achieving value for 
money through current protocols. Although Respondent R4 said that UKAS have to consider 
multifaceted factors to decide on the procurement process, Respondent R3 believed that 
conducting competitive bidding for a simple project such as a university hostel is benefiting 
the government in terms of competitive prices and proposals. 
Nevertheless, Respondent R5 said that, due to the customised treatment for each proposal, 
there are inconsistencies in UKAS practice, commenting, People (private companies) who 
have been dealing with other sections sometimes dispute inconsistencies between the section 
practices in UKAS. We do get queries from the banks about differences of Concession 
Agreement terms used by different sections. We do explain to them that each project is treated 
differently and there were sometimes refinements for certain projects. 
5.5.4 No Specific Regulations 
Six of the respondents acknowledged that there is no specific statutory act or regulation for 
PPP in Malaysia. Most of the six believed that there is no need for a specific PPP act. 
Respondent R2 explained that current UKAS practice is based on UKAS’ own guideline, the 
Privatisation Masterplan, cabinet meetings, and enabling statutory acts and provisions. A 
specific act will only restrict implementation. Respondent R12 said, There are some countries 
that have PPP specific rules, like Japan, and things do get some constraints due to that 
inflexibility. For here now, the government can decide if it is better for a project to be public 
procurement per se, following strictly the government rules; they will use the development 
expenditure and give it to the Public Works Department”. Respondent R12 added that 
Malaysia is not unique in this matter; advanced PPP practitioners like the UK also do not tie 
themselves with a specific PPP act. Respondent R2 did not reject the possibility of having a 
specific statute for PPP in Malaysia, nevertheless pointing out that, if we were to propose and 
push a specific act, we need a flexible one. 
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5.5.5 Flexibility 
Not being tied to any specific statutory act or regulation, UKAS is very flexible in its 
procurement process. Even the UKAS guideline is generic in nature. Respondent R4 stated 
there is a reason for the broad guideline: We have quite broad guidelines for our procurement 
process. It is because PPP is different from conventional public procurement. So in order to 
address the complexity in PPP, the guidelines need to be flexible. Respondent R2 seconded 
this:  The leniency of the guidelines is intended to give room for innovation. Respondent R1 
considered that flexibility in UKAS practice leads to dynamism.  
In detail, Respondent R2 explained, We try to facilitate proposals that come in. Whether it’s 
beneficial or there is a need to do it as PPP or otherwise. We are quite flexible in terms of the 
procurement process. We have to be creative and innovative. In PPP, it’s not the case of the 
Government knows best”. Relating the flexibility strategy of UKAS to its practice of direct 
negotiation with a single company, Respondent R1 claimed that flexibility in the practice 
itself is an advantage in achieving what the government needs. Although some responses 
seem optimistic regarding the flexibility strategy adopted by UKAS, from Respondent R6’s 
observation, UKAS has been too flexible and does not abide by its own guidelines, as changes 
are made to suit the status quo. 
5.5.6 Inter-Agency Committee 
Even though UKAS is the centralised agency for PPP implementation in Malaysia, it has set 
up several inter-agency committees with different roles. As Respondent R5 pointed out, 
UKAS do not make any decisions; endorsements are made by these inter-agency committees, 
later to be brought to the Minister’s Cabinet Meeting. Respondent R4 described how the inter-
agency committee is referred to once a proposal is complete: Before JKAS, we have the JPP 
meeting. Basically JPP is where we discuss and get all the necessary information. We will 
also call them for a presentation of their proposal. At the JKAS level they will further 
deliberate the proposal. JKAS have the authority to decide within their stipulated power. 
JKAS will recommend to JTAS and highlight issues or matters that are beyond their authority. 
Respondent R4 pointed out that the some of the inter-agency committee members are 
representatives from the Ministry of Finance and the Attorney General’s Chambers. They are 
important to highlight any inappropriate practice in the meetings.  
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5.5.7 Mandate from Minister’s Cabinet Meeting 
Six of the respondents mentioned that UKAS refers everything to the cabinet. Respondents 
R1, R4 and R5 boasted that UKAS obtains its authority and mandate directly from the 
cabinet. Nonetheless, the respondents did not specifically justify the mandate given by the 
cabinet when PPP falls under a particular act or statute. Considering it as an advantage, 
Respondent R1 observed, Supported by political will, we can expedite the project. It’s the 
highest authority. Although a proposal is discussed in detail by various tiers of inter-agency 
committee in UKAS, they only make recommendations to be endorsed by the cabinet. 
Respondent R1 added, The Minister's Cabinet Meeting may not 100% agree, they have their 
own view. The same experience was shared by Respondent R3 that the cabinet may decide 
otherwise than recommended.  
5.5.8 Value Management Workshop 
In an effort to achieve value for money from different procurement process, UKAS organises 
a Value Management workshop for all accepted proposals. Respondent R6 described this as 
an exercise to refine the scope proposed either by the government agencies or private sector. 
Respondent R5 explained that the process starts after the proposal is given approval by the 
cabinet: If it is approved, then we will conduct a Value Management (VM) workshop to set the 
optimum scope. The optimum scope will be the scope set in the RFP documents. The VM will 
be conducted with the relevant ministries and agencies, minus the private companies. 
Respondent R5 added, After the Value Management workshop, the proposed project may go 
through scaling down of scope to an optimum required scope, and then the company will have 
to make necessary adjustments and come up with a new price. We will bring the adjusted 
proposal and the new price to the JKAS. 
Respondent R5 believed that UKAS managed to achieve value for money through the Value 
Management workshop. Justifying the UKAS strategy, Respondent R5 clarified, Sometimes 
the requirements by the ministry or agency are over what is needed. They need to understand 
that the more area built, the more money is needed for the maintenance later. In addition, 
Respondent R5 said, Under PPP planning, each area built should be fully utilised. We don’t 
want a white elephant project. That is why we conduct the Value Management workshop. 
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5.5.9 Conditional Precedents 
UKAS imposes some conditional precedents with which the Special Purpose Vehicle is to 
comply in order for the concession agreement to become effective. All of the respondents who 
raised this connected it to the financial closure. Respondent R4 explained, Even when we have 
awarded, we have a six-month financial closure process where the Special Purpose Vehicle 
needs to submit some further financial documents required by the government. After the 
financial closure procedure only then does the concession agreement become effective. 
Failure to produce the required document within six months, results in the concession being 
cancelled. Highlighting the importance of the financial closure, Respondent R9 stated that 
there were contracts being cancelled and awarded to different Special Purpose Vehicles due to 
the failure to meet the requirements of the financial closure. Nevertheless, Respondent R5 
mentioned there were cases where the six-month period was extended. 
5.5.10 Good Governance 
Only two of the respondents claimed UKAS are upholding good governance even though they 
do not adhere to the available public procurement regulations. When asked whether the inter-
agency committee is bounded by any public procurement regulations, the response given was 
No; but the principle upheld is more or less the same (Respondent R5). 
5.5.11 Fair Distribution 
In awarding the concession contract, Respondent R4 pointed out that UKAS practises a fair 
distribution and tries to avoid any monopoly practice. 
5.6  Evaluation Criteria 
Under the Malaysian public procurement regulations, a detailed evaluation methods and 
criteria are published in Treasury circulars and the tender documents. In contrast, little is 
known of the award criteria of UKAS, and there are no published details on evaluation criteria 
for the UKAS procurement process. Although Respondent R5 claimed UKAS published its 
evaluation criteria inside its Request for Proposal, when checked the criteria mentioned were 
only for joining the bidding exercise and not for evaluation. Nevertheless, in a case of 
competitive bidding, Respondent R2 stated, The lowest price does not necessarily get the 
contract. The decision made is based on a comprehensive evaluation; the feasibility and 
147 
 
viability of the proposal, technical ability, financial capacity, concession terms and other 
considerations. Respondent R3 stated that UKAS carried out several process to filter a 
proposal. Respondent R5 said each proposal is evaluated on its compliance to the 
requirements set out in the Request for Proposal documents before other factors. 
Based on the respondents’ responses, below are other points raised on what UKAS looks for 
in evaluating a proposal. 
a. Feasibility – Respondent R9 said it is important for a PPP proposal to be 
feasible. Respondent R4 more or less confirmed this statement by commenting 
that a proposal will be discussed in JPP on its feasibility. For an infrastructure 
development proposal and requirements, Respondent R4 said, Basically, if an 
infrastructure of a facility is really needed, the end user needs to come out with 
a needs statement. Based on that needs statement, we will start to discuss the 
project, we will start asking questions. Whether the government has the ability 
to pay the lease? Do they really need the infrastructure? Is the projection of 
capacity need appropriate? The same process was also explained by 
Respondent R3.  
For the feasibility study of an unsolicited proposal, Respondents R4, R5 and 
R9 mentioned that UKAS corresponded with the relevant ministries or 
agencies to cross check with their development planning. Respondent R10 
however said, The requirements and expectations by the end user and UKAS as 
facilitator were different to a certain level of contradiction. The end user 
expectation was very high. However UKAS needed to scale down based on 
what they felt right. The disparity of these expectations can be great if it’s not 
well managed. UKAS have their own reason for interfering in ministries’ or 
agencies’ requirements: they are concerned with the feasibility of the end-user 
requirements. Respondent R5 pointed out, As an example, the Ministry of 
Health (MOH) requested a 400 bed hospital; we will ask whether they can be 
fully utilized from day one. What are the bed occupancy rates? Is the number 
of doctors sufficient for 400 beds? We don’t have any problems if they can 
justify and prove these demands; the population catchment in the proposed 
area has increased or is over-populated, the bed occupancy rate in nearer 
hospitals is also over populated. 
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b. Company background and capability – As mentioned earlier, UKAS
assessment takes into consideration multiple factors, not necessarily the lowest
price. The criteria to join the bid are clearly presented in the Request for
Proposal document, and Respondent R4 said, So to participate and venture into
this PPP, the company has to know their own capability and ability to deliver.
When they know they are not capable, they or we will know and they will be
rejected. Respondent R5 said the evaluations made by UKAS were assisted by
relevant agencies with different expertise. Respondent R9 added … the
proposal went to two committees, which evaluated the financial aspects and the
technical aspects of the proposal. After the technical committee has evaluated
the technical aspects, then the other committee will look into the financial.
Respondent R4 listed some of the factors UKAS looks: paid up capital;
expertise; previous experience; consultant’s hired, technical and financial
capability.
c. Bankability – Another important factor in the evaluation process is the
commercial bankability of the proposed project. This was pointed out by
Respondents R1, R2 and R9. Due to the funding mechanism of PPP, it is
important for a proposal to be seen as bankable for the financier. Respondent
R9 added that there were some initiatives by the private sector who proposed to
generate income from the land lease as part of the PPP package.
d. Mechanism – Selecting the right proposal and Special Purpose Vehicle for
PPP is critical. Explaining further the methods UKAS adopted to evaluate
proposals, Respondent R1 said they use a scoring system. Each criterion is
given a different weighting, and scores are compared and contrasted at various
selection stages. When asked about the weighting for each criterion, the
respondents replied that it depends on the type of project and the industry
involved. The scores are not published anywhere since they are intended for
internal used only. Besides the scoring system, UKAS has used other
evaluation methods; Respondent R1 said, Our internal evaluation is based on
certain parameters. We have used a five-point Likert scale based evaluation.
For a one-off project, we even have a seven-point Likert scale evaluation if it is
required.
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e. Price Bid – Although UKAS conducts a comprehensive assessment in
evaluating a company and its proposals, the price offered by the bidders still
needs to be considered. Respondent R5 commented, Financially, we are
interested in the price that the government needs to pay. It should be within our
budget, not burdensome in the future, and comparable to existing projects.
5.7 Issues 
Figure 5.18 illustrates some of the issues experienced by UKAS personnel, industry 
practitioners and experts. Ten issues were highlighted by respondents, presented below.
5.7.1 Inconsistencies 
The majority of respondents gave inconsistency as their main concern about UKAS in 
practice, for instance the absence of a specific law for implementation. This was voiced by 
Respondent R12: So that’s why I said in the absence of a clear law, the government can adopt 
what they want. Regardless of having their own guideline, Respondent R4 pointed out 
inconsistencies in practice between different sections of UKAS, which may be due to the 
vagueness of the guideline. Respondent R5 said UKAS has been queried: People (private 
companies) who have been dealing with other sections sometimes dispute inconsistencies 
between the section practices in UKAS. We do get queries from the banks about differences of 
Concession Agreement terms used by different sections. We do explain to them that each 
project is treated differently and there were sometimes refinements for certain projects. It was 
no surprise when Respondent R4 recalled that the National Audit Department had queried the 
UKAS guideline. 
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Figure 5.18 - Issues within UKAS Procurement Process 
Other respondents have different experiences with UKAS inconsistency. Respondents R6, R7, 
R10 and R11 experienced UKAS inconsistency in abandoning their own guideline. 
Respondent R7 said UKAS did not stand by their nationwide advertisement guideline, adding, 
There was no competition exercise as stated in their guidelines. Respondent R6 brought up 
the same point, explaining further, Literally, based on the UKAS guidelines, they insist on 
calling for RFP from at least three companies. However, they did not follow their own 
guidelines. I don’t have the numbers, but from what I have been told, most of the PPP 
projects for other education institutions also have not practised a competition format of the 
procurement process. Respondent R10 pointed out that everything is decided by the cabinet 
despite UKAS not complying with their own guideline. Without specifically stating the 
details, Respondent R11 explained that inconsistencies might result from the instructions 
received by UKAS from higher authority questioning the work of UKAS. Based on the 
response already presented, UKAS practice on the evaluation methods is also inconsistent. 
Meanwhile, Respondent R10 highlighted the inconsistencies between the stakeholders’ 
requirements, commenting, I would say the tricky part was dealing with UKAS personnel and 
the end user. The requirements and expectations by the end user and UKAS as facilitator 
were different to a certain level of contradiction. The end user expectation was very high. 
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However, UKAS needed to scale down based on what they felt right. The disparity of these 
expectations can be great if it’s not well managed.  
5.7.2 Future Deficit 
Even though desperation to obtain the infrastructure leaves stakeholders with little option, 
Respondents R4, R5, R6, R11, R13 were well aware of concern about the high cost of using 
PPP. Respondent R6 compared overall PPP project funding to credit card usage: I see it as a 
credit card where we spend money that we don’t have and pay later with a very much higher 
interest and longer payment period. Respondent R13 described PPP as, In other words, just 
deferring the government liabilities to a later time. Respondent R6 gave this impression: I 
would say the future cost of the infrastructure development using PPP is quite worrying. The 
rental/lease rate that the government has to pay is roughly four times higher than the same 
facility built using a conventional public procurement. 
Respondent R11 felt that UKAS was starting to feel the heat of poor planning from previous 
projects, adding that UKAS had already stopped some projects in some of the sectors in an 
effort to find a new sustainable model. According to Respondent R4, currently We try to limit 
to only crucial facilities to be done by PPP. We don’t want them to be burdened by the lease 
payments in the future. Respondent R9 confirmed this statement, pointing out Late last year, I 
was told that the Ministry of Health is planning to build another five hospitals using PPP but 
when they proposed this to the minister in the Prime Minister’s Office, it was kept on hold. 
The minister said that the government needed to look into other options, as he didn’t want it 
to be a burden of deficit for the future generation. 
Respondents R5 and R9 pointed out that it was the Ministry of Finance who were really 
concerned about the PPP future deficit for ministries and agencies. Respondent R9 said I was 
told that the MOF was not really in favour of PPP because of the higher cost for leasing the 
assets under PPP. There was a debate on this issue; the MOF did not want this debt to be a 
burden to the ministries and the government later. Nonetheless, Respondent R9 stated it is 
important to educate and create awareness among all stakeholders of the cost of maintenance 
of the built asset. Respondent R5 agreed: They need to understand that the more area built, 
the more money is needed for maintenance later. Respondent R5 added that the leasing cost 
should not really be a concern since UKAS will make sure the price agreed is within the 
budget and should not burden future generations. 
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5.7.3 Lack of Transparency 
The practice of UKAS is little known to the public. Respondent R8 believed that as a 
government agency, transparency is important as UKAS is accountable to the public. 
Touching on the subject of the award of concession, Respondent R13 pointed out, Quite 
mysterious; not transparent; nobody knows how the Special Purpose Vehicle is being 
selected; wondering as to whether they are technically viable and financially viable, to spend 
the capital outlet upfront, and complete the job as it is. Sharing this view, Respondent R8 said 
People are demanding transparency. Whatever they do, they should address these issues. The 
important thing they need to look at is the public’s interest. As part of the government, they 
are answerable to the public. People will question why company A is awarded a concession, 
who were the people behind them? Yes, there are certain PPP projects being awarded to 
certain people, but I believe that UKAS has their own justification. Respondent R8 also called 
for UKAS to be more transparent. Respondent R11 thought the assessment consideration 
should be made transparent; otherwise people might suspect abuse of power by the 
government. Respondent R13 considered advertisement as an important medium for 
transparency, so that every qualified organisation is given the opportunity to join a bidding 
exercise.  
Respondent R12 believed that UKAS has been transparent to a certain extent. UKAS 
published their guideline and made it available on their website, despite having other 
guidelines in use for internal purposes only. This was also supported by Respondent R4, who 
felt that UKAS had not been making all the important information accessible to relevant 
people. When asked about the availability of Special Purpose Vehicle requirements on the 
UKAS website, Respondent R4 replied, Yes, we don’t publish it. If it is for a RFP exercise, we 
will put the criteria that have to be met in the RFP document. Paid up capital; expertise; 
previous experiences; consultants hired, etc. Normally the requirement of a Special Purpose 
Vehicle in a competitive exercise is stricter than a direct negotiation requirement. Usually we 
will call for a pre-qualification exercise before an invitation for Request for Proposal is given 
to the shortlisted company.  
5.7.4 Lack of Understanding 
From Respondent R9’s observation, the early years of UKAS PPP saw much confusion and 
many misunderstandings of the programme from both sides: public and private sectors. 
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Respondent R9 explained that ministries and agencies had limited knowledge on the whole 
concept of PPP/PFI, failing to differentiate between PPP and conventional procurement used 
by the government. Respondent R9 added, To them, it’s just a design and build or 
privatisation or negotiated tender. Meanwhile, for the private sector, the same respondent 
observed that most of the proposals submitted were not suitable or feasible, stating, They 
failed to understand the concept of PPP/PFI and they failed to understand the context. 
Nevertheless, Respondent R9 admitted that the misunderstanding may have resulted from the 
lack of proper guidelines, and acknowledged that more time was needed to ensure everyone 
understood PPP.  
On a different note, the practice of unsolicited proposals to UKAS is different from any other 
practised in other countries. An unsolicited proposal implemented by UKAS is a development 
proposal from the private sector. When asked about this, Respondent R12 replied, To me, in 
the absence of a clear definition, I would still consider the need. Where does the need come 
from, from the institution themselves, isn’t it? They recognise the need, and they want it. This 
response is parallel with the global unsolicited practice. Respondent R12 further explained, 
My definition is simple: who initiated it? Who realised and can see the potential and who 
takes risk? Like these individuals, they are not taking risks because they know, there is 
already demand. The risk is in the implementation, not demand risk. The risk for demand is 
already there, but then like the ones who come to me for example they look at it and say how 
many students, how much accommodation do you need, what do you think of the university 
policy? Would the university allow students to live outside campus? That is how they establish 
it. So that to me is privately initiated. In contrast, Respondent R4 justified the practice of 
UKAS: I would say private initiated since the private sector comes up with the proposal. The 
drawback of this is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. Nevertheless, as pointed out by 
Respondent R9, I understand it will take some time before everyone can understand the 
concept of PPP”.  
5.7.5 High Turnover of Membership   
The UKAS procurement process involves several agencies and ministries. Although the 
composition of the teams involved in a project might be the same, the representatives sent by 
respective invited agencies might change for many reasons. There were many occurrences 
where the different representatives sent affected continuity. This issue was highlighted by 
Respondents R1, R8 and R10. In a tone of dissatisfaction, Respondent R8 stated, There were 
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issues on items agreed due to changes of officers. When this thing occurs, we need to explain 
again and again. Luckily everything has been sealed in the contract. Respondent R10 had a 
similar experience: However, the problem arises when the person who came to the meetings 
keeps on changing. Some of them were even from a different department in the organisation. 
Nevertheless, not to make the issue bigger, Respondent R1 stated, Sometimes the committee 
members come and go but then again, if we want to formulate a good policy, we need to 
prepare, and be well structured. So that, you can really comprehend the subject matter and 
come up with a better solution.  
5.7.6 Time Consuming 
One may have thought that resorting to PPP may save the government time, compared to 
traditional procurement. Comparing them, Respondent R3 stated, When some said that PPP 
could speed up a process, there are some projects that were still time consuming. If the same 
problems occurred, I would say using conventional procurement would be better. This 
respondent pointed out that the standard construction period for an infrastructure development 
in a UKAS BLMT agreement is three years, whereas it could be completed using 
conventional procurement in a much shorter time. In addition to the construction period, 
Respondent R6 mentioned that the process of UKAS was also time consuming since it 
involves multiple internal and external parties. Voicing his frustration, Respondent R6 also 
stated, We are having a major delay due to land matters, which I think that the company 
should have tackled earlier. Until now the Concession Agreement has not been able to be 
complete due to this. Another unpleasant experience voiced was, Compared to the 
conventional procurement, based on my experience, it took a longer time to seal the deal for a 
straightforward case. If there is an issue on land matter like ours, it will take much longer. 
We have another PFI/PPP project that has been on the shelf for almost 2-3 years due to 
issues of land title (Respondent R7).  
5.7.7 Competence of UKAS 
As the responsible authority for the national PPP programme, one would expect that UKAS is 
very capable. Nevertheless, Respondents R6 and R9 were uncertain as to UKAS’ competence. 
When asked to share the experience, Respondent R6 replied, I think even UKAS is not really 
ready for PPP yet. The knowledge of their own staff on PPP is only based on experience, 
which I feel they are lacking. At that time, they very much depend on cross culture staff 
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brought from the private sector. They should increase the level of knowledge and competence 
of their staff in handling PPP projects. They should also develop technical specialists in 
evaluating proposals in terms of the business model to be used, cash flows and forecasts of 
future prices. For our project, I can see that they were also relying on the so-called expert 
hired by the private company who proposed the development. They should have their own 
specialist or expert to verify and check their proposal. Although they invited other related 
government agencies to evaluate and put their comments based on previous databases, I was 
not so convinced. In my opinion, UKAS should have their own experts. When the proposals 
were distributed to the external agencies, it was time consuming. Meanwhile, Respondent R9 
admitted the weaknesses on early implementation of PPP by UKAS: One thing about UKAS 
personnel at that time, they were not trained and exposed to the financial background of PPP. 
That was why they needed the private sector to assist.  
5.7.8 Misunderstanding and Perception  
PPP implementation by UKAS is not without controversies. Respondent R12 observed that 
the perceptions of the public regarding UKAS PPP are mainly adverse. The first perception is 
regarding the award of concessions, and Respondent R12 pointed out, It has been commented 
on by many during the early days, the way in which projects are being distributed; without 
transparency, people claim cronyism and nepotism. Respondent R10, however, questioned 
the invitation to bid for a concession: “Normally if the time given is very short, we assume 
that the exercise is not a genuine competition exercise.   
Another typical misunderstanding regarding PPP UKAS is the funding of concessions is still 
by the Government. Respondent R12 stressed People need to get the concept right. Most 
people misunderstood the PPP/PFI by UKAS. Articles have been written by academicians and 
journalists about the funding of PFI/PPP projects here. The government did not fund any of 
the projects, instead providing a Facilitation Fund for a project to take off. Secondly, what 
people misunderstood is the fact that the government allows the Employees Provident Fund 
(EPF), for example, to fund. People say that this is funded by the government, but it is not. So 
please get it right! Explaining further the reason for this perception of government funding, 
Respondent R12 explained, So the fact that I think, if you check a paper by I can’t remember 
which university, they did a study about funding by EPF, and therefore they said it is very 
risky to the government. On the one hand, yes it is risky to the government, but it is more so to 
the private sector; it is also a risk, except the risk is to the private sector. When EPF is treated 
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like a private agency, the risk is therefore passed on to the private sector. It’s just that people 
get confused, because EPF take care of pensioners. Pensioners are generally civil servants. 
So if anything goes wrong, they are worried about the funding made by EPF. On the other 
hand we have to understand, if we look at the funding agreement, the government chose to 
guarantee a net income of so much for the EPF. So actually it is a solid investment by EPF.  
Respondent R12 gave another example, But there are occasions of Joint Ventures, for 
example like the Banting-Taiping highway. For that project, there are four different models 
used. There was one stretch, the government fully funded it like conventional finance, there 
were stretches where the government provided a certain percentage in order to facilitate, and 
there was another stretch, entirely PFI model, but when people look at it, because people say 
that it is supposed to be by the private sector, why is the government involved? Therefore, 
they said the government is funding the project. So that is not correct. It needs to be 
corrected. Defending the effort by the government in advertising government initiated 
proposal and experimenting with Swiss Challenge, Respondent R12 urged the public to 
change their thinking to be more positive. 
5.7.9 Contract Terms 
Respondent R13 highlighted an issue regarding the concession terms used by UKAS. 
Respondent R13 was dissatisfied with the Certificate of Practical Completion (CPC) to be 
issued by the consultants hired. Respondents R13 explained, The government may enter the 
site, see what is happening, but only they can issue the CPC. The next stage after that is to 
issue the Certificate of Acceptance. By that time, I believe it is too late in the day to actually 
argue whether full compliance has been undertaken by the contractor pursuant to the terms, 
since it’s already completed. Whether you like it or not I can’t terminate. All I can make is 
certain noises to make good. Respondent R13 believed it is significant for the government to 
have some authority in micro-managing the construction of the infrastructure: I would always 
argue in my opinion that the CPC must be issued by us, rather than the contractor’s 
consultant, given the fact that I’m going to pay later on. I would also argue that we have a 
right to actually comment on the progress on site and proper intervention is needed from time 
to time. That is my biggest worry. In addition, after that the price in term of quantification. Of 
course they need to maintain the collection of money and all that, again it is not transparent. 
That is my biggest answer. 
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5.7.10 Different Political Party in Government 
As described earlier in the literature review, the Federal Constitution of Malaysia recognises 
the sovereignty of the states in Malaysia, hence certain authority is retained by the state 
governments. In the case of the same ruling party governing both federal and state government, 
the concept of power sharing makes administration between these two governments less 
difficult. However, there are issues when different political parties control the federal and the 
state government. Respondent R1 pointed out, A current barrier is differences in political 
thought, between the federal government and the state governments. Different political 
thoughts have different approaches. For example, Selangor and Penang. 
The following sections examine the current competition policy within UKAS PPP. Figure 5.19 
illustrates the cognitive mapping of the interview findings in relation to the competition policy 
incorporated by UKAS. This is to assist in understanding the key aspects and the issues in the 
competition policy implemented by UKAS in the procurement process. 
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Figure 5.19 - Cognitive Mapping for Competition
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5.8 Ascertain the Relevance of Competition 
The participants were asked about the relevance of competition in the PPP procurement 
process.  12 out of 13 respondents acknowledged and agreed that such competition is important 
or very important (Figure 5.20). Collectively, and without hesitation, the respondents from the 
different groups interviewed agreed that competition is needed in the PPP procurement process 
for the following reasons:  
i. To achieve value for money;
ii. To obtain quality of concession delivery;
iii. To possess the bargaining power; and
iv. To honour accountability.
Figure 5.20 - Relevance of Competition in PPP Procurement Process 
Although it is apparent that the majority of the respondents acknowledged the benefits of 
having a competition exercise for the PPP procurement process, there was some concern 
about the success of the actual exercise in the procurement process by UKAS. Respondent R2 
created a doubt by mentioning that, Theoretically I would say competition is important, and 
Respondent R12 pointed out that … the manner of the competition must not be such that it 
defeats the intention of having the competition. These doubts were raised due to concerns 
about the effectiveness of the actual competition exercise. On the other hand, Respondents R6 
and R9 highlighted the importance of having a fair competition.  
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5.8.1 Value for Money 
Most respondents relate the competition element to obtaining value for money. As highlighted 
by Respondent R11, based on own academic survey conducted on PPP implementation, 
competitive tendering was identified as the most important measure to achieve value for 
money in PPP: Yes, I can’t remember which in paper, value for money or critical success 
factor, I asked respondents what are the key major elements in value for money in PPP: 
competition was among the top five. It shows that competition is very important, as perceived 
by the government and the private sector players. In fact, based on competition theory, we 
must have a competition. Reflecting on the outcome of Respondent R11’s own research and 
experience with UKAS projects, Respondent R11 recognised lack of competition as a 
contribution to the failure of a project: … In fact, they [the client] admitted that based on the 
first phase of XXXX projects, the quality of the end product is much lower, which may have 
been contributed to by the non-existence of competition in the procurement process. It’s 
proven when the project is completed; there were a lot of defects. At the end, the client is 
desperate and signs the acceptance of the infrastructure due to the student intake and can’t 
afford any more delays.  
Nonetheless, Respondent R3 believed that value for money can be achieved by other means, 
and was more concerned about the success of the project in general: … conducting a 
competition exercise in the PPP procurement process does not necessarily guarantee us value 
for money. This is supported by Respondent R5, who explained that the current practice of 
UKAS of organising Value Management workshops is intended to achieve value for money. 
Respondent R5 confided that … from these Value Management workshops held by UKAS, we 
obtained the value for money in each project. 
5.8.2 Quality of Delivery 
Meanwhile, three references were made by to the importance of competition in obtaining 
quality of service. These respondents believed that conducting a competition exercise in the 
procurement process allows the best Special Purpose Vehicle to be chosen, resulting in 
quality of delivery. Respondent R4 stated … if we want to have a quality end product, we 
want to be a partner with the best company available to deliver. Similarly, Respondent R13 
was of the opinion that competition is very important in achieving a high standard of delivery 
through to the end of the concession.  
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5.8.3 Bargaining Power 
In contrast to a competitive exercise, a non-competitive exercise in the procurement process 
reduces the government’s bargaining power. PPP is the best option when the government 
possesses maximum bargaining power (Zeisel, 2009). Respondent R7 shared this view, 
admitting that … the problem is when you start to negotiate with only one party, and then the 
government will lose their bargaining power. Respondent R6 stated the same thing: … if 
direct negotiation or direct award to a single company has been chosen, we don’t really have 
the bargaining power since we only deal with one party. Respondent R11 gave an insight into 
the implications of non-competitive exercise in the procurement process, pointing out that 
There are implications of direct negotiations in the future, including higher price of 
maintenance. Based on respondent R6’s project, which uses a non-competitive format for the 
procurement process, the cost of maintenance is four times higher than in a project using 
conventional public procurement. 
5.8.4 Accountability 
Despite some respondents being uncertain of the status of PPP as public procurement, UKAS 
is the government agency responsible for facilitating the procuring of infrastructure to the 
public through PPP. In a later phase, the lease of such infrastructure is most likely to be paid 
from the government’s reserve, which is contributed by the taxpayers, so there is no doubt 
that UKAS is significantly accountable to the public at large. Respondent R8 strongly 
believed that, The government is accountable to the public. Respondent R8 added … 
competition and transparency is the key.  
5.9 Beyond Competition 
Despite that respondents believe that competition is an important element to incorporate in the 
PPP procurement process, there appear to be some reservations by a few of the respondents, 
who are of the opinion that a holistic approach needs to be taken of the procurement process, 
rather than focusing on competition (see Figure 5.21).  
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Figure 5.21 - Beyond Competition
From the policy maker’s perspective, Respondent R2 pointed out that … We might get value 
for money at the point of the procurement process; however, competition will not guarantee 
the success of the infrastructure development. There are many other factors that still need to 
be considered. Respondent R8 added that the objectives and the drivers of the PPP itself are 
more important to be accomplished.  
This view was also supported by Respondent R3 which sees this from the operative point of 
view. Respondent R3 stated … competition exercise in the PPP procurement process, does 
not necessarily guarantee us value for money. In addition, Respondent R5 opined that if the 
objective of the government is to achieve value for money from the PPP exercise, it could be 
achieved by other means. To support his argument, Respondent R5 proposed that the current 
Value Management workshop conducted by UKAS is intended and able to achieve value for 
money even when a non-competitive exercise is being used for the procurement process. 
Generally speaking, this insight suggests that the respondents are aware of the importance of 
competition in the procurement process and the benefits of incorporating the competitive 
element; however, implementation of competition might not be a priority for the government. 
5.10 Exploration of Competition in UKAS Procurement Process 
Although the step-by-step procedure was discussed above, feedback from the interviews is 
vital in providing insight into the actual practice of UKAS on the ground. Figure 5.22 
illustrates the respondents’ remarks on the practice of competition in the procurement process 
for government-initiated projects, and Figure 5.23 for unsolicited proposals. It is important to 
note that the feedback is derived from the respondents’ own experience with the UKAS 
procurement process.  
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Figure 5.22 - Procurement Procedures for Government-Initiated Proposal 
5.10.1 Procurement Procedures for Government-Initiated Proposal 
For Respondents R6, R7 and R10, their projects were deliberately awarded to a sole company 
without a competition exercise, while Respondents R8 and R9 experienced a competitive or 
partly competitive procurement procedures by UKAS. The research defines partly competitive 
as selective tendering. 
Some respondents emphasised that the decisions from the procurement procedures need to be 
determined according to the nature of the project. Respondent R5 explained that … not every 
project is suitable to be in a competitive format. As an example, a military camp, power plant, 
we don’t do it in an open competition format due to security reason. For Respondent R12, the 
government put effort into fostering competition by advertising the Request for Proposal for 
government-initiated projects. According to Respondent R12, So I would say to a certain 
extent the movement towards competition, now appears to be more obvious. If you open up 
the UKAS website, most of the government-initiated projects are being advertised.  
5.10.1.1 Open Tendering for Request for Proposal 
While the endeavour of the government to foster competition is focusing on the UKAS 
guideline, it is not being followed. This was expressed in the following remark by Respondent 
R6, Literally, based on the UKAS guidelines, they insist on calling for Request for Proposal 
from at least three companies. However, sometimes they did not follow their own guidelines. I 
don’t have the numbers, but from what I have been told, most of the PPP projects for other 
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education institutions also have not practised a competition format of the procurement 
process. Respondent R7 and R10 had the same experience with different projects. 
As suggested in the previous section, the procurement procedures for each project needs to be 
tailored and may not be suitable to be conducted in an open format. Despite this, Respondent 
R12 believes that the government has moved on from awarding directly to sole companies for 
government-initiated projects, and based on the fieldwork the practice is very much alive. 
This was experienced by Respondents R6, R7 and R10. The projects awarded directly were 
not regarded as complex buildings and were conducted in an open format to obtain 
competitive pricing. Nevertheless, this is what the respondents may be referring to with 
regards to developing local or Bumiputera entrepreneurs, where simple types of project are 
used rather than awarding complex types of project.  
5.10.1.2 Selective Tendering for Request for Proposal 
Respondents R9 and R10 briefly highlighted their experience with UKAS selective tendering. 
Although there was nothing of significance in their feedback, Respondent R9 experienced a 
lengthy process. After the invitation for a selective Request for Proposal process, UKAS were 
not able to decide on the best proposal. They proceeded with another round of the Best and 
Final Offer exercise. 
Best and Final Offer was not mentioned in either the UKAS guideline or its website, thus 
making its implementation unclear. However, it was made clear that the substance of Best and 
Final Offer is commonly being used inside the UKAS procurement procedures. Respondent 
R3 revealed, For Best and Final Offer we call for a multiple round of tendering. The original 
proponent is also invited to join the tender exercise. Respondent R9 explained in detail the 
experience with UKAS Best and Final Offer. A multiple round of tendering is conducted until 
the government gets what it wants. When asked about the procurement process, the response 
received was that the guideline for Best and Final Offer is for internal use only and it is in the 
process of enhancement. 
5.10.1.3 Direct Negotiation with a Sole Company 
There are clearly inconsistencies in the procurement procedures practised by UKAS. 
Although it is stated in the UKAS guideline that a minimum of three companies should be 
shortlisted and forwarded to UKAS for consideration, Respondent R1 freely admitted that it is 
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the norm to award and negotiate with a single company for certain types of infrastructure. For 
a highway project, normally it will be a direct negotiation with a sole company. In the spirit 
of good governance, this may be acceptable if the project was initiated by a private company 
who had spent resources on conducting studies and presenting the proposal to the 
government; however, if the request originates from the government and there are minimum 
risks to be borne, the government might want to conduct some competitive element in the 
procurement procedures rather than awarding and negotiating with a single company. 
Although this may seem to result in a loss for the government, Respondent R1 pointed out 
that the advantage of using this route is its flexibility. If the concern was about value for 
money, Respondent R1 confided that We can really go for value for money even though with 
one company. Then again it depends on how we negotiate and prepare the value management 
process, hence reflecting the value for money to the public.  
As already discussed, in relation to achieving the terms of the national agenda, Respondent 
R6 shared his experience of a direct negotiation where “The concession was decided to be 
awarded to the proposer due to the reason of reducing the domination by existing major 
players and to train new players. They were consulted regarding this issue and were told that 
if they had different views, an invitation for Request for Proposal would be advertised. It is 
also interesting to note that the instruction to award and negotiate with a single company 
comes from a different party. Quoting Respondent R5, Nowadays, there is no one-to-one 
direct negotiation unless there is an instruction. Respondent R5, however, did not specify 
where the instruction was to come from. 
5.10.2 Procurement Procedures for Unsolicited Proposal 
Although the term unsolicited proposal is used globally, the respondents were more familiar 
with the term private-initiated project. Either they are not familiar with the term and the 
concept or they are not comfortable with the term unsolicited. When asked the numbers 
received as unsolicited proposals, Respondent R2, R3, R4, R5 and R6 stated that UKAS and 
clients did receive many of them. This is not surprising, since UKAS welcomes unsolicited 
proposals in their guideline. However, due to the confidentiality of the documents and 
information, the statistics on numbers of unsolicited proposals received by UKAS were 
unavailable. The impression given by the respondents were alike: Our project is mostly 
private initiated (Respondent R1); We receive quite a lot of privately initiated proposals 
(Respondent R3); Yes; we receive many” (Respondent R2); Of course. We received many. I 
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believe every work section received many unsolicited proposals. Either they were sent directly 
to us or to the ministry and other stakeholders (Respondent R4); and Lately it is more private 
driven (Respondent R5). Respondent R5 however emphasised back again to the numbers of 
unsolicited proposals received. Yes, we received many unsolicited proposals, but not every 
project will be realised especially if it is not in the ministry’s or agency’s planning. According 
to Respondent R9, most of the proposals received were not feasible or were lopsided. Despite 
the benefits that can be brought by the private sector, there were attempts to squeeze the 
government for a supra-profit contract. Due to the vast numbers of unsolicited proposals 
received, the policy maker in UKAS admits there is a need for a proper method to manage it. 
Figure 5.23 demonstrates the nodes for the overall picture of the respondents’ feedback on the 
practice of unsolicited proposals by UKAS. 
Figure 5.23 - Procurement Procedures for Unsolicited Proposals 
5.10.2.1 Open Tendering for Request for Proposal 
Despite the perception of a link between unsolicited proposals and direct negotiations, UKAS 
did try to inculcate some element of competition for unsolicited proposals. Respondent R3 
stressed that If there were more than one proposal for the same infrastructure, UKAS might 
suggest an open competition for Request for Proposal. In contrast, private practitioners may 
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take the opposite view. Respondent R10 stated that it was unfair not to award a concession to 
the original proposer: But I don’t think it’s fair for an unsolicited proposal to be called for 
another round of tendering. The original proposer has the advantage of having extra info and 
extra time for preparing the proposal. Sometimes I see this exercise as just a formality when 
in the end; they will still award it to the original proposer. Overall, the differences in these 
views are not surprising since the aims and objectives of the government and the private 
sector will not be the same. The government should always advocate good governance while 
the private sector aims for maximum profit.  
5.10.2.2 Direct Negotiation with Original Proposer 
From an expert’s point of view, Respondent R12 asserted that a pure private-initiated 
proposal typically comprised the private company’s own initiative and effort to conduct 
research, studies and the proposal of risk in implementation. There was also a hefty price 
absorbed by the private companies in order to produce the proposal. This explains why the 
private sector would prefer direct negotiation when submitting an unsolicited proposal. It is 
important to distinguish between the direct negotiation procurement procedures of a 
government-initiated project and a purely private-initiated unsolicited proposal. Unlike the 
government, the private company sees the potential and takes the risks, especially in 
implementation.  
Respondent R4, however, suggested that, based on experience, Most of my projects are direct 
negotiation projects. It’s either because the project is complicated or they were the only one 
interested in initiating and sending us a proposal. 
5.10.2.3 Swiss Challenge 
Although the Swiss Challenge is nowhere mentioned in the UKAS guideline or on the UKAS 
website, UKAS have been experimenting with it but with no success. When asked to define 
no success, Respondent R2 replied In the end, the original proposer’s offer is still the best. As 
shown in the nodes in Figure 5.23, the responses to implementation of the Swiss Challenge by 
UKAS are expressed in four nodes; 
 Achieves competition – Respondent R3 was satisfied with the mechanism in
dealing with unsolicited proposals: “Nevertheless the experience was ok and
168 
we know that by doing that we have alternatives. The prices submitted by other 
interested participants were quite competitive. 
 Time consuming - Respondent R1 believed that the whole process of the
Swiss Challenge was time consuming, stating Swiss Challenges can even take
up to two years. It’s too long. … If six months, it’s ok. But can it be done in six
months? If we can accomplish the Swiss Challenge process within one year, it
is considered as an achievement. This may be caused by the unavailability of
guidelines on dealing with unsolicited proposals.
 Feels an unethical move by the government – The respondents were also of
the opinion that the Swiss Challenge is unfair and unethical. This can be seen
by these responses: … I don’t think it’s fair for an unsolicited proposal to be
called for another round of tendering (Respondent R10); I’m not sure at that
time whether it’s the right thing to do, in the sense that the proposal was
initiated by the private sector but yet we invited others to bid. We also added
some requirements to the need statement for other companies (Respondent
R3); On the other hand to call a competition exercise for an unsolicited
proposal is not ethically right. PPP is not as simple as conventional
procurement (Respondent R9). Another bold statement made by Respondent
R9 was UKAS tried to avoid the Swiss Challenge if possible; to them it’s not
fair to the original proposer. The researcher observed that the views under this
node were however based on sentiment by the respondents. The only problem
legally related to unethical and unfair behaviour in the Swiss Challenge is the
issue of the intellectual property, which can be managed in an appropriate way.
 Advantage to the original proposer –The researcher looked deeper into why
the Swiss Challenge is undesirable. A clear indication given by an expert was
that the process was merely a waste of time and money, for both government
and the private sector. The reason given by Respondent R13 was, It’s a bit of
nonsense. To me I’m not keen simply because, the original proposer will have
the edge against others. He knows what he is proposing. In this situation, the
original proposer owns a Tunnel Boring Machine. He pointed out that, in
whatever situation, the original proposer will always hold an upper edge in a
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Swiss Challenge. The reason for this advantage was spelled out by Respondent 
R10: The original proposer has the advantage of having extra info and extra 
time for preparing the proposal. Sometimes I see this exercise as just a 
formality when in the end they will still award it to the original proposer. This 
view is supported by Respondent R9: We can see that whoever proposes a 
project will have the upper hand in terms of knowing what they want; how to 
do it; what business model they are going to propose and present to the 
government. 
Notwithstanding the good intention of organising competition through Swiss 
Challenge, Respondent R2 believed that it could not achieve competition since 
it would not attract other bidders. He stated that Normally since a private 
company initiated a proposal, they will be the only one interested with that 
project. Failure to attract bidders defeats the purpose of having a Swiss 
Challenge. 
5.11 New Economic Policy 
The government created the New Economic Policy much earlier than the PPP programme, 
and even earlier than privatisation. Since then, it has been used to in an attempt to balance the 
socio-economic equality of the multi-racial citizens of Malaysia, consequently aiming for 
national unity. As tools to achieve the national agenda, privatisation and PPP have been used.  
Little is known about the implementation of the New Economic Policy incorporated in the 
PPP procurement process by UKAS. In public procurement regulations set by the Malaysian 
Treasury, there are clear guidelines on the implementation of the New Economic Policy, 
although there are none for the PPP procurement process. As discussed in an earlier section, 
UKAS did not follow the public procurement regulations. Figure 5.24 shows the findings 
derived for the New Economic Policy incorporated within PPP in nodes. 
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Figure 5.24 - New Economic Policy 
5.11.1 Bumiputera 
In an attempt to discover the status of the New Economic Policy in PPP, the respondents were 
asked whether Bumiputera is applied to the PPP procurement process. The response in 
general suggests that the national policy is also applied in the PPP procurement process. This 
was confirmed by eight of the respondents. Respondent R2 asserted Yes, the policy is very 
much applied to the PPP too. The New Economic Policy is a National Policy. PPP is one of 
the instruments for the government to achieve the target of New Economic Policy to 
restructure the socio-economics of the people. We still have to follow the related overarching 
national policy. Respondents R4 and R11 also stressed that there is no exclusion since the 
New Economic Policy is a national agenda. Allied to the earlier question, the respondents 
were then asked about the details of the implementation, and the responses were more or less 
similar. Respondent R4 stated, We also put the requirements into our concession agreement. 
In the Special Purpose Vehicle we’re required to award some percentage to the Bumiputera 
work contractors and maintenance contractors. Even banks also played their part by putting 
some requirements for the Bumiputera policy. In line with this response, Respondent R5 
stated the same rule: Nevertheless, we emphasise in the Special Purpose Vehicle company 
structure to follow the 30% requirement of the Bumiputera circular. Besides the minimum 
percentage of equity ownership fixed for a Special Purpose Vehicle, Respondent R3 pointed 
out that a minimum percentage is also fixed for the work contractor and the consultants hired.  
Furthermore, some respondents were asked whether the government would benefit from PPP 
with the restriction imposed. Respondent R12 said that the government has always used 
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government procurement to achieve its aim in the New Economic Policy, and PPP is not 
spared. Hence if the Bumiputera benefit from PPP, the government has accomplished its 
mission, even if it outweighs other elements such as the competitive procurement process. 
Quoting Respondent R12, Without PPP/PFI, we might not have achieved the elements for 
nation building. Bumiputera certainly benefits from this. Respondent R13 praised the national 
policy and is of the opinion that the New Economic Policy should also promote competition 
between the Bumiputera: The New Economic Policy is good. In fact, the purpose of the policy 
is to promote a healthy competition and to actually inculcate or to help the Bumiputera to 
grow. On the other hand, at this stage not only to grow, but to compete between the 
Bumiputera. I believe we have good Bumiputera companies who can actually compete. 
Despite praise for and defence of the policy, Respondent R13 was concerned about the 
implementation on the ground: In this stage, the New Economic Policy can’t be blamed in 
that sense. If we want to conduct a healthy competition between the Bumiputera, we need to 
be transparent; when they submit the tender; how was it proposed; what are the guidelines 
for evaluation; how the tender is being evaluated; the financial capacity, then and there it’s 
ok. I am for New Economic Policy. But then again how to implement, I wonder. 
5.11.2 Foreign Company Policy 
Besides priority given to Bumiputera companies, there is another restriction to the 
involvement of foreign company or foreign ownership for PPP by UKAS. Respondent R5 
explained … under the annual development expenditure, the rule is not more than 49 percent 
equity; in PPP the percentage of equity is not more than 35%”. PPP goes a great way to tap 
resources and transfer technology from the private sector. Limiting competition from foreign 
companies in participating in the procurement process will relinquish some of the benefit of 
PPP. Respondent R5 raised the conflict of interest faced by UKAS: … in terms of the 
involvement of foreign companies, we have a restrictive policy for foreign involvement in the 
Special Purpose Vehicle. Yet, we want their innovation in high technology.  
5.12 Readiness of Industry 
In order to gain maximum benefit from a competitive procurement procedure, an environment 
of healthy competition should be introduced. Healthy competition will drive a company to 
strive for the best, hence benefiting the government through PPP. Consistent with the 
objective of enhancing the practice of competition in the UKAS procurement process, the 
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researcher examined the data for readiness of the Malaysian PPP industry. Table 5.22 outlines 
the feedback received on the readiness of the industry. The analysis in Table 5.22 
demonstrates the current situation of the PPP industry in Malaysia. A number of respondents 
talked about what they believe will hinder a healthy competitive exercise.   
Table 5.22 - Readiness of Industry 
Readiness of Industry 
Lack of players  Criteria in the Request for Proposal documents are intended to filter capable
companies from the non-capable. But the few left are mainly the same companies
who participate in most of the UKAS Request for Proposal exercises. (Respondent
R4)
 We discovered that the same companies participate in our tender exercises for
different sectors. (Respondent R4)
 Some may even be a sister company. Higher criteria in the Request for Proposal
may even result in same players. (Respondent R4)
 However, we might have a problem to get participation for complex projects due to
the minimum number of players. (Respondent R4)
 Participation from the private sector has also increased, different companies rather
than the same players. (Respondent R5)
Maturity of 
players 
 When a company wants to propose an infrastructure project, they should have
done a comprehensive study on everything including value for money, not
purposely for profit. The private sector should be more efficient in giving the
services. But it does not happen that way; we still have to guide them. The maturity
of the players is still not as I expected. (Respondent R3)
 Yes, we only have a few PPP players because of the financial thing. An organisation
must be strong in financials to join a PPP bid. The fact that the government needs a
company which will stand for another 27-30 years. Not a one-night company.
(Respondent R9)
Sectoral  Depends on the sector. (Respondent referring to the readiness for healthy
competition) (Respondent R1)
Competency of 
consultants 
 For our project, I can see that they were also relying on the so-called expert hired by
the private company who proposed the development. They should have their own
specialist or expert to verify and check their proposal. Although they invited other
related government agencies to evaluate and put their comments based on
previous databases, I was not so convinced. In my opinion, UKAS should have their
own experts. (Respondent R6)
 A study among QSs, in MICRA 2014, you look at the paper, even the QSs are not
sure how to deal with, in terms of provision of services when they deal with PFI.
Many start thinking it is the same as traditional procurement. In a way, yes, it is the
same. But in a way it is not the same. Because you are trying to price what is
needed to be considered and factors for 30 years. (Respondent R12)
 So what do they do? They think conventionally. They load it. If all the mentality of
our suppliers is like that, competition or negotiation will remain the same. It is only
a belief, through competition you might get value for money. (Respondent R12)
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5.13 Current Level of Competition 
Overall, it can be seen that UKAS has not set aside the competition element within its 
procurement process. Respondent R10 observed that there are some competition elements in 
the UKAS guideline, although Respondent 10 did not give examples. UKAS current practice 
is said to be improved over their previous practice. Respondent R2 commented, “Comparing 
then and now, we are moving towards more competitive exercise.”  Although it is said that 
PPP is complex and should not be treated in the same manner as public procurement, 
Respondent R12 commented, Why do we put to competition? If we want value for money, 
whether PPP is a complex procurement or not, we allow open tendering. 
There were five approaches mentioned by the respondents on the efforts taken by UKAS to 
foster competition within its procurement process:  
 Advertisement – According to Respondent R2, the calls for an open
competition of Request for Proposal were intended to achieve value for money:
We tried to achieve value for money through competitive bidding. Compared to
previous years, Respondent R2 emphasised that UKAS is moving towards
more open bidding, and provided in-depth reasons for UKAS’ previous
practice of lack of competition: Back then there were only few players and so
much political pressure. Respondent R2 added that the private sector was not
very supportive of the PPP back then.
According to Respondent R12, UKAS can be seen advertising their Requests 
for Proposal for projects which he understood as advertisement for 
government-initiated projects. The alleged practice of awarding concessions 
without competitive bidding is history. Giving credit to current practice, 
Respondent R12 stated, So if we base it on the fact that they have advertised all 
their calls for proposals, I would say that the competition has increased up to a 
higher level, and is relatively transparent. When asked whether the current 
competition practice needed to be improved, Respondent R12 suggested that if 
UKAS’ objective was to achieve competitive bidding and give an equal 
opportunity for everyone to participate and compete, UKAS had indeed 
achieved its objective. Considering his knowledge and observation on UKAS 
current practice, Respondent R12 stated … in terms of having fair opportunity 
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to all through the advertisement, they achieve it. In another words, no 
restrictions. The researcher, however, did not manage to acquire statistics on 
the number of concessions calling for open Request for Proposal for 
government-initiated and unsolicited proposals. 
 Access to information – In order to organise a fair and healthy competition
exercise, each interested party should compete on a level playing field. The
participants should have equal access to information on PPP procurement
opportunities and should not be restricted. According to Respondent R12,
notice of government-initiated projects is advertised on the UKAS website: So
in the advertisement, all the details, and documentation is there. Respondent
R4 further explained UKAS practice: If it is for a Request for Proposal
exercise, we will put the criteria that have to be met in the Request for
Proposal document. Paid up capital; expertise; previous experience;
consultants hired, etc. Normally the requirement of an Special Purpose Vehicle
in a competitive exercise is stricter than a direct negotiation requirement”.
Respondent R1 commented the same.
Access to information is also practised by UKAS for almost every procurement 
process. This can be seen from the response by Respondent R1, “Made known 
means if you are a proponent, you will be made aware. Aware means that after 
the prequalification stage we will select qualified companies for Request for 
Proposal, let’s say four or five companies, we conduct a briefing. We will tell 
the companies of the requirements, and then we will upload the question. You 
can access our website and look into the example of waste to energy projects. 
We received questions from companies for that project. Access to sufficient 
information will allow the bidders to demonstrate complete knowledge in their 
proposal. 
 Open for new entry – To attract players to enter the PPP industry and
participate in PPP programmes, Respondent R2 indicated that UKAS have
reduced the barrier. Back then it was hard for us to get private sector
participation in the PPP programme. So we have to set aside barriers for them
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to participate. I think we have moved forward. As much as UKAS wants to 
attract new entry to the market, there are still some restrictions on bidders 
which deter new entrants. Respondent R4 commented, Criteria in the Request 
for Proposal documents are intended to filter capable companies from the non-
capable. But the few left are mainly the same companies who participate in 
most of the UKAS Request for Proposal exercises. We wanted to let the market 
open. However, Respondent R12 was of the opinion that the practice is fair 
enough; interested participants should meet the requirements set by UKAS. 
However, putting barriers to entry may eliminate the competitive element and 
potentially lead to the market becoming a monopoly or oligopoly. 
 Avoiding monopoly –According to Respondent R4, UKAS tries to avoid
monopoly: We wanted to let the market open, and we would also like to avoid
monopoly and practice fair distribution. However, Respondent R4’s further
response demonstrates that practice is still selective in UKAS: Let’s say, the
nature of the project itself, there were many projects in my section that I
categorised as a simple project, especially hostels. I would love for them to be
opened to qualified companies to ensure that we will get a competitive price.
There are a lot of capable companies who can deliver. Then we will get a good
response resulting in a healthy competition exercise. However, on further
examination, although most of the concessions awarded by Respondent R4’s
section used the mode of direct negotiation with a single company, no
monopoly company was detected. There is a suggestion that UKAS has
imposed a clause inside the concession agreement to avoid monopoly;
Respondent R7 proclaimed, If I’m not mistaken, there are clauses that forbid
the concession holder to be involved with other PPP concessions. They are not
allowed to participate in other concessions until they have completed the
current concession. I see this as an effort by the government to curb the
monopoly of the big players. But I don’t know whether the enforcement is
really done by the government. However, since Respondent R7 is the only one
to mention this practice, the researcher could not establish whether it is
common in UKAS or a one-off practice.
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 Swiss Challenge– Based on the analysis conducted earlier, Swiss Challenge is
not common practice in UKAS. It seems that this is not a favourable option
even among private companies. Respondent R2 asserted that Sometimes in
order to get a job, the original proposer claims that they deserved to be
awarded due to the ownership of Intellectual Property. However, if we check
that they don’t qualify for Intellectual Property, we will advertise for Request
for Proposal. Respondent R3 commented that by introducing the competition
element for unsolicited proposals through Swiss Challenge, it was possible to
obtain competitive pricing and alternative proposals.
Figure 5.25 - Challenges in Incorporating Competition within the Procurement Process 
5.14 Challenges in Incorporating Competition within Procurement Process 
A number of issues were introduced by the respondents when they were asked about 
constraints and barriers to upholding competition; they have been coded into 12 sub-nodes. 
The responses are demonstrated in Figure 5.25. 
 Political or individual interest –A number of alleged abuses of power by the
government on PPP projects have been highlighted in the newspapers.
Companies have been awarded projects directly, without justification.
Interestingly, seven out of the 13 respondents indicated political or individual
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interest as a barrier to implementing competition. The nodes receiving the 
highest response gave the impression that this is the most common issue. In 
their own words, The main issue is the political interference (Respondent R8); 
Back then there were only few players and so much political pressure 
(Respondent R2); However, in Malaysia, due to strong political influences, 
competitive exercises may have been set aside, and To a certain extent UKAS 
can evaluate, unless they have been instructed by higher authority to award a 
project to a certain company (Respondent R11); A PPP proposal can come 
from a few channels. Either initiated by the private sector and submitted to 
either the relevant ministries or directly to us, or proposed by the 
ministries/agencies themselves and even from politically motivated projects 
(Respondent R4); and Nowadays, there is no one-to-one direct negotiation 
unless there is an instruction (Respondent R5). For Respondent R12, the 
alleged practice was in the past and the government should have improved by 
now: So to squarely say that now the mentality of the implementers still 
appears to be talking about hush-hush, still talking about nepotism and 
cronyism, I think that situation has changed. However, there is considerable 
proof that the practice may still be very much in place, as some of the 
respondents’ projects were awarded to politically connected companies. These 
companies were exclusively awarded a concession even if they had no 
experience in PPP projects. Although inevitably lucrative long-term 
concessions attract political interest, the competitive procurement process 
should be a solution to address this issue. 
 Intellectual property – Due to legal issues, intellectual property has been
deterring some countries from introducing the Swiss Challenge and Best and
Final Offer approaches. Respondent R2 pointed out that there were companies
who use intellectual property as a merit to obtain an award directly after
submitting the proposal. Respondent R1 said that there were also concerns
regarding this matter, We don’t want people to duplicate other people’s idea.
Respondent R1 continued, I think it’s plagiarism, and intellectual property
rights are a fundamental issue in PPP. This is where a legal framework for
PPP is deemed to be important. Respondent R13 stated that under Malaysian
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law and the judiciary, intellectual property is not something to be concerned 
about:  
 
Going back on how our system works. The person who proposes has not much 
idea anyway. I would refer to a few cases I read. It was the designer who came 
up with the idea; this is according to the few court cases in Malaysia. The 
designer joint-ventured with the one who proposed. Back to your question, 
seldom do people patent their ideas; people patent their designs, and design 
comes from the designers. Unless a company like XXXX can design, then they 
hire a designer to do a detailed design. That would be a challenge. I don’t 
think that would happen in Malaysia, especially with Bumiputera companies. 
I’m not that worried about that part. 
 
Based on his legal background and experience, Respondent R13 proposed a 
solution: if you want to conduct a Swiss Challenge, you have to impose a rule 
that the intellectual property has to be transferred or assigned to the 
government. The person who gets the job has to pay a sum of money for the 
intellectual property to the original proposer, then it can work. 
 
 Bona fide of bidders – It was suggested that the respondents found that open 
competition for the PPP procurement process might attract non-genuine 
bidders, therefore highlighting the intention of the bidders. Quoting 
Respondent R2, Are they really interested in the project? We have to ensure 
that the bidders are really committed to carry on the projects for up to 30 
years. Sometimes when we evaluate proposals received through a competitive 
process, everything is good on the papers submitted, but based on our 
experience of previous projects, they might not be able to deliver, to the extent 
of selling the project later. The same issue was raised for a Swiss Challenge 
process by Respondent R9.   
 
 Can be time consuming – The researcher encountered a complaint from one 
respondent that the process of organising and evaluating a proposal was time 
consuming. Respondent R1 gave an example of Swiss Challenge: We tried 
Swiss Challenge, but our main concern was time and speed. We don’t want 
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people to duplicate other people’s ideas. I think it’s plagiarism and intellectual 
property rights are a fundamental issue in PPP. The other concern is the time 
consumed. Swiss Challenges can even take up to two years. It’s too long. If six 
months, it’s ok. But can it be done in six months? If we can accomplish the 
Swiss Challenge process within one year, it is considered as an achievement. 
For Respondent R6, even logistics-wise a competitive process could take some 
time: When the proposals were distributed to the external agencies, it was time 
consuming. This may suggest that the actual competitive process did not 
contribute to the waiting period, but instead might be related to the efficiency 
of the delivery. No clear timeline is set by UKAS in their guideline. Clear 
guidelines should minimise the length of time consumed in organising and 
evaluating proposals.  
 Problems in evaluating proposals – From Respondent R9’s participation in
the UKAS procurement process, There were two rounds of bidding. When we
first submitted our proposal, UKAS reviewed it. But they had a major problem
of evaluating our proposal since it wasn’t an apple-to-apple comparison. For
competitive procurement procedures for unsolicited proposals to be used in the
future, Respondent R9 suggested the following: If you’re going to get another
party to challenge the original proposer, they will face the problem like I told
you to evaluate something that is not an apple-to-apple comparison. As a
consequence, difficulties in evaluating proposals may lengthen the overall
process, which will affect both the government and the companies. Since PPP
proposals are very subjective, it is important to note that ample time is needed
in evaluating and scrutinising them for positive results on procurement.
 Competition can be costly – Involvement in a competitive procurement
process can be costly to the bidders, and the cost will definitely be passed on to
the government in the bidding price. Respondent R12 pointed out that not
everything about competition in the procurement process is good: Of course
there are many disadvantages of open tendering, in particular the entry cost,
which at the end of the day, the industry will have to pay, because the
contractor will put it in their pricing.  … So for example, if we are going for
180 
open tender, and it is going to cost the industry so much, I do not know, like in 
the olden days, for hospital projects, we have contractors who submit their bid 
for simple design and build; it came up to RM 200k in those days, in the early 
1990s. So if there are ten contractors? How much already? You imagine that 
amount the government or the client has got to pay. So if that is the case that is 
no use. It is suggested in some of the literature that competition will increase 
the bidding cost; however, the literature also recognises that within certain 
measures the benefits of the competitive procurement process may outweigh 
the high cost of bidding.  
5.15 Summary 
This chapter brought together key findings from the document review exercise and the 
experience of the respondents that reflects the actual practice of the UKAS procurement 
process. Based on the document review, the study found both resemblances and dissimilarities 
in the documents reviewed. The differences in the information regarding the procurement 
process and competition are quite obvious. These may result from changes in government 
needs over the years. Conversely, the drivers for the government in adopting PPP and 
privatisation have not changed much. Although the wording may look different, the content is 
still the same. Both programmes aim to improve the socio-economy of the Malaysian citizen, 
attaining efficiency, reducing the government’s financial burden and facilitating economic 
growth. Even though it is only briefly explained, there is information in the Privatisation 
Master Plan regarding the procurement process for government- and private-initiated 
proposals. There is, however, insufficient information on procurement process activities in the 
UKAS guideline and website.  
Through the interviews it was found that the status of PPP under UKAS is unclear. There was 
a mixed response from respondents with no one able to cite or link their claim to any statutory 
or legal documents. The status of UKAS PPP is vital as it determines the entire operation of 
UKAS, including the procurement process. The analysis showed that UKAS procurement 
practice has been executed not strictly according to the public procurement regulations. 
UKAS has been dependent on a flexible guideline balanced with extensive inter-agency 
committee screening, with the cabinet making the final decisions. Although flexibility may 
result in creativity and innovation, it may also lead to abuse of power in the absence of 
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detailed regulations. The respondents were optimistic that a clear framework might draw a 
boundary to clarify current practice. 
Conventional public procurement was inadequate as an instrument to achieve the New 
Economic Policy, but the Malaysian Government continued to use PPP to achieve the same 
objective, despite avoiding the label of public procurement for UKAS PPP. The driver for the 
government in adopting PPP was not solely for PPP benefit, but more holistic. However, it is 
not known whether the government manages to get the best of PPP with current additional 
drivers. Nevertheless, notwithstanding its accountability as the government arm to manage 
PPP, UKAS’ attempts to achieve the macro aim of PPP tend to cloud the importance and 
benefit of competition and other good governance such as transparency. Although a majority 
of the respondents acknowledged the need for competition in the UKAS procurement process, 
the challenge is to strike a balance between achieving the aims and upholding good 
governance. No doubt the respondents were very optimistic about the changes this research 
might bring.  
Issues raised by the respondents were mostly in common, and similar to the issues faced by 
other practitioners globally. These issue can be resolved or minimised. The impact of not 
having a competitive procurement process seems to lead to larger and critical issues. The 
findings from the interviews have revealed the actual practice of the UKAS procurement 
process and the competition within it, complementing the document review. This information 
is important in understanding the whole phenomenon, and is essential to the development of 
the framework. 
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6.0  Discussion of Findings 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the final objective of the research, which is to develop a competition-
based framework. In order to address this objective, the chapter synthesises the results of the 
literature and document reviews, and the interviews, offers readers’ further meaning from the 
empirical findings. 
The literature review provided a wide picture of the research scope. It looked at the concept of 
PPP overall, before investigating the best practice as implemented by numerous PPP 
practitioners around the world and then examining PPP in Malaysia. Chapter 3 examined the 
concept of competition and its application within PPP. Best practice procurement processes 
globally, including unsolicited proposals, were analysed, as were the constraints to 
incorporating competition within PPP. The Malaysian governance for public procurement and 
competition policy were examined in this chapter. Moving on to the case study, in Chapter 5 a 
review was conducted of important documents referred to by UKAS, before analysis of the 
results of the interviews. These empirical findings are contextualised in this chapter and used 
to develop the framework in an attempt to enhance the procurement process for infrastructure 
delivery in Malaysian PPP by incorporating competition. This chapter is divided into two 
sections: the first discusses UKAS procurement process and the findings on competition; and 
the second explains development of the framework.  
6.2 Procurement Process under UKAS 
This section explores the UKAS procurement process and what influences their governance. 
The literature suggested that there are multiple ways to govern PPP. Although the governance 
of PPP is very much dependent on country-specific determinants (Rufin & Rivera-Santos, 
2012), no public sector should neglect the principles of good governance and accountability. 
The case study found that the governance of the UKAS procurement process is questionable. 
UKAS has been operating since 2006, and has managed to procure numerous PPP projects. In 
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Chapter 3, the researcher reviewed the procedures for Malaysian public procurement, 
proposing that UKAS is also bound by the same regulations. One of the major findings was 
that the respondents confirmed that UKAS did not follow the regulations for public 
procurement in Malaysia, or at least that they did not want to constraint themselves by 
adhering strictly to them. Furthermore, the respondents confirmed that there are no specific 
regulations for administering PPP within UKAS. In fact, several respondents believed that a 
specific act or regulations would only restrict UKAS from being flexible in implementation. 
The respondents listed UKAS’ own guideline as the authoritative document, in addition to the 
Privatisation Master Plan. Hence, the manner of UKAS’ procurement process according to 
these documents was further investigated. The information available in these documents 
revealed surprising discrepancies between them. 
6.2.1 Role of UKAS 
In reality, little is known about UKAS’ role and their degree of involvement in PPP 
implementation in Malaysia. UKAS comes under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister’s 
Department, which was granted certain discretionary powers under the Ministerial Functions 
Act 1969 (Act 2). In exercising the powers conferred by the Ministerial Functions Act, under 
the Ministers of the Federal Government (No.2) Order 2013 (P.U (A) 184/2013) it was 
gazetted that UKAS should be responsible for planning, coordinating, evaluating, negotiating 
and supervising procurements for privatisation and PPP projects. In addition, UKAS is 
responsible for policy making regarding PPP for the government of Malaysia. Wang et al. 
(2012) described UKAS’ role as planning and processing PPP project proposals. Respondent 
R1 explained that the concept of UKAS’ involvement was centralised planning and 
decentralised implementation, their involvement lasting only until the finalisation of the 
concession agreement. UKAS is not a party of any PPP contract. Although in theory they are 
supposed to facilitate and realise the PPP intentions of ministries and agencies, in practice 
they play more of a role in leading and deciding what they consider best for the ministries and 
agencies. This arrangement has led to problems post-contract where, for example, there was 
contradiction with other stakeholders such as the end users. Respondents R6 and R7 were of 
the opinion that UKAS needed to extend their involvement to project implementation, since 
they were very much involved in the deal making in earlier phases. 
Despite this, credit should be given to UKAS; throughout their PPP implementation they 
manage to accomplish the three main functions of a PPP unit suggested by PPIAF (2012): 
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developing the PPP programme and its policy; facilitating and coordinating PPP projects for 
government entities; and educating stakeholders regarding the programme.  
UKAS does not list decision making as one of its roles, but only prepares reports to be 
presented to inter-agency committees such as JKAS and JTAS before every decision is made 
by the cabinet. This micro-management by the cabinet approval is interpreted in two ways: it 
demonstrates that PPP under UKAS has very much political support, and that the cabinet 
wants to monitor and control every step of UKAS.  
6.2.2 Procurement Process: The Governance 
UKAS is very flexible in its procurement process. Proposals are facilitated and treated 
differently according to their context. Nevertheless, UKAS’ procurement process are only 
initiated once approval in principle has been received from the cabinet ministers for a 
proposal to proceed. Only then can the preparation of the Request for Proposal documents and 
invitation to participate be realised. It is not specified in any of the documents reviewed how 
UKAS decides on the route of the procurement process for a proposal.  
There are inconsistencies in decision making concerning the procurement process for 
government-initiated projects. Findings from the interviews confirmed that the cabinet 
ministers’ approval in principle includes which procurement process to use. The decisions, 
however, are based on the preliminary evaluation of proposals and recommendation by multi-
tiered inter-agency committees. According to UKAS, (2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d) there are 
inter-agency committees with different functions, JPP JKAS and JTAS, which review and 
evaluate PPP proposals and make recommendations to the cabinet. Findings revealed UKAS 
adopt their own internal assessment in deciding whether to employ PPP procurement for a 
proposal. The preliminary assessment details, however, are not made available to the public, 
and it is unclear how UKAS assessment works. Respondent R12 suggested that established 
procurement tools such as the Public Sector Comparator are themselves a form of 
competition. For instance, a proposal is required to compete with the government estimates in 
the Public Sector Comparator assessment.  
There is a lack of information on the availability of any published rules or guidelines for the 
cabinet to adhere to, hence there is no clarity about the decisions made for previous 
concessions. Respondents R4 and R5 pointed out that there were instances where the cabinet 
did not follow the recommendations of the inter-agency committee. This is not surprising, 
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since the cabinet holds unfettered power within the UKAS procurement process. Headed by 
the Prime Minister, it is the highest executive authority for the government’s activities, 
including procurement. Members are empowered under the legislature and made responsible 
for administering the law. The advantage of having cabinet decide is the ability to resolve 
problems under different jurisdictions of the relevant minister. Collective cabinet decisions 
should theoretically be in line with the national budget and government priorities, since all 
ministers are involved. Nevertheless, as described in the earlier chapter, cabinet members are 
political appointees from the party that has been ruling Malaysia for more than half a century. 
Tan (2008) suggested that similar practice during the privatisation era saw many conflicts of 
interest in the award of privatisation concessions. The concession award of UKAS PPP has 
also been alleged by the opposition party to be awarded to companies linked to the ruling 
party (Zahid, 2014). It appears that current practice in UKAS PPP gives the cabinet absolute 
discretion in making all decisions. This will increase the tendency for abuse of power and 
corruption. 
Similar to the Privatisation Master Plan, the UKAS guideline does not specify in systematic 
detail their procurement process. As an authoritative document, the guideline can be criticised 
as lacking clarity. Respondents R2 and R4 agreed that the UKAS guideline is too general for 
the whole PPP implementation. Nevertheless, Respondent R2 justified that the generic nature 
of the guideline was purposely intended to set out basic guidance to allow for flexibility, and 
that its content was adequate. The UKAS guideline is aware of its own limitations, claiming 
that it is a generic document.  
Each proposal is treated in a different way by UKAS. This has resulted in inconsistency in 
practice and transparency issues. Detailed and standardised procedures are considered 
important for PPP implementation (Aziz, 2007). The UKAS guideline, however, does not 
provide this and may affect PPP implementation in the long term. The confusion created by 
the generic nature of the guideline has made UKAS a subject for investigation by government 
watchdog agencies: the police, audit department, and the anti-corruption commission. 
Respondent R5 considered that there is nothing wrong with UKAS practice, as it is still in line 
with the public procurement regulations and good governance. Interested parties of PPPs and 
existing stakeholders may also check the UKAS website for information. However, there is 
different information on the UKAS website, which still lacks detail on UKAS procurement 
process. The absence of clarity demonstrated in the UKAS authoritative documents increases 
the vulnerability of UKAS practice to ethical misconduct. 
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6.2.2.1 Procurement Notice 
The procurement notice or advertisement is intended to attract participation from the private 
sector for the forthcoming project. The aim is to draw widespread attention and thus create 
competition through the number of participants. As discussed in Chapter 3, in EU countries in 
projects qualifying under EU directives as public contracts or works concessions, the 
procurement process starts officially with the publication of a procurement notice in the 
OJEU. The UKAS guideline does not explicitly regulate which projects should be advertised. 
In contrast to the guideline, the Privatisation Master Plan proposed that all government-
initiated projects be subject to a competitive bidding exercise. Apparently, there is lack of 
detail on the manner of publication of notice or advertisement for invitation to bid for UKAS 
projects. According to Respondent 12, UKAS did make efforts to advertise government-
initiated projects on their website, although Respondents R6 and R7 disagreed that UKAS 
advertised, based on their own experience. Advertising is an important medium to announce 
the government’s intention to develop infrastructure. Within the advertisement, the 
contracting authority should release sufficient information describing the projects; their 
purpose; qualification requirements (Craven, 2011); the procurement process timeline; and 
other important information (The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa & Partnerships UK, 
2009). This enables interested bidders to prepare to participate. Adequate access to 
information will lead to a healthy and fair competitive environment among bidders.  
6.2.2.2 Request for Proposal 
There is criticism of the way in which most of UKAS contracts were awarded through direct 
negotiation without competitive tender (Zahid, 2014). This was also experienced by the 
respondents. Respondent R1 declared that direct negotiation with a single company has been 
the default procurement process for highway construction. Despite this, comments from other 
respondents revealed that UKAS has adopted three types of procurement procedures for 
government-initiated proposals: open tender, selective tender and direct negotiation. 
Unfortunately, statistics on the type of procurement procedures employed by UKAS were not 
officially available. 
In the Privatisation Master Plan, competitive bidding is obligatory for all government-initiated 
proposals. The competitive bidding exercise was supposed to be open to the public or specific 
target players. Nevertheless, there were no details in the Plan on the manner of this exercise. 
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In contrast with the government-initiated proposals, for private-initiated proposals, contracts 
were awarded based on a first-come-first-served-basis to encourage private sector 
participation. Jomo and Syn, (2003) listed major infrastructure privatisation projects awarded 
without a competitive bidding exercise. Even with the Plan’s clear provision for competitive 
bidding for government-initiated proposals, there are still some projects included in the list of 
government-initiated proposal projects which were awarded through direct negotiation with a 
single company (Anuar, 2012).  
In some countries, only capable bidders are invited for Request for Proposal exercise. These 
qualified bidders are screened against the qualification criteria set, before being invited to 
participate in the tendering process. Similarly, UKAS use a pre-qualification exercise in 
certain projects to screen only competent and capable companies to participate in the 
procurement process. The recommendations of which projects should take the pre-
qualification approach are made by the inter-agency committee and decided by the cabinet. 
The number of shortlisted candidates to be invited for Request for Proposal also depends on 
the cabinet decision.  
It is essential for the contracting authority to secure optimum competition through an 
optimum number of participants. Too small a number of bidders may lead to collusive 
behaviour (Marques & Berg, 2011), while large numbers might deter participation due to less 
chance of winning (Garsse, 2008). The optimum number to achieve competition is subjective. 
Hansen (2003) pointed out that even three bidders can be competitive. Under the EU 
procurement directive, the minimum number of tenderers shortlisted for a restrictive tender is 
suggested as five, and for a negotiated tender the contracting authority should identify at least 
three rather than negotiating with a single company (Bovis, 2010). Estache and Iimi (2008) 
suggested that the minimum number of bidders to achieve intense competition for an 
infrastructure project is eight. The intention of achieving optimum competition is for 
economic efficiency, and a large number of bidders will also avoid collusive behaviour and 
corruption.  
6.2.2.3 Interaction with Bidders 
Prior to submission of the final bid, dialogue sessions with bidders should be engaged in, as 
beneficial to both parties. In the dialogue sessions between the contracting authority and 
potential bidders, clarification should be made on all aspects of the proposed development, 
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including the scope of the work, contracts, and post-construction responsibilities (The World 
Bank et al., 2014). This engagement must be conducted with each bidder to allow all bidders 
to access as much information as possible regarding the advertised projects prior to submitting 
final bids, hence allowing fair and healthy competitive bidding. Dialogue with each tenderer 
before the submission of the tender may help bidders equally to understand the whole process 
clearly and help to clarify any issues. The interaction with bidders will also help government 
to identify and improve any terms and conditions of the contract before it is awarded, making 
the contract more robust.  
No interaction with bidders should be made after the submission of the final bid, except for 
clarification. This is to prevent any changes after the bid is submitted and to diminish 
concerns about transparency and fairness. UKAS normally organise a site visit and pre-bid 
briefing on the same day. Following these, UKAS allow written queries within a day or two, 
and guarantee to respond within three working days after the receipt of a query.  
One of the flow charts on the UKAS website shows that a Value Management workshop is 
conducted before the preparation and invitation of Request for Proposal, but on investigation 
this is meant for the practice of direct negotiation. Further investigation discovered that on 
occasions UKAS conducted Value Management workshops after the Special Purpose Vehicle 
had been chosen. In an open or restrictive tender, the Value Management workshop may be 
conducted before the Request for Proposal with the ministries or agencies initiating the 
proposal. Another Value Management workshop with the successful bidder is conducted after 
the tender process. Through the workshop, UKAS are able to ensure that proposals are kept 
within their target in terms of price and scope. Where there is little concern about this practice 
for direct negotiations, there are worries about the unequal treatment in post-bid dialogues in a 
competitive bidding exercise. Although it may be good for the government to achieve their 
goals, any changes to the original proposal for the preferred bidder are unfair to the other 
unsuccessful bidders, who might be able to incorporate these changes in their bid if given 
equal treatment. Hence, it is important for the bidders to access comprehensive information 
before submitting their final bid. 
6.2.2.4 Evaluation and Selection of Preferred Bidder 
Following the submission of tenders by bidders, the period of evaluations occurs. Neither the 
UKAS guideline nor the website specify the evaluation criteria. Pre-determined evaluation 
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criteria should encourage maximum participation of genuine bidders. The selection of the 
most suitable Special Purpose Vehicle is vital in determining the success of the project (Kwak 
et al., 2009). This important information was not found in any of the documents reviewed. 
Under the Malaysian public procurement regulations, the evaluation criteria to be employed 
are clearly indicated. Publishing or notifying the bidders and public of the evaluation methods 
guarantees no impartiality in the evaluation to favour a particular bidder. Respondents R3 and 
R5 stressed that UKAS conducted several phases of evaluation. The early phase saw each 
proposal being evaluated for compliance with the requirements set out in the Request for 
Proposal. The interviews also revealed the evaluation criteria UKAS used when evaluating a 
proposal. Although in the process a feasibility study had been conducted in making the 
decision to choose which PPP route, the feasibility of the proposal was again examined as one 
of the main criteria.  
Proposals received from the private sector may exceed what was required by the government, 
and hence not be feasible. On the other hand, UKAS found that most of the time the 
requirements of the ministries and agencies were excessive. UKAS believe it is important that 
the proposal should be buildable and financially sustainable by the ministries and agencies, 
which in this case is the end user. In ensuring the bidder delivers effectively, UKAS 
emphasise the assessment of the bidders’ technical and financial strength to ensure they 
possess sufficient resources to undertake the project they propose. These two criteria are 
considered critical by UKAS to ensure that a bidder is fit to deliver its commitment 
throughout the entire concession period. A checklist for background information includes 
previous performance, current jobs in hand, experience and managerial capacity. Complicated 
projects require highly trained and skilled personnel. These criteria, however, may deter a 
new entry from breaking into the PPP industry.  
Bidders’ financial capacity is established through submission of evidence on financial 
standing and access to financial resources (debt and equity). Since bidders are also required to 
finance the project, UKAS requires them to submit financial arrangements and proposed 
payment mechanisms for scrutiny. It is also important to UKAS that the proposal is 
commercially sound and robust. Although the financing obligation is transferred to the bidder, 
UKAS need to establish that there would be no or minimum financial risk in the proposal. A 
high level of bankability encourages lenders and investors to participate in the project.  
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UKAS did not specify any methods to evaluate proposals in any of the published documents. 
Respondents R2 and R5 mentioned that the methods are not publicised since it is for internal 
use only. However, this information needs to be transparent. Respondent R1 did give a 
glimpse of the methods employed by UKAS to evaluate proposals: scoring methods and 
weighting. Commonly a pre-set weighting is fixed for specific criteria and proposals are given 
a score to be compared later with the overall score. The pre-set weightings however, vary 
according to industry and other factors decided by the inter-agency committee. UKAS also 
experimented with a Likert scale scoring for proposal evaluation. Currently, the flexibility and 
lack of transparency in the evaluation methods make it vulnerable to abuse of power and 
suspicion of manipulation of the scoring methods to indulge in favouritism for certain 
companies. Another important factor in evaluation of a proposal pointed out by one 
respondent is of course the price. Although UKAS do not use the lowest-price approach, the 
bidding price offered by the bidder or proposer is essential and needs to be within the budget 
approved by the cabinet and in line with government priorities so that it will not be a burden 
in the future.  
It is not known how UKAS select the bidders to be considered for the award of the contract. 
Nevertheless, the UKAS guideline indicates that ministries and agencies shortlist three 
companies to be submitted to UKAS for selection. In reality, evaluation is conducted by the 
inter-agency committee, and UKAS bring the shortlisted companies to the cabinet for 
approval. Ismail (2013) suggested that the number of shortlisted companies should be 
increased to more than three. Although the tender board in the Malaysian Public Procurement 
Regulations is told to choose the offer most advantageous to the government, it is not known 
how the cabinet chooses the winning bid for PPP. Discretion in choosing the winning bid 
depends on the prerogative of the cabinet, raising much ambiguity.  
The successful bidder is notified by UKAS. Negotiations on the terms and conditions of the 
contract then take place. Prior to contract signing, endorsement from the cabinet for the final 
contract agreement must be obtained. The signing of the concession agreement ends the 
procurement process. 
6.2.2.5 Unsolicited Proposals 
Besides government-initiated proposals, the UKAS guideline encourages unsolicited 
proposals. The Malaysian government has welcomed private-initiated proposals since the 
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privatisation programme, to encourage local participants to participate in privatisation. It 
promises to award concessions based on a first-come-first-served-basis, subject to their 
meeting the government’s requirements. The government’s aim was to reward innovation in 
the local private sector. However, as explained in Chapter 5, proposals which did not meet the 
requirements fixed by the government will be put through a competitive bidding exercise. 
Although in the Privatisation Master Plan, no label was used in describing the procurement 
process, the content is similar to a Swiss Challenge, Bonus System or Best and Final Offer 
System, where the original proposer is invited to participate in the competitive tender. If the 
winning bidder is not the original proposer, the winning bidder shall compensate the original 
proposer for costs, including those incurred in preparing the proposal. 
The UKAS guideline offers no explicit rules for unsolicited proposals, which share the same 
route as the government-initiated proposals. The private sector may submit proposals direct to 
UKAS or through the relevant ministries or agencies. The proposal will then be evaluated by 
UKAS and brought to the cabinet for decision. As a measure to ensure that any proposed 
infrastructure is needed, the interviews revealed that whenever UKAS received an unsolicited 
proposal, they would cross-refer it with the ministries’ or agencies’ development plans. 
Priority is given to proposals already falling within existing planning. This move taken by the 
government is to ensure that all unsolicited proposals approved to proceed are consistent with 
or comparable to the national development planning and budget. In this way, unsolicited 
proposals will not affect or distort existing priorities. 
Nevertheless, this practice increases the possibility of corruption. Any person(s) within the 
contracting authority may disclose the information to any company regarding any 
development projects needed or planned by the ministry. The so-called unsolicited proposal 
will have the advantage of being awarded through direct negotiation, as current practice does 
not require unsolicited proposals to undergo competitive bidding, according to UKAS default 
practice. Even though one respondent pointed out that this might be the only way the 
government can get their infrastructure, this makes it vulnerable to individuals who pursue 
self-gain at the expense of the taxpayer’s money. 
As discussed in the literature review, an unsolicited proposal originates from the private 
sector and is not submitted in response to request from the contracting authority. The private 
sector is responsible for the project’s feasibility and all other associated studies for the 
proposal. For example, it is supposed to use its own resources to develop the proposal. The 
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private sector is also taking a risk on the bankability of the proposed project. Based on UKAS 
practice, the private sector with this information will have the upper hand and bear less risk in 
submitting a proposal, as the work is already on the government priority list and in demand.  
As explained in Chapter 5, UKAS’ experiment with Swiss Challenge were not as successful 
as expected. Respondent R3 claimed that, through Swiss Challenge UKAS managed to obtain 
competitive pricing. Nevertheless, Respondents R2 and R9 felt that both Swiss Challenge 
were unethical, as they were unfair on the original proposer who had spent resources in 
preparing the proposal. Respondent R13 felt that the exercise was merely a waste of time and 
money, as in the end the original proposer would always have an advantage over other 
bidders. Another challenge highlighted was attracting other bidders to join the Swiss 
Challenge when they knew that the original proposer had the advantage in knowing what was 
required, how to do it and what business model to propose. There was a perception in the 
industry that these exercises were merely a formality, indicating that UKAS procedures were 
seen as discouraging bidders and depriving the PPP market of competition. 
6.2.3 PPP Status 
The legal status of PPP as public or non-public procurement is essential to the whole 
administration of PPP. In order to understand UKAS’ irregularities in their procurement 
process, the researcher set out to identify the status of their PPP implementation. It was 
surprising to find out that every respondent, especially personnel from UKAS, the policy 
maker, was uncertain of the status of PPP. This uncertainty about the legal status does indeed 
have an impact on UKAS PPP transactions. Mixed responses were received about the status 
of UKAS PPP, but in their personal view, some respondents saw UKAS PPP as non-public 
procurement, perhaps explaining why UKAS did not follow the public procurement 
regulations. Avoiding the rigid procedures involved in public procurement might explain the 
reluctance of UKAS to commit to these regulations. 
Other respondents considered that PPP is part of public procurement. One respondent argued 
that, even though the initial funding comes from the private sector, in the end the government 
will still pay for the built infrastructure. PPP is just another way of procuring and delivering 
public infrastructure. PPP fits public procurement features except for the private funding. It 
should be noted, however that some concessions have been partly funded by the government-
linked bank, so less credit risk is borne by the private sector. Wang et al. (2012) stressed that 
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this arrangement of funding cannot be considered as private financing since they were still 
guaranteed by the government.  
Respondent R12 suggested that Malaysia is not alone in this matter, since most countries have 
a blurry demarcation between the status of PPP as public procurement or otherwise. Different 
approaches have been identified between common-law and civil-law countries. Countries that 
have adopted civil law may have better methods to identify the status of PPP. Under EU 
directives, PPP is considered as a public contract and hence is a public procurement. 
However, this does not make each PPP transaction by EU member country easier than 
previously. PPP itself is a complex procurement with diverse financial arrangements and asset 
ownership. EU public procurement always gives competition priority. Hence, prior to 2006 
the implementation of PPP did not fit perfectly into available procurement processes for 
public contracts under the EU public procurement directives. Recognising the issues and 
concern regarding awarding of PPP concessions, the EU introduced the Public Procurement 
Directive 2004/18/EC which allow PPP (but not all) to be procured more easily using the 
competitive dialogue procedure. These regulations were an attempt by the EU to cater for 
modern procurement methods such as PPP, while still upholding the EU treaty and general 
principles of law decided by the EU Court of Justice, such as equality of treatment and 
transparency. The 2004 regulations were updated with a new version in 2014.  
There are suggestions in the literature for establishing a clear institutional framework for PPP 
implementation by enacting a specific PPP law or regulations. Although this has proven 
helpful in certain countries, PPP advanced practitioners as in the UK and Australia have 
shown that PPP can still be run within the existing public procurement framework. 
Nevertheless, this can only be successful if the foundation of the country’s current 
institutional framework is clear on boundaries to facilitate PPP. In the absence of clear 
regulations, UKAS facilitate PPP implementation on a project-by-project basis, final 
decisions being made by the cabinet. In this way, UKAS believe that they are catering for the 
needs of each project through flexible practice. This, however, has resulted in inconsistencies, 
lack of transparency and susceptibility to unethical conduct such as abuse of power and 
corruption.  
Completing transactions in the malleable private market does not automatically give UKAS 
the right to forget their responsibility. As discussed earlier, UKAS is a government agency 
responsible for planning, coordinating, evaluating, negotiating and supervising all 
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privatisation and PPP projects, including the corridor development under the purview of the 
Ministers of the Federal Government (No.2) Order 2013 (P.U (A) 184/2013). All decisions 
for UKAS are also made by cabinet ministers, the highest executive power in the Malaysian 
legislature. The findings indicated that despite the complexity of PPP, which is not the typical 
public process used to procure infrastructure, PPP projects procured by UKAS are motivated 
solely by consideration of public interest. PPP involves future financial commitment from the 
government and the taxpayers themselves in certain PPP models. From the evidence presented 
above, it is clear that UKAS PPP status is indeed a public contract. Thus, the procurement 
process and the governance of UKAS PPP should not deviate from the public procurement 
regulations.  
6.2.4 Additional Drivers 
Another crucial point observed was the government’s drivers for adopting PPP, which 
strongly influenced the decision on the procurement process chosen and the shaping of a 
national PPP institutional framework itself. The respondents listed the drivers for adopting 
PPP as the funding methods; the urgent need for infrastructure; private sector participation; 
risk sharing; comprehensive scope; following global trends; and reducing expenditure. 
Although the UKAS guidelines did not specify the drivers for the government in adopting 
PPP, in addition to the common drivers the government did list in the Privatisation Master 
Plan additional drivers for adopting privatisation, specifically achieving the aims of the New 
Economic Policy. Even though there is no explicit text in the UKAS guidelines regarding 
additional drivers, respondents confirmed that PPP through UKAS is a continuation of the 
privatisation programme, and hence one of the instruments for the government to achieve the 
aims of the New Economic Policy. Malaysia is not the only country who has additional 
drivers in adopting PPP, as Wang et al. (2012) suggested that China, Indonesia, India and 
Thailand, for example, have also done so. Furthermore, their report suggested that it is a 
common practice for developing countries to do so. According to the interviews, besides 
socio-economic engineering through PPP, the government is trying to develop more local 
capabilities. The ruling regime also uses the infrastructure built as evidence of performance. 
Priority among the drivers of UKAS PPP is, however, outside the scope of this research. It is 
no doubt a challenge for UKAS to strike a balance between the additional drivers and prime 
drivers. The literature suggested that these additional drivers most likely would shadow other 
drivers that the contracting authority needs to emphasise, such as value for money. The 
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findings illustrated that in one instance experienced by the respondents, JKAS suggested that 
direct negotiation with a single company be employed instead of advertising the project for 
competitive bidding. The justification given was to curb the domination of big PPP players. 
This is in line with the findings from the interview with a policy maker, that non-complex 
projects were prioritised to Bumiputera companies, to the extent of awarding concessions 
through direct negotiation to a single company. No justification was offered by the 
government for the selection criteria for these companies, thus exacerbating speculation and 
suspicion about the genuine programme.  
6.2.5 Issues Governing the Procurement Process 
Given the complexity of PPP, the UKAS procurement process are not without issues. 
Respondents shared their experience and opinions of the issues that have been shadowing 
UKAS. Some issues are common globally, while others are specific to the Malaysian context.  
As highlighted in the discussion above, UKAS have been inconsistent in their procurement 
process. The findings suggested that the root of the inconsistency was due to the absence of 
detail guidelines and the flexible practice of UKAS. Whilst UKAS have managed to deliver 
PPP despite the inconsistencies, the problem should be addressed and not polished or ignored. 
Interviews with UKAS personnel revealed that they are well aware of the problem. 
Nevertheless, they stressed that PPP is best when each project is treated differently. Under the 
guidance of the multi-tiered inter-agency committee, UKAS believe this will keep their 
practice in check and not break any law; after all, final decisions are made by the highest 
executive authority.  
Although the pressure to fund proposed infrastructure had initially been lifted, the respondents 
were still concerned about the future deficit of leasing costs, given the higher private sector 
cost of financing and risk. Respondents R1 and R5 gave an assurance that as cabinet approved 
all PPP projects, concessions remained within the national budget. Apparently, UKAS and the 
government of Malaysia treat PPP as another source of funding to fill in budget gaps, by 
creating future fiscal commitments. This is no different from the use of a credit card. The 
MOF, however, is concerned that the future government expenses combined with current PPP 
commitments will create a greater fiscal cost for the government. PPP debt is currently 
bypassing expenditure control and put under Off Budget expenses. This practice can lead to 
more problems, such as non-transparent transactions and creating large contingent liabilities, 
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thus undermining efforts to sustain the nation’s macro-economic position. Since government 
commitment to PPP is high, it is important to ensure full disclosure of future payment 
obligations.  
Respondents R4, R8, R11 and R13 also called for UKAS to be more transparent in their 
practice. The literature review shows lack of transparency ever since the beginning of the 
privatisation programme. The public are also demanding greater transparency in the 
government’s purchase of goods and services. As part of the government, UKAS is 
accountable and answerable to the public. The decision to keep some information for internal 
use only indicates the lack of transparency practice by UKAS. Transparency has always been 
emphasised in the Malaysian Public Procurement Regulations, which are clear on every 
procedure and process, even the evaluation method and selection of the preferred bidder. This 
is very much in contrast with UKAS’ procurement process. Transparency in the procurement 
process is important as it guarantees potential investors consistency in the procurement 
process, with no interference or undue restriction. In spite of this, the government has been 
criticised for lack of transparency in the procurement process, specifically in how the Special 
Purpose Vehicle is selected. This has led to misunderstanding among the public, so improving 
transparency will be worthwhile in helping to diminish misconceptions. 
Respondents highlighted lack of understanding as one of the issues in implementing PPP. In 
the early years, both private and public sectors had a poor understanding of implementation of 
the PPP concept by UKAS. UKAS received many unrealistic proposals in the expectation of 
the exclusive award of concessions. Furthermore, the researcher discovered that the 
respondents only vaguely understood the concept of unsolicited proposals in PPP. Most 
considered that any proposal from the private sector was unsolicited, even though the project 
was already on the government’s development list. As highlighted earlier, the current practice 
concerning unsolicited proposals may result from the absence of clear guidelines, making it 
vulnerable to manipulation. 
Lack of capacity in UKAS was also being highlighted by respondents. UKAS personnel were 
seen as inexperienced by other stakeholders. For example, one respondent felt that UKAS 
need to have in-house experts to evaluate their financial and life-cycle costing, observing that 
UKAS relied too much on information provided by the proposer. A PPP unit should have a 
balance of skills and experienced personnel to fulfil its role. In its early years, UKAS 
consisted mainly of staff with limited technical knowledge and expertise in PPP. They 
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therefore organised secondment of staff from and to Government Linked Companies (GLC) 
to develop the knowledge and training of their own staff. The inter-agency committee was 
also an attempt by UKAS to bring specialists and subject matter experts from various 
government agencies to assist UKAS in its operation.  
Respondent R1 also claimed that the procurement process of UKAS PPP were more time 
consuming than in conventional procurement. This is understandable, since the realisation 
process of a proposal is difficult. It includes lengthy negotiations and going back and forth to 
cabinet meetings for every decision. Furthermore, the involvement of multi-tiered inter-
agency committees also extended the timeline. Respondent R3 believed that conventional 
procurement is more straightforward even for the same problem, such as land matters. Outside 
the research context, Respondent R3 indicated that even the construction period for a PPP 
project is longer than with traditional procurement.  
Another issue brought up was the high turnover of invited members of the committees, which 
disrupted progress. Apparently, the respondent from UKAS did not feel that this would affect 
the continuity of their excellent service to stakeholders, as it was part of the business and 
UKAS was well prepared to take necessary action every time a new member was appointed. 
Lastly, UKAS face administrative problems with some states having different ruling political 
parties from the federal government. However, no details of this problem were explained. The 
researcher can only assume that problems arise due to different authorities’ policy on land 
matters. 
6.3 Relevance of Competition within PPP Procurement Process 
In the Privatisation Master Plan, the government clearly promoted contestability and 
prioritised competitive bidding procedures for all government-initiated proposals. Even for 
unsolicited proposals, the Plan suggested introducing competitive bidding procedures for 
unsuccessful negotiations. This shows that the government acknowledged the impact of 
competition for privatisation implementation. However, the government stance on 
competition is unclear in PPP implementation. There is no mention in the guideline or website 
on competition policy or preference for the UKAS PPP procurement process.  
The interviews revealed that the great majority of respondents (12 out of 13) recognised the 
relevance of competition within the procurement process. They added that the government 
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would be able to reap benefits from a competitive exercise, including value for money. This is 
in accordance with a survey conducted on Malaysian PPP by Ismail (2013), where 
respondents pointed out competitive tendering  procedures as the most important factor in 
achieving value for money in a PPP project. Effective competition in the procurement process 
will encourage bidders to make high-quality proposals with a competitive true market value, 
enabling the government to select the best offer. There is also evidence from the literature 
review that competition will encourage companies to be more innovative compared than in a 
monopoly situation. Competitive bidding allows government to pick the most capable 
company from a large pool of bidders, and respondents pointed out that the best possible bid 
will guarantee a high quality of service delivered by the selected company. 
Competition within the procurement process is also salient for the government to retain their 
bargaining power. This will result in a better price for the concession as it reflects the real 
market price compared to the escalated price of direct negotiation with a single company. 
Respondent R13 pointed out that competition is the key to enhancing the accountability of the 
government. Since UKAS are accountable for ensuring that resources are effectively used, 
they should develop accountable procurement process that guarantee fairness and impartiality, 
especially in awarding the contract. This will benefit all stakeholders including the 
partnership, thus creating value for the community. 
Despite acknowledging the significance of competition within the procurement process, 
Respondents R1 and R2 were of the opinion that in UKAS PPP, competition is not the main 
focus or objective. Their argument was that competition itself does not guarantee the success 
of a project. If competition is aiming for value for money, UKAS were able to achieve this 
through their Value Management workshops, even when not calling for competitive bidding. 
However, neglecting competition causes harm to the many, while the profits generally go to 
the few. The impact of higher charges to users from privatisation, linked to direct negotiation 
awards places a burden on the people of Malaysia to the present day.  
6.4 Readiness for Competition 
In order to promote healthy and genuine competition, it is necessary to have a dynamic 
market that can exert competitive pressure as intended. In markets with a sufficient number of 
players, competition induces efficient use of resources, producing a quality product for a 
competitive price for the consumer. The respondents felt that the PPP industry is still being 
199 
dominated by a few big companies and their sister companies, especially in certain sectors 
with a complex nature. Nevertheless, there has been an increase of participation from the 
private sector at every available opportunity, including the submission of unsolicited 
proposals. However, in several instances new entrants have been deterred by the criteria set 
by UKAS in the evaluation stages. This is not surprising since UKAS need to be highly 
selective in their partners, as the PPP contract requires a long-term commitment, especially 
financially. This has been an obstacle for smaller companies. Although the submissions from 
new entrants may sometimes reflect their lack of maturity, they are still a good sign for the 
future of PPP in Malaysia as it takes time to develop the capability of the private sector. On 
the other hand, it is the responsibility of UKAS as the PPP unit, and the government of 
Malaysia, to create an open and level playing platform to attract more participants from the 
private sector. This can be done with a comprehensive institutional framework which includes 
a sound competition policy.  
6.5 New Economic Policy 
The New Economic Policy has been the national agenda since it was announced in the 1970’s. 
Since then, public procurement has been one of the government’s instruments in achieving the 
aims of the New Economic Policy. Respondents R2 and R5 confirmed that PPP under UKAS 
is also an instrument of the government for achieving the Policy’s aims. The Privatisation 
Master Plan explicitly stated that privatisation is formally aimed at increasing Bumiputera 
participation. To achieve this, the government imposed the condition that privatised projects 
should be 30 percent owned by Bumiputera companies, while a minimum quota of 30 percent 
of the work contract must be awarded to Bumiputera companies. One of the problems with 
this policy is the tendency of Bumiputera contractors to sub-contract their allotment to others 
for instant profit, instead of building their own capacity to create resilient Bumiputera 
companies (McCrudden & Gross, 2006).  
UKAS does not publish any details of their approach within the procurement process to 
achieve the aims of the New Economic Policy. Nevertheless, based on the interviews, the 
modus operandi used appears to be more or less the same. The same minimum percentage as 
in the public procurement regulations is reserved for the Special Purpose Vehicle equity, and 
the portion of work contracts to be awarded to Bumiputera contractors. Most of the 
respondents acknowledged that the New Economic Policy is an overarching policy which 
should be continued until its objectives are met. The significance of achieving its aims can be 
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seen in the Malaysian government’s success in negotiating the Bumiputera agenda in the 
nation’s latest venture in Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement.  
The New Economic Policy has been criticised for supporting only well connected Bumiputera 
rather than giving the benefits to the whole Bumiputera community. There is evidence that the 
Policy has not achieved its target, even after the privatisation programme (Jomo, 2004). Ramli 
et al. (2013) presented a long list of negative impacts brought about by the policy within the 
government’s procurement. This includes money politics, rent-seeking behaviour, political 
patronage and dependency syndrome.  
Nevertheless, Respondent R13 stressed that the New Economic Policy was not to be blamed 
for the irresponsible actions of certain opportunists, although admitting that the Bumiputera 
has no doubt been benefiting from it. Over time, the programme has had a positive effect on 
empowering Bumiputera entrepreneurs and conglomerates. Believing that there are many 
capable Bumiputera companies available, the respondent suggested that instead of exclusive 
awards to well-connected Bumiputera companies, a healthy competitive exercise should be 
conducted in which all Bumiputera companies could participate. 
Besides the preferential treatment to Bumiputera companies, there are also restrictions on 
foreign companies’ involvement in UKAS PPP. The policy has been consistent from the start 
of the privatisation programme. Nevertheless, acknowledging the need for foreign experts’ 
involvement in complex projects, the maximum percentage equity owned by a foreign 
company has been reduced in PPP, compared to conventional procurement. The Privatisation 
Master Plan listed several requirements for a project when considering the involvement of a 
foreign company. However, there are no details regarding foreign involvement in the UKAS 
guideline or website. One respondent pointed out that by limiting foreign involvement, the 
government may not be able to attract foreign experts to participate in PPP programmes. On 
the other hand, due to the rules on the equity of ownership, foreign companies are required to 
form partnerships with domestic companies. This measure allows the domestic partner to 
secure expertise from their foreign partner and enables transfer of technology throughout the 
process. 
6.6 Challenges in Incorporating Competition within the Procurement Process 
Despite their eagerness to enhance the current policy of competition within the UKAS 
procurement process, the respondents highlighted several issues. The constraints identified in 
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the case study are not alien to other PPP practitioners, hence many strategies and solutions 
have been suggested to tackle the issues raised. Among of the constraints highlighted was the 
political or individual interest in concessions. Respondents stated there are many 
circumstances of political patronage in UKAS projects. Political pressure may also to an 
extent have exploited UKAS. The allegation that certain companies have been given exclusive 
awards has been pervasive since privatisation, and continues in the current PPP programme. 
Although in theory the public service should always be apolitical, Siddiquee (2005) claimed 
that in Malaysia, the public service has always been intimate with politicians. Given the 
absence of clear guidelines for competition, and the lack of transparency, political neutrality is 
hard to achieve. Attempts to enhance the current competitive practice and policy within the 
procurement process are demanded to ensure transparency in the selection of the Special 
Purpose Vehicle, to combat and control any attempt at corruption. 
Intellectual property has always been an intangible area in PPP, especially for unsolicited 
proposals. Intellectual property is all about safeguarding the material developed by the 
proposer, and its ownership should always be protected in order to encourage innovation and 
private sector participation in PPP. In countries which consider unsolicited proposals, 
compensation is made to the original proponent in the event that they fail to secure the 
contract (Hodges & Dellacha, 2007b). This arrangement should be communicated to other 
bidders as early as the notice of procurement. In return, the contracting authority is allowed to 
use the proposal for one-off development, or as agreed with the original proponent. 
Failure to resolve the intellectual property issue may restrict the contracting authority in 
continuing with the development. Nonetheless, this depends on each country’s regulation of 
licensing, patents and intellectual property. UKAS is not concerned with the issue of 
intellectual property. Although most of the companies submitting unsolicited proposals 
request exclusive award of the proposed project on the grounds of intellectual property, 
UKAS will ensure that the claim is legitimate. In fact, most of the time, the claim is baseless. 
However, the legal framework of UKAS PPP is unclear on the transfer or assignment of 
intellectual property to the government. If needed, the transfer of this right should be 
negotiated and transferred before pursuing the competitive bidding exercise. The amount of 
compensation shall be determined on a project basis, given the nature of PPP. Currently, the 
approach used by other countries is applied to UKAS projects.  
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Throughout the life of UKAS, it has been observed that the number of participants in PPP has 
increased, so UKAS might not be having a problem in recruiting numbers for effective 
competition. However, the competitive exercise may also attract non-genuine bidders. The 
Malaysian construction industry has long been infested with rent-seeking companies aspiring 
to rapid wealth, privatisation projects included. This is not surprising since the lengthy 
contract with the government is seen as a lucrative opportunity for rent-seeking behaviour. 
However, the possibility of a rent-seeking company succeeding through direct negotiation 
with a sole company is greater than through a competitive procurement process. Throughout 
the competitive procurement process, UKAS should be able to reduce the rent-seeking 
behaviour in the tender evaluation stages. Tenderers will be thoroughly evaluated for their 
technical and financial capability, to eliminate companies that prove to be incompetent. 
It is noteworthy that there is no clear timeline or schedule for procurement process in the 
UKAS guideline or website. They only listed their customer charter aim for meeting deadlines 
for a few of their procedures. Respondents claimed that a competitive procedure is time 
consuming, especially in introducing competition for unsolicited proposals, but the PPP 
procurement process is always lengthy because of its complexity. In the UK, the average 
tendering period is 34 months (Saussier et al., 2009), while Australia listed 14 to 19 months 
for their procurement process period (Grieken & Morgan-Payler, 2014). According to 
Dholakia and Dholakia (1994), under Malaysian privatisation it took a minimum of one to 
two years for a procurement process to be completed. There are no statistics for the average 
length of UKAS procurement process. The problem with a lengthy process is that it 
discourages bidders from participating in the competitive exercise. Long procurement process 
are also expensive, explained in the literature by lengthy negotiations, political barriers 
(Babatunde et al., 2014), unclear or absent project objectives (Romeiras de Lemos, 2002). 
One respondent maintained that the delay experienced in UKAS was due to the inefficiency 
of the procurement process itself. The involvement of many inter-agency committees makes 
coordination challenging. Difficulties in evaluating tenders are also found to contribute to the 
length of the process. It is no secret that PPP evaluation is more complex than conventional 
procurement, and in a competitive bidding exercise multiple bids are received. To carry out a 
realistic apple-to-apple comparison is not easy with PPP proposals, although there are long-
term benefits in conducting it thorough evaluation to ensure the most qualified bidders are 
successful. Nevertheless, UKAS could find a way to improve the procurement process 
schedule by cutting red tape and bureaucracy to reduce the current unnecessary length of time.  
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Besides the lengthy process, much of the literature identified the high cost of bidding in the 
competitive exercise within the standard procurement process, and one respondent agreed that 
this is the same case for UKAS PPP. This may discourage new entrants and even existing 
players from participating in the bidding exercise, reducing competition. However, in practice 
the winning bid will recover the costs incurred by implicitly ‘front loading’ them in preparing 
a detailed and comprehensive proposal, and hence making government the party who has to 
pay later. For unsuccessful bidders, the government may consider introducing an honorarium 
as a token of their participation. Although this might involve some additional cost to the 
government, the benefits of the competitive procurement process may outweigh the high cost 
of bidding. As indicated by one of the respondents, UKAS have a bigger aim from PPP than 
looking solely at the monetary return. This strategy would stimulate the development of local 
entrepreneurs and encourage them to become involved in the PPP industry, unlike the current 
strategy of exclusive direct negotiation procedure. 
6.7 Formation of Framework 
Throughout this study, the researcher has methodically analysed the current UKAS 
procurement process and the competition policy incorporated within it. Understanding the 
current practice of UKAS is vital to the development of the framework, in evaluating the 
current practice, effort and the gap that needs to be filled. The development of the frameworks 
build on the findings from the literature review, the case study and the researchers’s analysis 
of the subject matter. 
The literature shows that Malaysia is an avid PPP user in infrastructure development. The 
publicised reasons for the government to adopt PPP are mostly economic or productivity 
related. As illustrated in Figure 6.26, the drivers include reducing government expenditure, 
improving efficiency, ensuring value for money, and optimal sharing of risk, responsibilities 
and/or resources. These drivers are in line with those of other PPP practitioners globally. 
However, in contrast with other practitioners, Malaysia has the New Economic Policy as an 
additional driver of PPP. The case study indicates that UKAS is challenged to reconcile and 
strike a balance between getting the best from both PPP and the national agenda. Furthermore, 
as a PPP unit, UKAS needs to drive the PPP industry. 
The researcher also established that UKAS PPP is part of public procurement, whose aim to 
serve the public interest should be the priority. Hence, as illustrated in Figure 6.26, good 
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governance should be the dominant UKAS driver, aiming to safeguard public interest while 
trying to achieve equilibrium for all drivers. Although the research itself does not focus on 
prioritising UKAS drivers or their equilibrium, whatever else is decided UKAS must be 
bound by the sphere of the good governance since UKAS PPP is part of the public 
procurement. Additional drivers such as the New Economic Policy should not be a dilemma if 
good governance is foremost. Good governance should be the standard, and in upholding it as 
a hallmark it should ensure efficient use of resources, fairness, transparency and 
accountability. To date, UKAS has been too focused on achieving the drivers, tending to 
subjugate good governance as justified by the decisions of the cabinet.  
A significant proportion of the respondents acknowledged that competition within the 
procurement process is relevant to achieving economic benefits from PPP. This is in line with 
the discussion in section 3.4 where competition is considered vital to achieve economic 
benefit and also to prevent unethical misconduct in handling procurement. Despite the 
importance of competition, this is not the main purpose of UKAS in PPP. Economic benefit 
such as value for money is claimed to be achieved through other means. UKAS have been 
selective in their practice, choosing not to be bound by public procurement regulations by 
denying that PPP is part of public procurement. However, the Malaysian public procurement 
regulations emphasise competition and transparency. Competition is the proven way to 
safeguard government procurement from ethical misconduct and corruption. Hence the sphere 
of good governance in Figure 6.26 should be achieved through incorporating competition into 
the UKAS procurement process.  
The cabinet holds a large degree of power over the UKAS procurement process. It can be seen 
as absolutely discretionary, which is alarming. Under the principle of administrative law, no 
power should be absolute. The government has been criticised for alleged corruption and 
gaining from the award of PPP concessions. Although there is no litigation against UKAS 
regarding their administration and procedures, there is nevertheless an abundance of court 
cases on government administration regarding absolute discretion and public interest. 
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Figure 6.26 - Proposed Role of Good Governance 
Although the cabinet was vested with the power of the executive authority under Article 39 of 
the Malaysian Federal Constitution, any arm of government, including the cabinet or any 
minister vested with power, is still subject to Malaysian Law, especially in discharging their 
duties. In the landmark case of Pengarah Tanah dan Galian, Wilayah Persekutuan v Sri 
Lempah Enterprise Sdn Bhd11, the Director of the Land Executive Committee (a government 
agency) was accused of acting in excess of his power. The company concerned had been 
ordered to accept the amendment to the title of a piece of land from perpetuity to a 99-year 
lease. The director’s ruling was found unlawful by the judge, who cautioned: 
Every legal power must have legal limits, otherwise there is dictatorship. In 
particular, it is a stringent requirement that a discretion should be exercised for a 
proper purpose, and that it should not be exercised unreasonably. 
11 [1979] 1 MLJ 135 
206 
This ruling has set a great precedent for government administration. Prior to this case, the 
power of government agencies and ministers was seen as unfettered. Another recent case of 
relevance to UKAS is that of Bato Bagi & Ors. v Kerajaan Negeri Sarawak & Another 
Appeal12. In this case, the judge applied the principles laid down in the above case:  
In my view, the impugned sections may just be a general guideline since it is left to 
the discretion of the Minister. But even if it is a discretion it should not be 
untrammelled and unfettered of which the courts frown upon.  
In relation to UKAS procurement process, there are no controlling instrument assuring that 
cabinet discretion is properly used. In the absence of a clear guideline or regulation for the 
cabinet to follow, absolute discretion allows the cabinet to impose whatever it thinks fit or 
reasonable, including prioritising the interest of the ruling party in a matter of public 
importance. The limited level of transparency in the UKAS procurement process, and its 
silence on criticism regarding prejudice and unfair process in awarding contracts, make the 
cabinet appear accountable for an unreasonable exercise of power. To further appreciate these 
findings, the researcher interpreted the judgement and emphasised the significance of 
incorporating competition within the procurement process as a tool to keep UKAS in their 
place, serving the public interest and reducing the impact of discretionary authority that the 
cabinet currently possesses in the UKAS procurement process. 
The researcher acknowledges the current challenges to incorporate competition within the 
procurement process, as highlighted by the respondents and in the literature review. 
Unfortunately, no research has been conducted into the impact of these challenges. In addition 
to the challenges highlighted by the respondents, the researcher suggested that there is also 
market failure due to the long-term practice of restricting competition (New Economic 
Policy). This challenge can be resolved and would become less of an issue with reform 
involving cultural change and commitment from the government. Accordingly, the researcher 
recommends that the framework should not be limited by the challenges identified, as they are 
still present even with a non-competitive procurement process. 
12 [2011] 8 CL 766 
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6.7.1 The Frameworks 
By taking into consideration the distinct features of project development of government-
initiated and unsolicited proposals, the researcher developed two different frameworks to 
cater for the different needs and priorities of each route. These frameworks are intended to 
enhance competitive practice incorporated within the procurement process. It is important to 
emphasise that, as discussed in an earlier chapter, the framework is needed primarily to 
achieve good governance as required under the law, and not solely for economic benefit or 
value for money. According to the findings, the initial implementation of Malaysian PPP saw 
UKAS focus on the drivers discussed in an earlier chapter; nevertheless, UKAS acknowledge 
that it is time to recognise the drivers in the context of exercising good governance. This does 
not mean that government would be unable to accomplish its aims; rather, the frameworks 
place competition as a tool to achieve good governance and as a safeguard for the taxpayer 
that the government needs to comply with. The frameworks developed are more streamlined 
and are shown in Figure 6.27 (government-initiated proposals) and Figure 6.28 (unsolicited 
proposals). 
The frameworks draw on the approach of fostering competition and preventing anti-
competitive behaviour within the procurement process. Reinforced with more stringent 
procedures, they are also expected to ensure discretion is exercised reasonably. The 
frameworks are built on four attributes as discussed in section 3.4: 
i. Fostering more competition;
ii. Preventing collusive behaviour;
iii. Avoiding corruption;
iv. Exploiting economies of scale and scope.
Figure 6.27 shows the framework for government-initiated proposals, from the proposal stage 
until the contract has been awarded. The red boxes indicate the area that has been enhanced in 
accordance with one or more of the attributes above. The framework recognises the current 
practice where a solicited proposal is initiated by a ministry or agency and is already included 
in their development plan. The role of the ministries and agencies remains the same, and 
includes identifying the needs of the infrastructure and proposing a project plan to UKAS. 
Upon receiving the proposal, UKAS conduct a feasibility and bankability evaluation. 
Currently, the evaluations are not transparent and are not available to the public. Evidence of 
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assessment should be made accessible. The lack of transparency allows the possibility of 
manipulation of the evaluation and choosing a PPP which is not advantageous to the 
government in terms of value for money. In current system, the evaluation then will be tabled 
in the cabinet meeting for approval in principle. 
Figure 6.27 – Framework for Government-Initiated Proposals 
Although the researcher acknowledges that different models produce materially different 
results, the framework suggests that established and robust value-for-money assessment be 
adopted for evaluation at the feasibility stage and afterwards. Following a widely accepted 
model, such as the Public Sector Comparator, enables the government to be transparent in 
their evaluation, especially in deciding the advantageous use of PPP for proposals submitted 
by ministries and agencies. The comparator also enables the government to include 
competition between the PPP proposal and the reference project. 
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Since a comprehensive assessment is expected to assess and compare the merits of using PPP 
with other conventional government finance procurement methods, the researcher also 
suggests that decisions should be made by the inter-agency committee rather than the cabinet. 
The highest UKAS inter-agency committee involves the heads of relevant ministries and 
agencies, who are capable and qualified to make decisions from the perspective of the 
national economy and government policy. 
If the proposal by the ministries or agencies is executed through PPP, the next process is the 
invitation to Request for Proposal. Currently the decision on procurement procedures depends 
on the cabinet decision along with approval in principle. Once a project is confirmed, the 
framework suggests a mandatory competitive tendering procedures for all government-
initiated proposals, in order to foster competition. A procurement notice should be advertised 
to announce the government’s intention and to solicit bids from the private sector. The 
procurement notice demonstrates that the government’s decisions are transparent, giving 
equal treatment to all participants and not discriminating between Bumiputera and non-
Bumiputera companies. Another suggestion is that Bumiputera companies may be given an 
advantage in terms of additional points later in the evaluation. 
In continuing the aspirations of the New Economic Policy in PPP implementation under 
UKAS, the framework suggests that the policy on the percentage of equity and percentage of 
work contract to be awarded to Bumiputera companies should remain. In the event that the 
government would like to use PPP to develop Bumiputera entrepreneurship, the government 
should have identified the type and threshold of non-complex projects in advance. These 
projects should be open only to Bumiputera owned companies, instead of awarding 
concessions to a single company through direct negotiation procedure using Bumiputera as 
the reason.  
Consequently, interested parties are allowed to participate by buying the tender documents. 
Due to the complex nature of PPP tenders, the framework suggests a series of briefing or 
dialogue sessions with the parties prior to submission. The dialogues are intended as a 
platform to facilitate access and exchange of information between the parties. This interaction 
will give parties a better understanding of the project, the requirements and addressing 
enquiries. The government would also be able to draft a better contract based on the feedback 
from the dialogue.  
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Subsequent to the submission of tenders is the selection review stage. No changes are 
suggested to UKAS’ current evaluation methods of submissions. However, the framework 
suggests that the UKAS evaluation methods and criteria are made known in advance to the 
tenderers at the stage of the procurement notice or the tender document. Announcing these in 
advance would increase stakeholders’ and bidders’ confidence in the regulatory process, with 
the assurance that that there is no manipulation or bias.  
As evaluating PPP proposals is not an easy task, the framework suggests that further sessions 
of dialogue are conducted with each bidder for further clarification, if required. This process 
is not a negotiation procedure and no changes would be allowed to the original bid. The 
framework suggests that a minimum of five bidders be shortlisted by the inter-agency 
committee to be taken to the cabinet for decision. The cabinet should be given clear 
guidelines for selecting the most beneficial offer from the preferred bidder.  
In addition to the notification to the successful bidder, the framework suggests that 
unsuccessful bidders are also notified of the justification for selection, enabling Bumiputera 
companies in particular to remove flaws in any future bids, following the award is the process 
of finalising the concession agreement with the selected Special Purpose Vehicle. 
The framework for the unsolicited proposal procurement process is shown in Figure 6.28. It 
suggests that the term unsolicited proposal is clearly defined and enforced: it is an original 
business proposal from a private entity for infrastructure development in which it is the 
intention of the entity to invest. The proposal should also not have been submitted in response 
to a request by UKAS/ministries/agencies, nor have been part of their development plans. In 
addition to the definition of uniqueness in the Privatisation Master Plan, in the event that a 
proposal submitted does not qualify as an unsolicited proposal, it should be rejected. 
Following the receipt of a proposal from private parties, an assessment using an established 
model is suggested to test its feasibility and value for money. Models such as the Public 
Sector Comparator compare the proposal with the reference project and government databases 
to identify the worthiness of the proposal either by PPP or conventional public procurement. 
The decision to procced with the unsolicited proposal as PPP should be decided at the highest 
tier of inter-agency committee. However, the deliberation of the cabinet is required for 
contracts of especially great value. 
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The framework suggests that it be mandatory for any successful proposal to go through a 
competitive bidding exercise such as a Swiss Challenge or Bonus System. However, the 
original proposer must be notified of the government’s intention. If the original proposer 
agrees with the suggestion, agreement should be reached regarding issues like the transfer of 
intellectual property and compensation in the event of an unsuccessful bid. In pursuing the 
next step, UKAS shall advertise the Request for Alternate Proposals in the same way as for 
solicited proposals. The procurement notice should include the information that the exercise is 
part of a Swiss Challenge or Bonus System. However, if the infrastructure is complex it is 
advisable that only a targeted group is invited to participate in the tender exercise. UKAS 
must notify interested parties of the outline content of the original proposal to enable them to 
submit alternative proposals. 
The number of bidders is important to achieve effective competition. Should there be fewer 
than five bidders submitting alternate proposals, the exercise will be cancelled, and bidders 
will be compensated for the cost incurred in preparing the bid. In this case, the government 
may enter into direct negotiation with the original proposer if it decides to proceed. 
After their receipt from the bidders, the alternate proposals shall be evaluated according to the 
criteria and mechanism stated earlier in the procurement notice and Request for Alternate 
Proposal documents. Any advantage or bonus points awarded to the original proposer shall be 
disclosed to other bidders in advance. Through the evaluation, the inter-agency committee 
should submit a minimum shortlist of five bidders (if achievable) to the cabinet for decision. 
From the selection to the post-award stage, the framework for unsolicited proposals follows 
that for government-initiated proposals. The losing bidders will be compensated by the 
government for the costs incurred in preparing their bid. If the original proposer is 
unsuccessful, he is entitled to compensation as agreed when consenting to the competitive 
bidding exercise. 
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Figure 6.28 – Framework for Unsolicited Proposals 
The researcher has attempted to streamline the previous approach of UKAS in incorporating 
competition within the procurement process. Previously, UKAS focused on why in the first 
place they opted for PPP. To achieve this UKAS faced a formidable challenge in driving the 
programme to a certain level of maturity. UKAS chose instead to be flexible in their 
implementation and successfully overcame the challenges with the full support of the 
government.  
Nevertheless, compared with UKAS’ existing approach, the frameworks focus on upholding 
good governance through a stringent competition policy while meeting the PPP aims. The 
great power of the cabinet in micro-managing UKAS PPP is streamlined in the framework to 
encourage fair play. Based on the findings, the absolute discretion of cabinet has been 
accepted positively by UKAS as it helps to resolve problems and reduce red tape. The 
administrative law in Malaysia is, however, against this and believes that there should be 
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limits to exercising discretion. With the motive to enhance the competition practice within the 
procurement process for Malaysian PPP, the frameworks presented is formulated based the 
findings on the research finding on innovative procurement process developed to address the 
complexity of PPP. Importantly the proposed frameworks take into consideration the whole 
governance of UKAS which add the novelty of this research PPP.  
Among the enhancement of the proposed framework is the competition created through 
mandatory open procedure and the increase of shortlisted numbers of bidders to be considered 
for the award. The competition among bidders may result in obtaining competitive price and 
higher quality of bids. The competition effect can drive the bidders to produce a proposal that 
may not be achieved with a non-competitive process. Meanwhile, the introduction of dialogue 
process between the public authority and bidders provides flexibility for both party to address 
complexity of PPP while maintaining transparency and equal treatment for bidders. The 
dialogue aim for a clearer understanding to produce a robust proposal and concession 
agreement. Mandatory of competitive procedure for unsolicited proposal also allows the 
government to benefit from competitive procedure and reducing the practice of direct 
negotiation with a single company which is essential to avoid corruption. Other notable 
enhancement proposed is by increasing the level of transparency of the procurement process. 
Transparency demonstrates that the bona fide of the public authority in awarding the project 
hence encouraging new entrants and existing players to participate. The summary of proposed 
enhancement to the competition practice is as shown in Figure 6.29. 
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Figure 6.29 - Measures Proposed in the Framework 
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6.8 Validating the Framework 
The frameworks are deemed to fill the competition gap in UKAS’ current practice. They 
represent the findings synthesised from the literature review and case study. In order to 
confirm the frameworks’ credibility, the researcher sought the judgement of the main 
stakeholders. The exercise to validate the frameworks focuses on confirming that the 
proposed measures would enhance competition and the potential for use by the industry. 
For this purpose, the researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with identified 
respondents representing different types of stakeholder involved with the UKAS procurement 
process, and who would be affected by the application of the frameworks. These stakeholders 
are listed in Table 6.23.  
Table 6.23- Justification for Identified Stakeholders 
Respondents Identifier Capacity as 
stakeholder 
Justification 
Chairman of the 
Public Account 
Committee (PAC) for 
Parliament of 
Malaysia  
Ra Public Selected for his role in overviewing the government’s 
financial commitment and its role in ensuring 
accountability and good governance in government 
activities.  
Director of Policy 
Section, UKAS 
(Representing UKAS 
Director General) 
Rb Government Selected for his role in policy making and managing 
PPP programmes for the government of Malaysia. 
Deputy Director of 
PFI Unit, in the Public 
University in 
Malaysia. 
Rc Client Selected as one of the organisations with the most 
number of projects using UKAS procurement process. 
Project Director for a 
concession procured 
under the UKAS 
procurement process 
Rd Practitioner 
in Industry 
Selected for the experience of the organisation and of 
the project director in Special Purpose Vehicles and 
UKAS. 
The respondents were interviewed face to-face at different times and locations, according to 
their preference. Initially, they were briefly presented with a summary of the research, its 
findings and the formation of the frameworks. The interviews were based on pro-forma 
questions designed to get feedback on the frameworks’ strategy to enhance competition, and 
acceptance of the frameworks. The feedback on the acceptance of the frameworks is 
illustrated in Table 6.24. 
216 
Table 6.24 - Response to the Framework 
Theme Questions Ra Rb Rc Rd 
Representation 
of the 
framework 
Do you find the 
framework 
presented 
useful? 
Yes, as I look at it I understand that the 
competition within your 
framework is to achieve good 
governance and I think your 
framework is comprehensive. 
When we started the PPP 
programme we did what we 
had to do, but the current 
situation is different; the 
stakeholders demand more 
transparency, and we have to 
facilitate that. So everything 
that you did is the direction 
that we need to go now. It is 
in line with UKAS’ vision. 
Your framework is better than 
the framework we used 
previously, but I do have a 
concern about making it reality. 
I’m ok with the framework, but 
to implement it you need to 
look at the details, especially 
the implementation, but it 
should be ok. 
What are the 
advantages of 
the framework? 
It can create efficiency, 
reduce cost and at the 
same time we do not want 
the Bumiputera companies 
to be complacent. They 
should know how to do 
business and compete in 
the proper way. There 
should be no more short-
cuts, political patronage, 
cronyism or other bias. 
The framework is fair and 
what we have in mind.  
The measures suggested will 
definitely enhance competition 
within the procurement 
process. 
The way I look at it, you are 
getting more people involved: 
the dialogue, the notice. On 
transparency, I see your 
framework addresses it well. 
Currently UKAS is not really 
transparent. 
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What are the 
disadvantages 
of the 
framework? 
I can’t find one, in my 
opinion, this is good. 
I think it needs some adjustment 
and to be tied up with the 
international best practice. UKAS 
need to study in detail the 
consequences of the 
enhancements made, such as 
dialogue, Public Sector 
Comparator evaluation and 
others. The ideal would be an 
enhancement not only in UKAS 
but with other stakeholders such 
as ministries and others. For 
example, UKAS sometimes 
receives applications from 
ministries or agencies to award 
to a certain company,  
 
You didn’t mention anything 
regarding time or schedule 
for your framework.  
For me it’s the competitive 
bidding exercise for unsolicited 
proposals. If the government is 
able to really compensate us, it 
should be ok  
Do you think 
the framework 
enhances the 
competitive 
element of the 
current 
procurement 
process? 
Yes. Yes. Yes. I think in terms of value 
for money, we will definitely 
benefit from your framework. 
However due to the stringent 
procedures, I think it will take 
a longer time than the current 
process. Long term wise, I 
believe through your 
framework the government 
would be able to partner with 
the best company. We can’t 
get that through direct 
negotiation. 
Yes. 
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In general, the feedback received was very positive, with each respondent agreeing that the 
framework enhances competition within the procurement process, compared to the current 
UKAS procurement process. The respondents were also optimistic for the framework to be 
adopted by UKAS. Some notable comments include scepticism about the idea of reducing the 
cabinet’s power. The researcher, however, acknowledges the power and rank of the cabinet in 
the Malaysian administrative and legal framework. The framework only suggests that 
decisions on the procurement process do not need to be referred to the cabinet if the 
guidelines for the inter-agency committees are clear on which procurement process is to be 
adopted.  
On the idea of a mandatory competitive bidding exercise for unsolicited proposals, 
Respondent Rd felt that the private sector would not be totally happy about it. However, if 
common unsolicited proposal issues such as intellectual property or compensation for costs 
incurred are addressed as well, Respondent Rd would welcome the proposal. As for further 
suggestions for improving the framework, Respondent Rc proposed that the frameworks 
include suggested timelines for each stage. Although this suggestion is useful, it is outside the 
scope of the current research.  
Overall, the respondents agreed that the framework is achievable and would be accepted by 
stakeholders involved in the UKAS procurement process. However, further research into 
UKAS and relevant organisations is required since reform of the UKAS PPP programme 
would involve multiple stakeholders. Respondent Ra believed that the framework could be the 
catalyst for reform that is much needed, especially in competing with international companies 
and encouraging Bumiputera companies to be more mature, without full backing from the 
government.  
6.8.1 Post Validation 
Based on the comments received during the validation exercise, the frameworks have been 
refined where the researcher felt that amendment was needed to communicate better with the 
reader. No amendments have been made to the terminology or the structure of the 
frameworks. However, the authority involved has been inserted in the frameworks to 
demonstrate that the cabinet is still involved in PPP implementation by UKAS. This is 
because there was some confusion over the cabinet’s involvement in the UKAS procurement 
process when the researcher suggested it should be reduced.  
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The refined frameworks are illustrated in Figures 6.30 and 6.31, with the refinement 
highlighted in purple. 
Figure 6.30 – Final Framework for Government-Initiated Proposals 
Inter-Agency 
Committee 
Cabinet 
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Figure 6.31– Final Framework for Unsolicited Proposal 
6.9 Summary 
This chapter has critically discussed the findings which were significant in addressing 
research objective five, to develop a framework to enhance the competitive practice 
incorporated within the PPP procurement process. The chapter revealed that the belief and 
understanding of PPP as non-public procurement has made UKAS complacent about their 
current practice. Initially, they needed to make sure and push the programme to be successful. 
Hence, with the support of the government they coerced their way to identifying all the 
drivers for adopting PPP. Nevertheless, for this reason, PPP under UKAS has not been 
Inter-Agency 
Committee 
Cabinet 
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without criticism, especially of the procurement process and the manner in which contracts 
are awarded.  
The main finding in this chapter is that the current procurement process allows the cabinet to 
have unfettered power in micro-managing UKAS, which is alarming. Through legal 
interpretation of the decisions of the Malaysian judiciary on relevant cases, the researcher 
established that no public authority or government department should have such a large 
degree of discretionary powers. Besides fostering competition to achieve value for money, the 
researcher recognises that competition within the procurement process is salient in upholding 
good governance, thus ensuring procedural fairness, a transparent process and reasonable 
practice of discretionary power by the executive. All these together led the researcher to 
develop a framework to provide an instrument to govern PPP implementation, while 
safeguarding the interests of the taxpayer. 
The response to the framework has been nothing but positive, with the anticipation of the 
policy maker for further research at the organisational level. Stakeholders agreed that the 
framework would be beneficial since the measures proposed would definitely improve 
competition within the procurement process, reform which is sorely needed. Although the 
framework was developed in the context of Malaysian PPP, it could also be applied in 
countries who adopt PPP with further aims.
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7.0 Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises and concludes the thesis by revisiting in the content of earlier 
chapters. Chapters 1-3 form the foundation. In Chapter 1, the researcher identified the 
concerns about lack of competition in PPP procurement and recognised the need for 
competition as an important factor in a successful PPP programme. These led to the 
characterisation of the aim and objectives of the research. Chapter 2 reviewed the literature 
regarding the concept and practice of PPP globally, before focusing on the Malaysian context. 
It established the overall setting of PPP practice worldwide, and looked in detail at the 
practice in the UK, recognised as the most advanced PPP practitioner. PPP practices in 
Malaysia were examined, historically and within the current context. In Chapter 3, the 
concept of competition in general was examined, before its application within the context of 
PPP procurement process. For global practice, the competition element incorporated in the 
EU PPP procurement process, established as a sound and effective competition policy for the 
benefit of the public, was examined. For unsolicited proposals, the researcher investigated the 
practice in countries which had introduced a competitive element in the procurement process. 
Chapter 3 continued with the synthesis of the constraints experienced by other PPP 
practitioners in organising a competitive procurement process, and ended with focusing on the 
competition policy and practice by UKAS for Malaysian PPP. The methodology and conduct 
of the research were outlined and described in Chapter 4. In brief, the research is an 
exploratory study, its axis the interpretivist stance, using a single case study approach with a 
combination of document reviews and semi-structured interviews to gather evidence. Findings 
drawn from the interviews were analysed in Chapter 5, and the findings from both sources 
were integrated and discussed in Chapter 6. The crystallised result was then used to formulate 
and develop the framework, which was elaborated at the end of the chapter.  
In presenting the conclusion, this final chapter revisits the objectives of the research and their 
achievement. It then highlights the contribution of the research to the body of knowledge, and 
to stakeholders. Despite the significant output from this study, there are limitations which are 
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discussed later in this chapter. The thesis concludes with recommendations for the 
enhancement of practice and suggestions for future research.  
7.2 Accomplishment of Research Objectives 
As the aim of the study is to enhance the procurement process for infrastructure delivery in 
Malaysian PPP by incorporating competition, five research objectives were identified to steer 
the research in achieving its aim. The research objectives are: 
i. to understand and analyse the PPP procurement process with particular
reference to competition;
ii. to evaluate the challenges to incorporating competition within PPP
procurement process globally;
iii. to appraise and synthesise the PPP procurement process with particular
reference to competition adopted by the Malaysian Government for
infrastructure delivery;
iv. to investigate the relevance of competition within the PPP procurement process
in Malaysia;
v. to develop and validate a competition-based PPP framework which targets
improvement for Malaysian PPP.
In the next section, the researcher revisits each objective in order to review the degree of 
success in accomplishing it.  
In addressing the research objectives, the need to understand PPP is crucial. The research 
explored the concept of PPP and its practice globally, to understand the drivers for 
governments to adopt it as an alternative approach to procuring infrastructure. The rise of PPP 
was, indeed, triggered by the pressure on governments to provide infrastructure. Despite the 
absence of a universal definition of PPP, Table 2.1 synthesised the different types of PPP 
arrangement and their major elements to establish common elements in their practice. The 
result indicated largely similar PPP practice between nations, but with some significant 
differences. The diversity in practice and differences in terms used are the reasons for the 
absence of a single agreed definition of PPP. The differences in practice result from national 
governments satisfying their legal frameworks and domestic market requirements. 
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Co-operation between public authorities and the private sector in providing infrastructure is 
not new. PPP, however, brought the co-operation between the two parties to a different scale, 
mainly through the increase in participation of the private sector in the public infrastructure 
development as seen in PPP. The responsibility of the government to provide public 
infrastructure has shifted to the private sector through PPP. In adopting PPP, governments 
commonly propagate co-operation, justified by economic diversity. In detail, Chapter 2 
appraises the justifications for diversity offered by PPP that attracts governments to adopt 
PPP. The two main justifications are optimisation of risk, resources and responsibilities; and 
maximisation of value for the public sector. Despite wide recognition of these reasons for 
public authorities to employ PPP, there are concerns about the sincerity of governments in 
resorting for it. The structure of PPP from the contractual perspective is appraised, to 
complete the understanding of the concept. 
The research also examines benchmarks of PPP practice globally. As the UK has been 
identified as the leading PPP practitioner, section 2.8 analyses in depth the history and 
evolution of PPP in that country, before turning to the aim of the thesis, exploration of the 
aspects of Malaysian PPP, its history, evolution and current practice. The legal framework, 
policy, and regulation of PPP operation in Malaysia are considered and compared with the 
UK, where similarities are found in the history and evolution of PPP, the drivers for adopting 
it, and its evolution from the privatisation programme.  
7.2.1 Research Objective 1: To Understand and Analyse PPP Procurement Process 
with Particular Reference to Competition 
The findings for Research Objective 1 were discussed in Chapter 3. As PPP is inherently a 
complex form of procurement, incorporating a competitive element in the process is no doubt 
an obstacle for government. Although the PPP procurement process is country-specific, the 
literature review showed that international experience considered competition as paramount, 
with most governments making significant efforts to incorporate it in PPP. Hence, the 
outcome expected from Research Objective 1 was to analyse the practice of governments in 
incorporating competition within the PPP procurement process.  
In achieving Research Objective 1, Chapter 3 starts with understanding the concept and a 
definition of competition in general, concluding that the PPP market structure is a 
monopsony, with government as the sole buyer, facing multiple bidders as suppliers. Further 
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examination of the application of competition in PPP found that countries worldwide consider 
PPP as part of public procurement, to acquire goods, services or works, to be delivered to the 
public. In some countries this is clearly defined and regulated by specific laws for PPP 
implementation. 
The efforts made by the EU to uphold competition in public procurement and PPP can be 
considered as a cornerstone. The EU’s advanced competition policy provides a platform for 
companies for member states to compete equally and against any anti-competitive behaviour. 
The procurement procedures employed by the EU are identified as open tender, restricted 
tender, and negotiated procedures, and latest competitive dialogue, each fostered with a 
competitive element. The prequalification phase to shortlist bidders for negotiated procedure 
is notable. Chapter 3 also examined the different stages in the procurement processes and the 
element of competition incorporated within them. There is wide reporting of good practice in 
integrating measures to foster competition and to prevent anti-competitive behaviour within 
the different stages. These measures are important to regulate competition within PPP. In the 
EU directives on PPP, procurement processes are designed to achieve equality and public 
accountability. 
Research Objective 1 would not be completely satisfied without an appraisal of unsolicited 
proposal practice, presented as part of Chapter 3. On one side are countries which reject the 
practice of unsolicited proposal, and on the other are countries which manage to organise 
competitive bidding for unsolicited proposals, administered in various ways. The most 
common criticism of competitive bidding for unsolicited proposals concerns intellectual 
property rights, which seriously challenge participation and are time consuming. Despite 
criticism, within a robust framework unsolicited proposals are proven to be a catalyst in 
obtaining innovative infrastructure to meet public sector needs. Based on the results of the 
literature review outlined above, competition within the procurement process was identified, 
thereby achieving Research Objective 1.  
7.2.2 Research Objective 2: To Evaluate the Challenges to Incorporating 
Competition within PPP Procurement Process Globally 
Research Objectives 2 was addressed through the comprehensive literature review in Chapter 
3, identifying the challenges faced by practitioners in advocating competition. Among the 
prominent barriers are the complex nature of PPP, the high cost of tendering, the lengthy 
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process, the possibility of renegotiation and legal issues such as intellectual property rights. 
As highlighted in the research problem, even though practitioners acknowledge the 
importance of competition within the procurement process, in many cases it is still 
inadequate, probably because these challenges hinder practitioners in employing it.  
Further evaluation of the challenges suggested that most of the countries attempt to address 
these challenges as competition remains relevant. For example, to encourage bidders to 
participate, some countries have introduced compensation to cover the cost incurred in 
bidding. Another example is the introduction of competitive dialogue (EU member states) and 
interactive tendering (Australia) to address the complex nature of PPP. The effort 
demonstrated by governments to overcome these challenges suggests that competition within 
the procurement process is essential. This is in line with the suggestion by KPMG Corporate 
Finance (Aust) Pty Ltd (2010), that lack of competition within the procurement process 
prevents the governments from obtaining best value for money from PPP. 
The findings from this exercise leave no doubt that, despite the challenges to advocating 
competition within the procurement process, the determination of governments in stimulating 
competition within the market is essential. Although PPP escalates the involvement of the 
private sector in public procurement, the government should always uphold competition to 
ensure efficiency and safeguard the interests of the public.  
7.2.3 Research Objective 3: To Appraise and Synthesise PPP Procurement Process 
with Particular Reference to Competition Adopted by the Malaysian 
Government for Infrastructure Delivery 
Research Objective 3 was accomplished through a combination of two sources of evidence: 
document review and interviews. It focuses on comprehending the less-known procurement 
process employed by UKAS for the government of Malaysia in procuring and delivering 
infrastructure. Any existing gap identified in the current practice is filled by the formulation 
of the framework in Chapter 6. A series of reviews were conducted on official publications 
and unpublished documents produced to support the implementation of UKAS PPP. While 
these documents are authoritative documents, they do not specify the details of the 
procurement process employed by UKAS. Basically, the information provided in the 
documents differs, yet they have to be read together, mutatis mutandis. The lack of clarity of 
in these documents frequently results in inconsistent practice by UKAS.  
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The outcome of the interviews revealed that the generic nature of the UKAS documents is 
indeed intentional. The purpose is to allow flexibility within procurement under the belief that 
it encourages innovation. On the basis of the findings from the case study, UKAS has been 
governing its procurement process flexibly but not necessarily according to the Malaysian 
public procurement regulations. The justification given was that UKAS PPP is non-public 
procurement and does not fall under the jurisdiction of public procurement regulations, even 
though it was found that the UKAS guidelines state that UKAS PPP is part of public 
procurement. The absence of specific PPP law and clear definition of Malaysian PPP is 
clearly identified as a gap that contributes to this confusion. Nevertheless, UKAS does not 
violate any regulations as it operates with strong government support. Every decision for 
UKAS procurement process is referred to and decided by the cabinet, the highest executive 
authority in Malaysia.  
The result of the interviews revealed that for government-initiated proposals, UKAS 
employed open tender, restrictive tender, and direct negotiation with a single company. 
Although UKAS also resorts occasionally to prequalification, two-stage tendering with 
prequalification is not commonly used to shortlist bidders as the pool of PPP players is small 
and the process required is cumbersome. Shortlisted names are obtained from an existing 
database or from the relevant ministries. UKAS encourages unsolicited proposals by the 
private sector, with the probability of awarding the concession to the original proposer, 
justified by attracting private sector participation. UKAS experimented with some of the best 
practice mechanisms for introducing competition to unsolicited proposals, such as Swiss 
Challenge, but prefers to stay with direct negotiation.  
7.2.4 Research Objective 4: To Investigate the Relevance of Competition Within the 
PPP Procurement Process in Malaysia 
Research Objective 4 was achieved by addressing the relevance of competition in the PPP 
procurement process in the context of Malaysian experience. Through a detailed review of 
authoritative UKAS documents, the relevance of competition was found to be limited. The 
sole document emphasising a competitive procurement process is the earliest one, the 
Privatisation Master Plan. However, actual practice does not follow all the guidelines of this 
Plan.  
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The relevance of competition within UKAS was therefore appraised through the interviews 
conducted. As analysed in Chapter 5, without hesitation most respondents agreed and 
recognised that competition is relevant within the UKAS procurement process. This is in line 
with the evidence of Ismail (2013) that competitive tender is perceived as the most important 
measure to achieve value for money for UKAS. Through the interviews, respondents also 
stressed that, despite the relevance of competition within the procurement process, UKAS 
faces a challenge in striking a balance between the economic drivers of PPP and the national 
agenda, hindering the actual practice of competition within procurement. 
Research Objective 4 looks further into the challenges faced by UKAS in incorporating 
competition within its procurement process. As discussed in Chapter 6, several constraints are 
faced by UKAS in enforcing competition, one of them being the national agenda. The New 
Economic Policy, which requires the government to manage the manner of competition, is 
organised within the UKAS procurement process. UKAS and the cabinet have not been 
consistent in upholding competition to accomplish all the drivers highlighted in Chapters 5 
and 6, resulting in an accusation of ethical misconduct and concern over the accountability of 
UKAS practice.  
Further investigation, however, revealed that competition involves more than achieving 
economic benefits. As UKAS and the cabinet are still exercising public power, using public 
resources and providing services to the public, PPP by UKAS is very much part of public 
procurement and hence accountable to the taxpayer. In addition, having identified that under 
Malaysian law, UKAS and the cabinet are not allowed to exercise their powers and discretion 
unfettered, competition within the procurement process comes into play. Competition rules 
within the procurement process are a substantive mechanism to ensure the achievement of 
good governance within UKAS, and competition will also safeguard public interest and 
maximise value added for the taxpayers. In general, the relevance of competition has been 
answered through evidence and discussion presented in Chapters 5 and 6, thereby achieving 
Research Objective 4. 
7.2.5 Research Objectives 5: To Develop and Validate a Competition-Based PPP 
Framework Which Targets Improvement for Malaysian PPP 
The findings from Research Objectives 1, 2, 3 and 4 are the basis for development of the 
frameworks required in order to accomplish Research Objective 5. Investigation for the 
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research objectives allowed the researcher to examine the best practice and challenges for 
competition within the procurement process globally, before focusing on the Malaysian 
situation. Several propositions were put forward. First, the holistic responsibility of UKAS to 
satisfy the country’s need for socio-economic engineering through PPP is addressed by the 
proposed frameworks which allows UKAS to achieve accountability without having to 
abandon any of its drivers.  
The second proposition is that current UKAS practice gives the cabinet absolute discretion of 
powers. The public power held by UKAS and the cabinet in administering PPP needs to be 
stewarded with appropriate regulations so that it is not exercised unfettered, hence 
safeguarding the interests of the public. To address this proposition, competition is 
incorporated to regulate the procurement process and to uphold its integrity. The proposed 
frameworks are designed to induce and enhance current competition while preventing anti-
competitive behaviour; with the measures proposed in the frameworks, it will be better 
regulated, with a higher standard of administration for PPP in Malaysia.  
The third proposition, while conceding some scepticism with competitive procurement in 
Malaysia, is that the identified constraints, such as lengthy procedures, high cost of bidding 
and the bona fides of bidders, exist even with the current non-competitive framework. Hence 
the only difference with the introduction of a competitive procurement process is that 
government will obtain the benefits of competition. The research nevertheless identified that 
certain situations may not be suitable for a competitive procurement process; if that is the 
case, there are other options for UKAS. The development of the competition-based 
frameworks resulted in partial achievement of Research Objective 5. 
Another outcome expected from Research Objective 5 is validating the frameworks developed 
throughout this research, and the validation exercises conducted with identified stakeholders 
received positive feedback. Respondents representing the main stakeholders: taxpayers, 
UKAS, practitioners and clients, agreed and applauded that the frameworks will enhance 
current competition within UKAS procurement. Revisions were made to the frameworks, with 
the addition of the authority involved conveying the message better and avoiding confusion. 
The final version of the frameworks was shown diagrammatically in Figures 6.30 and 6.31 in 
section 6.8.1. Developing and validating the framework indicates the accomplishment of 
Research Objective 5.  
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7.3 Research Contribution 
The case study on competition policy within the procurement process for Malaysian PPP 
contributes to the field in several ways. The case study is impeccable, given its desire to 
achieve economic benefits from adopting PPP while maintaining the current policy of 
restricting competition due to the national agenda which engineers the socio-economy of its 
citizen. The question raised is whether PPP can achieve its best results when there is a limited 
competitive environment. This section presents the contributions made by this research.  
7.3.1 Contribution to Knowledge 
The research has made contributions to different dimensions of knowledge. 
a) In the context of PPP practice globally, this research adds to the existing
bundle of knowledge on PPP. Specifically, it adds valuable information to the
limited literature on Malaysian PPP through UKAS. This includes examination
of the current scenario of Malaysian PPP, providing a comprehensive
understanding of Malaysian PPP through UKAS. It includes the differences
between Malaysian PPP and other global practitioners and the multi-faceted
reasons for the current practice.
b) The methodology designed for this research can also be adopted by other
researchers to investigate similar problems in different countries.
c) At an early stage of the research, the researcher concluded that competition is
an essential element if PPP is to achieve value for money. Maintaining
competition in government procurement ensures taxpayers’ money is spent
wisely to obtain services or goods at a reasonable price. Competition is
incorporated within the PPP procurement process for its ability to achieve
economic benefits. Despite the relevance of competition, the researcher
identified a gap in organising and incorporating competition within the
procurement process.
d) This research concludes that Malaysian PPP has been able to introduce another
way of achieving value for money besides competitive tendering: by organising
a value management workshop. In fact, there is little information of similar
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practice globally, so this contributes to knowledge and is an opportunity for 
future research. 
e) In this research, findings were made on the accountability of UKAS PPP as
public procurement to taxpayers. It also become conscious of the unfettered
power held by the cabinet in the UKAS procurement process. This is the
antithesis of good governance, as it can lead to administrative abuse and ethical
misconduct. In addition, with the lack of transparency in the UKAS
procurement process, accountability practice is a major concern.
f) Besides achieving value for money through a competitive exercise, competition
is also seen as the main element in the framework to regulate the discretion
held by the cabinet within the UKAS procurement process and to achieve a
higher standard of good governance. Although this differs from the publicised
role of competition, the findings made here are a significant contribution to the
field of public procurement and public policy.
7.3.2 Contribution to Practice 
This research also contributes to practice, as summarised below: 
a) Drawing on the findings made during the course of the research, Chapter 6
presented frameworks for UKAS to enhance the competitive elements. For the
government of Malaysia, the frameworks are consistent with their motive for
adopting PPP, to achieve holistic goals through the adoption of PPP; using the
framework, they should not be concerned that any of the drivers are left out. As
Malaysia has been adopting a protective policy to encourage Bumiputera
companies, the frameworks contribute by broadening the perspective for
Bumiputera companies to compete with each other to develop their competitive
edge.
b) As good governance is demanded from public agencies and the government,
the competitive elements within the procurement process can serve as a
regulator ensuring relevant laws are compelled with in the interest of the
public. The application of this framework, which emphasises competitive
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elements, is expected to address criticisms of the practice of political 
patronage, rent seeking and unfairness in awarding contracts which are 
currently associated with government procurement awarded as a non-
competitive exercise. Reaching a high standard of good governance within the 
procurement process will improve the image of the government domestically 
and internationally, hence boosting the public perception and confidence of 
potential investors in the Malaysian PPP programme.  
c) The relevance of competition is recognised by most of the PPP practitioners,
and has been adopted by advanced practitioners to achieve value for money.
The competitive pressure created by the framework will lead to potential high-
quality bids at competitive prices, hence benefiting the government and the
taxpayers. In anticipation of application of the framework by UKAS, it is
hoped that UKAS will achieve equal benefit.
7.4 Research Limitations 
Despite the expected significance of the enhanced competition frameworks, the research is not 
without its limitations. Throughout this research the following challenges were encountered:  
i. In conducting the case study, the researcher sought to access a wide range of
material relevant to the subject matter, but was not allowed to see project files
and other internal procedure documents such as those on the tender evaluation
mechanism. Since most of the UKAS documentation is restricted, this presents
an obstacle and slightly affected the research design where it was planned to
cross-analyse the UKAS procurement process for launched concessions with
the authoritative documents. As most of the UKAS projects are still active,
UKAS decided not to disclose commercially sensitive material to the public,
including the researcher. Despite this limitation, the researcher obtained
information on UKAS procurement process from the experience of the
respondents.
ii. The research focused on the national issue of Malaysian PPP reflects in best
practice worldwide. However, PPP is largely a country-specific practice, and
the frameworks produced are based on the Malaysian scenario with a specific
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case study on the central PPP unit of the government; hence, application of the 
frameworks to other countries might need refinement according to their own 
context. Given the deliberately context-sensitive nature of the research, 
generalising the findings was not an aim, although countries with a similar 
context may adopt what seems best for them. As most countries have been able 
to benefit from a competitive procurement process, there is no reason why 
others should not be able benefit from their experience. 
Despite the listed shortcomings, the research outcomes satisfy the aim and objectives and 
have been validated. 
7.5 Future Recommendations 
The outcomes of the research are based on a specific aim and specific methodology adopted 
to fill the gap identified. Therefore, the researcher considers that this thesis is a first step to 
future research based on its findings. 
Further research should be conducted on the government’s priority of the drivers identified in 
adopting PPP, to identify genuine reasons. Although PPP can be a catalyst in achieving 
infrastructure, PPP is not panacea for all problems, and there are concerns on the 
shortcomings of PPP, such as the creation of heavy debt for the future.  
In response to the positive feedback and enthusiasm received for the competitive frameworks 
for UKAS, the possibility of integrating and testing these frameworks in an actual PPP 
concession should be considered by the next researcher. As people are concerned with the 
paradox of a lengthy process for a competitive procurement process, this is worth considering 
for future research, and may make the frameworks more robust. 
In line with a survey study conducted by Ismail (2013), this thesis has found that competition 
is indeed relevant within the procurement process, but with a slightly different result. 
Different methodology was used for the two studies. Further research using different research 
designs, for example the adoption of multiple case studies or grounded theory, would be 
interesting, to see whether the same results are obtained. The result from such a study would 
definitely benefit the Malaysian PPP industry as a whole. In addition, although the research is 
centred around Malaysian PPP, the research design and the framework could be applied in 
countries adopting PPP with additional drivers, such as India, Thailand, China and Indonesia. 
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7.6 Conclusion 
Although PPP is not the only way for governments to meet the demands for infrastructure, the 
findings suggest that it is a preferred solution worldwide, because it offers more diversity than 
traditional procurement. For example, in the traditional setting the public sector is responsible 
for financing the proposed infrastructure, but with PPP the responsibility has been shifted to 
the private sector. The procurement is also expected to overcome some of the other 
shortcomings to using traditional procurement, such as inefficiency and delay in projects. 
Nevertheless, PPP is as challenging as it is complex in nature. The relevance of conducting a 
competitive procurement process has been highlighted as essential in maximising the benefits 
of PPP. This research has been undertaken to synthesise the competition policy incorporated 
by PPP practitioners globally and to analyse the practice in Malaysia. The findings suggest 
that even though there are constraints in organising the competitive procurement process 
within PPP, new procedures such as competitive dialogue have been introduced to ensure that 
a competitive exercise takes place whenever possible. As PPP develops long-term contractual 
relationships, integrity in selecting the private partner should be assured.  
Despite PPP being introduced as recently as 2009, the involvement of the private sector as a 
partner in delivering infrastructure has already substantially benefitted the government of 
Malaysia. The study has confirmed that the government’s PPP programme is a continuation of 
the privatisation and PFI programmes. To label the Malaysian PPP programme as being at the 
stage of infancy is inaccurate. Taking the market maturity curve as a benchmark, Malaysia 
has already achieved the stage one attributes, most of the stage two attributes and is already 
executing some of the advanced attributes of stage three, that is already midway along the 
maturity curve in its PPP programme. If the success of the programme is measured by the 
infrastructure delivered, credit should be given to the government and UKAS for their 
achievements to date, through working with the private sector from privatisation to PPP. 
It is important to stress that the implementation of Malaysian PPP by UKAS is not 
straightforward. It is deployed by the government as one of the vehicles through which to 
achieve the aim of the New Economic Policy: an ethnicity-based affirmative-action policy 
designed to re-engineer the socio-economy of the people. In spite of criticism of the policy, 
the government’s role and responsibility are holistic. The findings from this study suggest 
that, to kick-start the programme and drive industry, UKAS has been flexible in its 
procurement process where it is fully supported by cabinet ministers. The New Economic 
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Policy has been blamed for the lack of a competitive procurement process, but in fact the 
research findings suggest that the problem is not with the policy, but with its implementation. 
Nonetheless, given that the PPP programme has been in progress for some time, restructuring 
on the governance of the procurement process is necessary, to reflect the integrity and 
transparency of the implementation of the programme and maximise the benefits of adopting 
PPP. Additionally, an improved competitive policy within the procurement process is 
essential to safeguard the taxpayers’ money. Finally, the findings of this research provide 
useful guidance and valuable information on the competition practice within the procurement 
process, and the challenges faced within the global and Malaysian context. This research 
recommends the injection of a much-needed competitive element in the UKAS procurement 
process, without abandoning any of its drivers, thus maximising the benefits of adopting PPP.  
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Interview Guidelines for Research Entitled ‘Improving Competition within the Public 
Private Partnership (PPP) Procurement Processes in Malaysia’ 
Brief Description  
Malaysia has started to promote Public Private Partnership (PPP) as one of the Government’s 
procurement processes of choice. PPP has been identified as one of the best procurement 
options for the government to optimise its spending while obtaining better value for money 
through the private sector’s expertise and innovation. Another highlight of PPP is the sharing 
of risks between the public sector and private sector in different phases throughout the 
implementation of procurement. 
Competition in the PPP procurement process results in maximum innovation and efficiencies. 
Maintaining competition in government procurement ensures the taxpayers’ money is spent 
wisely as services or goods are obtained at a reasonable price. An effective competition policy 
in PPP also increases the rate of attracting the private sector to invest in PPP programmes. 
Hence the role of the government is vital in ensuring and stimulating competition in the 
procurement process. However, due to PPP’s complex characteristics, there is evidence that 
PPP lacks competition elements during the procurement process. With regard to this lack of 
competition, the research intends to analyse international and Malaysian PPP practices and the 
competition policies incorporated into the procurement process.  
The research aim is to develop a competition based framework for the PPP Procurement 
Process in Malaysia which could serve as a guideline to promote and uphold competition in 
the PPP procurement process. 
Interview Participants.  
The proposed participants are personnel involved directly or indirectly in the chosen 
projects/developments. They are from UKAS, shareholders, SPV companies, construction 
companies, sub-contractor companies, fund/finance providers, academicians, etc. due to their 
knowledge and involvement in PPP implementation by the UKAS. The participants are 
chosen based on their: 
i) Expertise in UKAS procurement process;
ii) Relevant experience of PPP project implemented by UKAS.
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A different set of questions will be given to individuals from UKAS personnel and other 
participants.  
Confidentiality 
All data and information shall be used for research purposes only with the informed consent 
to the organization involved and the participants. No personal information that may be used 
to identify the participants in the study, publications or public presentations associated with 
the research will be disclosed. Codes and/or pseudonyms will be used in the data where 
necessary to protect your identity and anonymity. 
Development of the PPP Competition Framework 
There are two research themes identified for this research which are Public Private 
Partnerships and Competition. The framework will be constructed through the analysis of 
information obtained from the interviews and other sources of evidence collected within the 
context of the research themes. Every participant is encouraged to express personal opinions 
and experience which will be highly valued in this research. A set of relevant interview 
guidelines will be sent to the participants before the interview takes place. 
The interview questions for UKAS personnel are as below: 
Research Themes Interview Questions Role in Study 
Introduction 
Could you please tell me how long have you 
worked with UKAS? 
Background of the respondent 
Could you elaborate your role and influence in 
the agency (UKAS)? 
Background of the respondent 
Public Private Partnership 
Can you clarify whether PPP is considered as 
Public Procurement? 
[Follow up question for both yes or no] Could 
you tell me the relevant statute, current 
guidelines, principles and regulations used? 
Understanding the current context of 
PPP implementation in Malaysia by 
UKAS 
What made the government focus and promote 
on the use of PPP? Any certain event? 
Understanding the Government policy 
goals and objectives 
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[Follow up question]  
How would you compare PPP procurement 
with other Government procurements for 
infrastructure delivery? Are there any problem? 
To identify other procurement 
constraints/benefits  
Could you elaborate on the procurement 
process determined by the agency (UKAS)? 
[Follow up question]  
Who were the main people in deciding the 
procurement process? Were they experts, 
leaders or decision makers. 
Understanding the social actors’ 
interpretations, influence and meaning 
put on decision making 
Competition 
How do you perceive the current competition 
policy applied and implied in the UKAS 
procurement process? 
[Follow up question]  
Tell me about the current guidelines, principles 
and regulations on competition implied and 
practiced by the agency (UKAS). Do you think 
it's enough? 
Understanding the current context of 
implementation of competition by 
UKAS 
Who determined whether a proposal is feasible 
and acceptable? Can you please give an 
insight or view of a decision making process 
(objectives, rationale & argument) to choose 
the most appropriate private partner for a 
project/development? 
[Follow up question ]  
Could you tell me the relevant statute, current 
guidelines, principles and regulations used? 
Understanding the rationale/justification 
of the decision making process by 
UKAS 
Does UKAS receive many unsolicited 
proposals? 
Could you elaborate how UKAS dealt with 
unsolicited proposals? 
Understanding UKAS method to deal 
with unsolicited proposals 
According to the Malaysian Ministry of Finance 
(MoF) Circular (PK 1/2013 or SPP 4/1995), in 
line with the New Economic Policy, Bumiputera 
companies are given priority in the government 
procurement. Does this circular apply to PPP?  
Understanding the Bumiputera policy 
applied and implied in UKAS PPP 
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Could you elaborate in detail the 
implementation of this circular and any relevant 
Bumiputera policy in PPP implementation? 
In general do you think competition is 
important in PPP implementation?  
[Follow up question] 
How about in Malaysian PPP? 
To ascertain the importance of 
competition in PPP implementation. 
What are the barriers faced in implementing 
competition in Malaysian PPP? 
To ascertain the importance of 
competition in PPP implementation. 
Suggestions/Opinions/View 
What would you suggest to improve UKAS 
PPP?           
What other information do you think I might be 
interested in? Would you like to share with 
me? 
Thank you for your time and cooperation. For any clarification and queries regarding this 
study, you can contact the researcher or the supervisor of the researcher as set out below:  
Researcher: 
Muhammad Imran Bin Zin Zawawi 
School of the Built Environment  
University of Salford,  
Manchester M5 4WT  
United Kingdom 
Email: m.i.zinzawawi@edu.salford.ac.uk 
Telephone: +447763543639 (UK) 
Supervisor: 
Professor Dr. David Eaton 
School of the Built Environment  
University of Salford,  
Manchester M5 4WT  
United Kingdom  
Email: D. Eaton@salford.ac.uk 
Telephone: +441612955222(UK) 
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Interview Guidelines for Research Entitled ‘Improving Competition within the Public 
Private Partnership (PPP) Procurement Processes in Malaysia’ 
Brief Description  
Malaysia has started to promote Public Private Partnership (PPP) as one of the Government’s 
procurement processes of choice. PPP has been identified as one of the best procurement 
options for the government to optimise its spending while obtaining better value for money 
through the private sector’s expertise and innovation. Another highlight of PPP is the sharing 
of risks between the public sector and private sector in different phases throughout the 
implementation of procurement. 
Competition in the PPP procurement process results in maximum innovation and efficiencies. 
Maintaining competition in government procurement ensures the taxpayers’ money is spent 
wisely as services or goods are obtained at a reasonable price. An effective competition policy 
in PPP also increases the rate of attracting the private sector to invest in PPP programmes. 
Hence the role of the government is vital in ensuring and stimulating competition in the 
procurement process. However, due to PPP’s complex characteristics, there is evidence that 
PPP lacks competition elements during the procurement process. With regard to this lack of 
competition, the research intends to analyse international and Malaysian PPP practices and the 
competition policies incorporated into the procurement process.  
The research aim is to develop a competition based framework for the PPP Procurement 
Process in Malaysia which could serve as a guideline to promote and uphold competition in 
the PPP procurement process. 
Interview Participants.  
The proposed participants are personnel involved directly or indirectly in the chosen 
projects/developments. They are from UKAS, shareholders, SPV companies, construction 
companies, sub-contractor companies, fund/finance providers, academicians, etc. due to their 
knowledge and involvement in PPP implementation by the UKAS. The participants are 
chosen based on their: 
i) Expertise in UKAS procurement process;
ii) Relevant experience of PPP project implemented by UKAS.
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A different set of questions will be given to individuals from UKAS personnel and other 
participants.  
Confidentiality 
All data and information shall be used for research purposes only with the informed consent 
to the organization involved and the participants. No personal information that may be used 
to identify the participants in the study, publications or public presentations associated with 
the research will be disclosed. Codes and/or pseudonyms will be used in the data where 
necessary to protect your identity and anonymity. 
Development of the PPP Competition Framework 
There are two research themes identified for this research which are Public Private 
Partnerships and Competition. The framework will be constructed through the analysis of 
information obtained from the interviews and other sources of evidence collected within the 
context of the research themes. Every participant is encouraged to express personal opinions 
and experience which will be highly valued in this research. A set of relevant interview 
guidelines will be sent to the participants before the interview takes place. 
The interview questions for other UKAS PPP practitioners are as below: 
Research Themes Interview Questions Role in Study 
Introduction 
Could you please tell me which organization 
you work for and its role under the PPP 
arrangement? 
Background of the respondent 
Could you please elaborate your role in the 
above said PPP projects/developments?  
Background of the respondent 
Public Private Partnership 
Which project has your organization been 
involved with?  
[Follow up question] 
Could you describe the procurement process 
involved? Are there any issues or problems? 
Understanding the industry 
practitioners experience with PPP 
implementation by UKAS 
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How do you view the current state of PPP 
implementation in Malaysia undertaken by 
UKAS? 
[Follow up question] 
How would you compare PPP procurement 
with other Government procurements for 
infrastructure delivery? 
Understanding the industry 
practitioners perception of 
implementation of PPP in Malaysia by 
UKAS 
What were the challenges faced by your 
organization in participating in PPP 
procurement managed by UKAS?  
Understanding the potential 
constraints/benefits of implementation 
of PPP in Malaysia by UKAS 
Have you been involved in other PPP projects 
with other organizations? 
[follow up question]  
How would you compare with PPP by UKAS? 
Compare and contrast the 
implementation of PPP in Malaysia by 
UKAS 
Competition 
How do you perceive the current competition 
policy implied in the UKAS procurement 
process? 
Understanding the current context of 
implementation of competition by 
UKAS 
What are the strengths of your organization’s 
proposals in the bidding exercise? 
[follow up question]  
Have you ever considered submitting an 
unsolicited? 
What are your strengths in doing so? 
Understanding the competitive 
advantages of an organization 
In general do you think competition is 
important in PPP implementation? 
[Follow up question]  
Do we need to enhance current practice of 
competition in PPP? 
Understanding the importance of 
competition in PPP implementation. 
Suggestions/Opinions/View 
What would you suggest to improve UKAS 
PPP?           
What other information that you think I might 
be interested in? Would you like to share with 
me? 
APPENDIX D  Set 2
277 
Thank you for your time and cooperation. For any clarification and queries regarding this 
study, you can contact the researcher or the supervisor of the researcher as set out below:  
Researcher: 
Muhammad Imran Bin Zin Zawawi 
School of the Built Environment  
University of Salford,  
Manchester M5 4WT  
United Kingdom 
Email: m.i.zinzawawi@edu.salford.ac.uk 
Telephone: +447763543639 (UK) 
Supervisor: 
Professor Dr. David Eaton 
School of the Built Environment 
University of Salford,  
Manchester M5 4WT  
United Kingdom  
Email: D. Eaton@salford.ac.uk 
Telephone: +44161295522
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Interview Guidelines for Research Entitled ‘Improving Competition within the Public 
Private Partnership (PPP) Procurement Processes in Malaysia’
Brief Description 
Malaysia has started to promote Public Private Partnership (PPP) as one of the Government’s 
procurement processes of choice. PPP has been identified as one of the best procurement 
options for the government to optimise its spending while obtaining better value for money 
through the private sector’s expertise and innovation. Another highlight of PPP is the sharing 
of risks between the public sector and private sector in different phases throughout the
implementation of procurement.
Competition in the PPP procurement process results in maximum innovation and efficiencies. 
Maintaining competition in government procurement ensures the taxpayers’ money is spent 
wisely as services or goods are obtained at a reasonable price. An effective competition policy 
in PPP also increases the rate of attracting the private sector to invest in PPP programmes.
Hence the role of the government is vital in ensuring and stimulating competition in the 
procurement process. However, due to PPP’s complex characteristics, there is evidence that 
PPP lacks competition elements during the procurement process. With regard to this lack of 
competition, the research intends to analyse international and Malaysian PPP practices and the 
competition policies incorporated into the procurement process. 
The research aim is to develop a competition based framework for the PPP Procurement 
Process in Malaysia which could serve as a guideline to promote and uphold competition in 
the PPP procurement process.
Interview Participants.
The proposed participants are personnel involved directly or indirectly in the chosen 
projects/developments. They are from UKAS, shareholders, SPV companies, construction 
companies, sub-contractor companies, fund/finance providers, academicians, etc. due to their 
knowledge and involvement in PPP implementation by the UKAS. The participants are 
chosen based on their:
i) Expertise in UKAS procurement process;
ii) Relevant experience of PPP project implemented by UKAS.
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A different set of questions will be given to individuals from UKAS personnel and other 
participants.  
Confidentiality 
All data and information shall be used for research purposes only with the informed consent 
to the organization involved and the participants. No personal information that may be used 
to identify the participants in the study, publications or public presentations associated with 
the research will be disclosed. Codes and/or pseudonyms will be used in the data where 
necessary to protect your identity and anonymity. 
Development of the PPP Competition Framework 
There are two research themes identified for this research which are Public Private 
Partnerships and Competition. The framework will be constructed through the analysis of 
information obtained from the interviews and other sources of evidence collected within the 
context of the research themes. Every participant is encouraged to express personal opinions 
and experience which will be highly valued in this research. A set of relevant interview 
guidelines will be sent to the participants before the interview takes place 
The interview questions for PPP experts are as below: 
Research Themes Interview Questions Role in Study 
Introduction 
Could you please tell me which 
organization/institution you work for? 
Background of the respondent 
Could you please elaborate your role in the 
development of PPP policy in UKAS? 
Background of the respondent 
Public Private Partnership 
How do you see the current state of PPP 
implementation in Malaysia undertaken by 
UKAS? 
Understanding the experts observation 
of implementation of PPP in Malaysia 
by UKAS 
What made the government focus and promote 
the use of PPP? Any certain event? 
[Follow up question]  
Whose interests were being promoted most? 
Understanding the expert’s assessment 
on government policy goals and 
objectives. 
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Participants inside the government or outside 
the government? 
Did you or your institution have the capacity to 
influence, inhibit or facilitate UKAS regulations 
or policy?  
[Follow up question]  
How about research regarding PPP? 
Understanding the influence of experts 
in implementation of PPP in Malaysia 
by UKAS 
Competition 
How do you perceive the current competition 
policy implied in the UKAS procurement 
process? 
Understanding the experts view of 
implementation of competition by 
UKAS 
In general do you think competition is 
important in PPP implementation? 
[Follow up question] 
Do we need to enhance current practice of 
competition in PPP? 
Understanding experts view on the 
importance of competition in PPP 
implementation. 
Suggestions/Opinions/View 
What would you suggest to improve UKAS 
PPP?           
What other information that you think I might 
be interested in? Would you like to share with 
me? 
Thank you for your time and cooperation. For any clarification and queries regarding this 
study, you can contact the researcher or the supervisor of the researcher as set out below:  
Researcher: 
Muhammad Imran Bin Zin Zawawi 
School of the Built Environment  
University of Salford,  
Manchester M5 4WT  
United Kingdom 
Email: m.i.zinzawawi@edu.salford.ac.uk 
Telephone: +447763543639 (UK) 
Supervisor: 
Professor Dr. David Eaton 
School of the Built Environment  
University of Salford,  
Manchester M5 4WT  
United Kingdom  
Email: D. Eaton@salford.ac.uk 
Telephone: +441612955222(UK)
